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20 FEBRUARY 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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20 FEBRUARY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW ON U.S. PLANS TO DEPLOY SDI IN 1994

TASS Report

LD261725 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 26 Jan 87

[Washington's "Space Rubicon"--TASS Headline]

[Text] Moscow, 26 January (TASS)--TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

In the past few days the "star warriors" have grown dramatically more active in the United States, demanding a transition from research into space strike weapons to their deployment. At a seminar organized for the President in the White House, Pentagon officials tried hard to demonstrate that an "initial" system of "Star Wars" weapons could be deployed as early as 1994. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and his lieutenants claim "dramatic results" from the work already done on SDI so that the "first phase" weapons can be deployed within the next few years. Next March, as the newspaper THE BOSTON GLOBE has just reported, the White House chief will be given concrete recommendations on the development of two "tiers" of the system one space-based and other ground-based, between 1991 and 1994.

All this shows the fright of the "Star Wars" proponents over the fact that the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik raised the cause of nuclear disarmament to an unprecedentedly high level and at the same time demonstrated the fallacy of the American SDI programme. That is why Washington is in such a hurry to put up the ultimate barrier to every effort to advance arms control. Administration officials are seeking to block compromises at the Soviet-American Geneva talks and to make President Reagan go back on his promise, given in Reykjavik, to honour the ABM Treaty for another 10 years.

SDI proponents would like to guarantee continued work on that dangerous programme regardless of the findings of further research. They want "to put their markers" in the space Klondike so that the Star Wars programme could not be scrapped by future U.S. Administrations, as Attorney-General Edward Meese [name as received] frankly stated. They also are in a hurry to tip strategic parity in favour of the U.S. as soon as possible and develop in addition to the nuclear first-strike potential any "shield," even a leaky one, behind which those given to armed ventures would feel themselves more confident or, in other words, more brazen.

It cannot be ruled out either that one of the purposes of the ongoing campaign is to break the resistance of at least some of those congressmen and senators who are opposed to SDI and to secure the appropriation of the funds needed by the military-industrial complex for the programme already in the immediate future. The "Star Wars" advocates seem to fear in all seriousness that, as the absurdity of SDI makes itself felt, less and less money will be appropriated for it. At the same time Washington is trying to make the American and world public believe that the fulfillment of SDI is "inevitable" and that for this reason it is late and useless to protest against it.

SDI, THE WASHINGTON POST wrote the other day, if for Ronald Reagan what the pyramids were to the Egyptian pharaohs: It should perpetuate the President's grandeur. But SDI leads to the dramatic escalation of the risk of nuclear war -- sanctioned, unsanctioned or accidental -- a war after which neither "space pyramids," nor the United States nor anything else will be left in the world. When SDI begins to be deployed, the ABM Treaty along with every hope of the peoples for the abolition of nuclear weapons will be buried, a race with space weapons will be launched and strategic arms arsenals will begin to be built up even speedier. That is why those who demand the deployment of SDI weapons actually want the presidential legacy in the form of rubble -- the rubble of treaties and agreements, the rubble of missed opportunities to build a safe world, the rubble of human civilization as a whole.

PRAVDA on SDI Deployment

PM221139 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[Gennadiy Vasilyev "Commentator's Column": "In A Hurry"]

[Text] New York -- Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington the other day, Defense Secretary C. Weinberger pressed for the speediest U.S. deployment of space weapons.

Earlier, THE WASHINGTON POST reports, the Pentagon head and his most zealous subordinates, including General J. Abrahamson, who is in charge of the SDI program, and Assistant Secretary R. Perle, had held an unusual seminar for President Reagan in the White House. Using plans and diagrams, they had demonstrated to the President that an "initial" space weapons system can be deployed by 1994.

The "Star Wars" supporters are clearly in a hurry. Pentagon officials, arms manufacturers, and ultrarightist organizations have launched a vigorous campaign to speedily "cross the Rubicon" -- passing from research and design work in the space weapons sphere to their actual deployment in near-earth space.

Why such a rush? The answer to this question is given by that pillar of the U.S. extreme right-wing forces Attorney General E. Meese. The SDI enthusiasts, he said, are in a hurry to switch to the practical implementation of their plans so that "future administrations are unable to demolish" this plan. That's putting it frankly.

They are also in a hurry because in the U.S. Congress, where there was already serious opposition to the most militarist aspects of administration policy, criticism of SDI has been mounting further since the recent midterm elections, which brought success to the Democrats. In fact, SDI, to quote Senator Albert Gore, is merely a formula for the path leading to an "even faster arms race and the end of any meaningful efforts in the arms control sphere."

It is difficult not to agree with this view. The start of the deployment of elements of space systems will undermine the ABM Treaty and destroy the peoples' hopes of strategic arms cuts. As is known, it was Washington's stubborn reluctance to confine SDI work to the laboratory which was one of the chief obstacles to the achievement of important decisions in Reykjavik paving the way to a nuclear-free world. The Washington hawks' efforts to impose on the United States plans for starting the deployment of space weapons soon can only be seen as an attempt by the Pentagon to deal a further body blow to the peoples' hopes.

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CSO: 5200/1246

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: WEINBERGER SPEECH NOTES AIMS TO DEPLOY SDI EARLY

LD231025 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0921 GMT 23 Jan 87

[Text] Washington, 23 Jan (TASS) -- Speaking in Colorado Springs (Colorado), U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated the Reagan administration may soon take the decision on deployment [razvertyvaniye] of weapons of the first phase of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) by the start of the 1990s. According to the ABC television company, the Pentagon boss said these involve space-based kinetic weapons, and ground-based antimissile systems. He asserted "dramatic results" have been achieved in experiments connected with SDI.

The television company provides the following explanation for the speeches of the U.S. defense secretary in support of a speedy start to deployment of "Star Wars" weapons, which have recently sharply increased in frequency: "Weinberger considers that taking the decision on deployment of SDI will make it difficult for the subsequent administration to renounce it. According to what has been said by the secretary's assistants, his speech was previously approved by Frank Carlucci, the President's national security adviser. This assumes the White House is ready to start its latest big campaign in support of SDI".

Observers call attention to the administration's departure from its previous statements that all necessary research would be conducted before it made the decision on deploying [razvertyvaniye] SDI. Now, however, persistent calls are being heard from official Washington for a stage by stage deployment of the Star Wars system as soon as possible or in other words, they should not wait for the completion of research work on that program.

This was virtually confirmed by General James Abrahamson, director of the organization implementing the Strategic Defense Initiative. Commenting on reports which had appeared concerning the possibility of a stage by stage deployment of individual components of SDI as they are developed [razrabotka], he said, "We are carefully studying this concept." Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, pointed out that to achieve the planned timetable for deploying SDI components it would be necessary within the next few months to take the decision which would aid movement towards this aim.

As the press remarks, one of the aims of this new propaganda campaign is to get the U.S. public used to the idea of the inevitability of the full-scale implementation of the Star Wars program.

Opposition is growing in the U.S. Congress to such dangerous plans of the administration. Congressmen Les Aspin, Charles Bennett, Marvin Leath and Nicholas Mavroules on Wednesday expressed themselves opposed to satisfying the request of the White House for the allocation in the 1987 financial year of additional appropriations for the "Star Wars" program. At a joint press conference they came out in favor of the United States' observance of the ABM Treaty. A day before a press conference was held by Senators William Proxmire and Bennett Johnston, at which they criticized plans for the deployment of the first components of the ABM space system already at the beginning of the nineties. As Johnston stated, "the U.S. Congress will not assign money" for these purposes.

"'Star Wars' for Reagan," writes THE WASHINGTON POST observer Mary McGrory "is the same as the pyramids were for the Pharaohs, or the colosseum for the Roman emperors. It is a monument which would perpetuate the grandeur of the President. However, scientists consider SDI an extremely unreliable and destabilizing invention, which is not a protective umbrella for 'the good guys,' but a game of chance for politickers with the aim of blocking the attainment of any serious agreement on arms control."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS ON BASIC GOALS OF SDI PLANS

LD222024 Moscow TASS in English 2020 GMT 22 Jan 87

["Mad Hopes of "Star Wars" Protagonists" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

In the less than four years since President Ronald Reagan announced his "Strategic Defense Initiative," the scope and character of that program and the timeframe for the deployment of first strike weapons in outer space have been revised several times.

Washington no longer recalls the promise made by Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983, to make nuclear weapons "impotent and outdated." Intensive work on the development of space strike weapons is going hand in hand in the U.S. with a strenuous buildup of nuclear systems, both ground-based and submarine-launched. Plans are being made, too, for fitting out space systems with nuclear warheads. The recognition of the destabilizing character of the buildup of both offensive and ABM systems in the U.S., made by the President himself, has been forgotten as well.

Americans are no longer promised a "dependable shield" against retaliation. The Pentagon now allows for the possibility that hundreds and even thousands of devastating warheads will penetrate the American ABM defenses. Emphasis has been shifted to the protection of American command centres, nuclear arms depots, missile silos, atomic reactors and similar targets.

In December 1986, President Reagan was presented with another version of the "Star Wars" program, which envisioned the deployment of the "first echelon" of large-scale ABM defenses as early as 1994. The goal of that plan is to expedite transition from research into extensive ABM defenses to the practical deployment of space systems so that, as U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese put it, the program could not be harmed by succeeding administrations.

In spite of all those revisions, however, the basic goals of the U.S. "Star Wars" program remain unchanged. Some American specialists note that the "fundamental goal" of the SDI program is to tip the existing balance of forces and achieve military superiority for the U.S.

Another goal of the program is to offer unprecedented profits to the tycoons of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Last but not least, the "Star Wars" protagonists in Washington hope to drag the Soviet Union into a race with costly and senseless ABM weapons and thus thwart the program for the renovation and reorganization of the Soviet economy. An adviser to the U.S. President and one of the more zealous proponents of the militarization of space, Edward Teller, hopes that SDI will make the Soviet Union dramatically increase its defense spending. If the USSR begins to deploy an ABM system of its own, Teller says, SDI can be considered justified.

Only one of those three goals can be considered realistic: The current U.S. Administration really can enrich American arms merchants -- but even that on the condition the U.S. population offers no serious resistance to these plans.

As for the White House's hopes to achieve military superiority or bleed the Soviet Union white in a race with space weapons, they are built on sand.

The Soviet Union will effectively counter the development of extensive ABM defenses in the U.S., but in ensuring its security, the Soviet Union, naturally, will not follow the mad scenarios drawn up in the Pentagon. It has been pointed out on more than one occasion that the Soviet Union's reply will be efficient, timely and far less costly than the American "Star Wars" program.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GENERAL LEBEDEV CITED ON SDI, ABM TREATY

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Major General Yu. Lebedev: "SDI--The Locomotive of the Arms Race"]

[Text] It will be 4 years this year since the U.S. president announced the development of the "Star Wars" program, which he euphoriously called the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Since that time it has not ceased to alarm the world. This program, which was advertized by its adherents as "a deliverer from nuclear ballistic missiles" heaps impassable obstructions in the path to a nuclear-free world. SDI was the main cause for the frustration of possible agreements in Reykjavik on reducing and in the final analysis even eliminating nuclear weapons. Aimed at deploying space strike weapons -- components of a broad scale ABM system, this program is torpedoing the limitless Soviet-American Treaty on Limiting Anti-Missile Defense Systems.

Ignoring historical experience, the real correlation of forces, and inevitable fateful consequences for the American people themselves, in Washington they believe that with the aid of space weapons they can devalue the Soviet nuclear potential for retaliation, make themselves "invulnerable" in a nuclear conflict. Counting on victory in a nuclear war and on satisfying their global pretensions -- herein lies the real threat of "Star Wars" for all mankind.

The SDI program is part of the U.S. military plans based on offensive nuclear strategy and aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR. It, this part, is called upon to implement an offensive strategic program which most fully meets the Pentagon's requirments for a first strike weapon. This weapon includes the latest intercontinental ballistic missile, the MX, and the planned Midgetman, the qualitatively new seabased Trident II missile, new types of strategic bombers, and an entire generation of cruise missiles with increased range and precision. Let us point out that all these systems of nuclear weaons exceed existing models in their effectiveness many times over.

In their characteristics space weapons created within the SDI framework cannot but be classed as offensive. They can be used for the suprise destruction of key space apparatuses of the opposite side (warning, communication and other

satellites), for "taking it unawares," thus depriving it of the possibility of retaliation against nuclear aggression. Some strike space weapons with a range of 4,000-5,000 km can destroy various ground facilities in several seconds.

Another thing is obvious too. The control over the complex of space armaments in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system will in practice be taken over by computers. Thus, the very existence of humanity will become a hostage of machines. Even the most perfect automatic systems are not immune to failures, malfunctioning, and just errors. In other words, in case of the realization of SDI the world military-strategic relations will depend on most complicated space robots hanging over the earth."

Leaders in the White House deceive themselves when they hope that with the help of "Star Wars," and a technological spurt they can achieve a breakthrough in the military sphere and impose their will on others, including the Soviet Union. Yet Washington's attempts are doomed to failure. The USSR has at its disposal all that it needs for dashing these adventuristic hopes.

However, in the new year, while space is still free from weapons, there remains the prospect of achieving a political settlement of the problem. The Soviet Union reaffirms that the proposals put forward by it in Reykjavik remain on the negotiating table, that we are ready for reaching mutually acceptable agreements, including on the consolidation of the regime of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and on the non-admittance of weapons to outer space. This would pave the way for scrapping nuclear weapons. In 1987 this country will continue to work for it with redoubled energy.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AIDE ON DANGERS OF SDI

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 86 p 3

[Article by Academician M. A. Markov, Hero of Socialist Labor, member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and chairman of the Soviet Pugwash Committee, under the rubric "Echoes of Reykjavik": "SDI: Conspiracy Against Peace"]

[Text] Nearly 30 years ago, when the bulging nuclear arsenals had already sharply raised the problem of scientists' responsibility for the fate of civilization, the famous Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued in which it was probably stated for the first time that with the appearance of nuclear weapons people should learn to think in a new way. For many years now I have studied this extremely urgent problem--the development of a new political thinking, which in our day has become an urgent necessity and a command of the times. In particular, nine years ago the magazine VOPROSY FILOSOFII carried my article "Have We Learned to Think in a New Way?" in which I attempted to analyze why such thinking was vitally necessary to humanity.

Indeed, before the appearance of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction it was believed that war was a continuation of politics. But people created nuclear weapons, and their use in the event of war threatens the destruction of all humanity. War can no longer be a continuation of politics, since politics will simply cease to exist after a nuclear war. A world war must be avoided at any cost, and in order to do so a new political thinking is necessary.

How can war be avoided? In general this is part of a broader problem--the problem of the peaceful coexistence of the two opposing social systems. U.S. President Reagan put forward the idea of a global solution of this problem: the technical solutions known by the name "Strategic Defense Initiative" or the "star wars" program. In the opinion of President Reagan and his closest advisers, it is perfectly feasible to create a military technical system that would make nuclear disaster impossible.

In my view, this is an attempt to solve the problem of coexistence in a one-sided fashion that takes only the United States' interests into account. The Soviet Union continues to be regarded as the source of all evil on the planet (a kind of "evil empire," to use the expression of the American president

himself), and the task is set of protecting the United States from it with a palisade of missile and space systems. We'll protect ourselves, they say, and you do as you like.

By its very nature the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI for short, does not presuppose negotiations on arms reductions. Negotiations are admissible, but merely pro forma and fruitless negotiations that camouflage the United States' military preparations.

Apologists for SDI claim that SDI is a purely technical concept that has nothing to do with politics. This is not the case. After all, SDI is at the center of serious political problems that fundamentally contradict the idea of peaceful coexistence and detente.

Judge for yourself. The implementation of SDI will require huge monetary outlays. How can the money be gotten from the taxpayers? By the tried and true method of frightening them with the danger of communism, the "Soviet threat." This is already a political reality. Furthermore, it is believed in the United States that the Soviet Union, if it undertakes to create an analogous system, will also have to spend huge sums. Washington politicians link with this the hope of exhausting our country economically in an arms race. But this is also a political factor.

In the urge to attain military superiority, the United States is, naturally, attempting to make scientific and technological progress more difficult in the countries that are its potential adversaries. Hence the policy of embargoes, trade restrictions and curtailment of scientific ties.

And the main thing: SDI is not a matter of the near future. It is a program geared to many years. And what happens in the meantime? In the meantime there is a race in traditional nuclear arms, and it is developing exceptionally widely. Let me cite just the main U.S. strategic programs: the MX, the Midgetman, the Trident, the Stealth, etc. Thus, SDI is a political concept that is, to all intents and purposes, the global antithesis to detente and proves to be a unique variety of the cold war.

Yet another argument of supporters of SDI is that SDI is an exclusively defensive program. Incidentally, using such arguments they have succeeded in finding a good many supporters. But a question arises: Does a tank's armor serve defensive or offensive purposes? And what about the invisible airplane on the creation of which the United States is working? The fact that it cannot be detected with radar--is that for the purposes of defense or aggression? At one time mines were made of metal and could be found with a mine detector, but then they started to be made in wooden and plastic cases. Incidentally, during the war I worked on an instrument that would find nonmetallic mines.

SDI is of the same nature. Let's suppose that the space weapon has been created and deployed. Under cover of the "space shield" a large number of the adversary's missile units are destroyed. Not all of them will be destroyed; moreover, the more there were in the first place, the more will remain unharmed. So if you begin the full-scale development of SDI, there can be no

consideration of any reduction in the number of missiles. And the converse is also true: The fewer missiles the adversary has, the more likely they are to be destroyed with a nuclear strike. This is precisely why, in arguing insistently for a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union considers the restriction of SDI to laboratory research to be an essential condition for such a reduction.

History shows that for every type of weapon a counterweapon is always found. And a response to SDI, if necessary, will also be found; moreover it will not necessarily entail the creation of an analogous system. This has been stated repeatedly by the leaders of our country. But there is one other danger that SDI entails--the movement of the arms race to a new area that has never before been used for military purposes, i.e., to space. In order to create fundamentally new weapons systems, tests are needed. This is the reason for the United States' stubborn refusal to cease underground nuclear explosions, which are required for perfecting the components of space weapons. They are the energy source for the devices involved. Under the influence of public opinion, voices were starting to ring out in the U.S. Congress proposing to limit the power of explosions. And at the Pugwash Conference some American scientists tried to persuade us that explosions of less than one kiloton in power were harmless, that they would not make it possible to perfect elements of SDI. But one wonders: why, then, are they needed at all? The ending of underground nuclear explosions is a pledge that not only the realization of SDI but the perfection of ordinary nuclear weapons will be made substantially more difficult.

The greatest danger of the arms race lies in the qualitative development of weapons. It is precisely the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons that has proved a powerful destabilizing factor every time in international relations. Recall how multiple independently targeted missile warheads once complicated the international situation and how the appearance of tactical nuclear weapons made negotiations more difficult. And what about the neutron bomb? If SDI is carried out, the arms race threatens to get completely out of control.

There is one more serious danger. I won't get into the technical details, but I shall say that with the implementation of SDI the risk of an unsanctioned, accidental nuclear war would increase. In order to deploy space weapons it would be necessary to create computers of unprecedented power that would survey extremely complex space and earth observation systems in lightening speed and identify the nature of thousands of objects. On the other hand, the qualitative improvement of military technology is leading to the fact that the time left for taking a counter decision is growing smaller and smaller. Therefore, man is compelled to entrust the right to decide and instantaneously carry out the decisions that are taken to a machine. But there is a physical law according to which the number of misfires and erroneous solutions made by a computer initially declines as the systems used grow more complex but then increases as the tasks set for the computer grow more complex. In other words, the future destiny of man, according to the SDI variant, is supposed to be decided not by human reason but by a soulless robot, a "mechanical" construction that science knows, in principle, cannot be absolutely reliable. So SDI represents the possibility of destroying humanity with a robot created by man himself.

In opposition to this very complex, costly and, most important, unreliable program, the Soviet Union puts forward a simple idea: if there are no nuclear weapons, there won't be a nuclear war.

This is the essence of our peace policy and the Soviet leadership's comprehensive peace proposals. The summit meeting in Reykjavik gave humanity the most realistic chance, in contrast to the fantastic and dangerous idea of SDI, to do away forever with the Damoclean Sword of the threat of universal nuclear destruction. Despite the fact that agreements were not reached in Reykjavik, the historical significance of the meeting is extraordinarily great: The Soviet proposals withstood rigorous examination in the discussions that took place and proved "on the verge of the adoption of major historic decisions." The package of Soviet peace proposals that were advanced in Reykjavik has had a great influence on the international antiwar movement and has shown the planet once again who really wants peace. The world public has also drawn its own conclusions from the fact that the negotiations "got stuck" precisely on the American Strategic Defense Initiative plan. This is of great importance, since Washington has so far managed to enlist its closest allies in work on SDI. But if the colossal money that it is planned to spend on carrying out SDI were allocated to civilian branches and the development of the fundamental sciences, the effect from the development of new technologies would be no less. I know this from the experience of the development of new technologies in basic research on the properties of matter.

Of course, the idea of SDI also has powerful support on the part of the corporations that earn fabulous profits in the production of military hardware. The monopolies need new orders. Understandably, they will not let the possibilities connected with the production of equipment for "star wars" get away. After all, the undertaking is bound up with trillions in profits! This is why the U.S. administration will not so readily agree to disarmament and the abandonment of SDI. Pressure, the most serious pressure of public opinion, is needed here.

The foreword to the book "Security for All," written by Olof Palme, the late prime minister of Sweden, has a sentence that indisputably contains a certain truth: "Disarmament will scarcely ever come about," Palme writes, "if peoples wait for initiatives on the part of governments and experts. It can become a reality only as a result of the expression of the political will of people in many parts of the globe."

Recall what a widespread movement developed throughout the whole world in defense of heroic Vietnam, which was struggling against American aggression. If it had not been for the demand of world and American public opinion, the United States would not have ended that war.

The following opinion also exists: Don't we sometimes overestimate the role of the antiwar movement? For example, three years ago, when the question of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe was raised, the movement of the supporters of peace reached a grand scale, yet the European parliaments voted for the missiles all the same.

No, the antiwar movement has tremendous power. It simply proved insufficiently powerful that time. It was partially extinguished by Europeans' hope of success at the negotiations in Geneva, and President Reagan cleverly took advantage of that. I have repeatedly stated at Pugwash Conferences, and I still repeat that negotiations are good if they lead to concrete results. But negotiations are an evil when they drag on endlessly and reach an impasse, while nonetheless leaving people with the hope of a favorable outcome. It is distressing, but that situation seems to be repeating itself at the present time. What is required of Reagan and his advisers? That very new thinking that is so essential to humanity today.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: ROLE OF U.S. CIVILIAN RESEARCH IN SDI

Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences A. Avdulov, winner of USSR State Prize: "A Space Frankenstein"]

[Text] The "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program is spreading like a malignant tumor through the scientific research establishments of the United States. The leaders of SDI are encountering sharp resistance of scientists, who do not wish to participate in this peace-threatening adventure in universities and in other nongovernmental organizations. The pressure is even greater on governmental laboratories and research centers, the employees of which can simply be ordered to participate. They are financed by the government and are forced to adapt to its requirements. In the words of the Washington-based journal SCIENCE, "a kind of strategic defense, achieved by government employees who have survived more than one whimsey of the administration and who desire to survive this time as well, is unfolding." This is the state of affairs, for example, with the scientific organizations of the U.S. Department of Energy.

After supporting President Reagan's "Stars Wars" program, the civilian nuclear energy programs were pushed into the background and military space projects were advanced as the main tasks. One of the leading colleagues of the aforesaid department states directly: "The bright hopes of many managers of research programs are related to how they can connect their own work to SDI, since they will then be protected against budget reductions."

What do the organizers of SDI require of the power engineers? They primarily require sources of power for all types of military space stations. These stations will consume much more power than the artificial earth satellites or interplanetary spacecraft that have been launched into space orbits up until now. According to rather conservative estimates, generators with unit electric capacity of at least several hundred kilowatts are required for military space platforms. This is just to support functional capabilities, let us say, for housekeeping needs, without regard to the energy required to "fire" laser, beam and other weapons. And much greater capacity--from 100 to 300 megawatts--is required for military actions! This is approximately the power of a small modern power plant.

How then can such large-scale needs be supported? The modern artificial earth satellites and near-earth stations mainly use the power of solar cells. The

largest American spacecraft operating on these sources was the Skylab station and its cells produced approximately 15 kW. Onboard power sources with capacity of 60 kW are planned for the new station, which the United States is now developing and plans to launch in the mid-1990's. All this is much less than the power required for military purposes. Moreover, solar cells have large dimensions, they can be maneuvered, they are an easy target and they are not yet very reliable. For this reason, specialists generally feel that the given type of sources are unsuitable for military platforms. Another prospect, which was considered within SDI, was the use of chemical generators. They are capable of producing large power, but they are very cumbersome and heavy at the current level of technology. They simply cannot be launched into space. Moreover, they would release vapors which would affect the efficiency of laser emitters.

There remain radioactive sources, of which two versions are possible. First, there are the so-called radioisotope thermionic generators (RTG). They are widely used to supply power to the equipment of automatic stations, launched into deep space toward the distant planets of the Solar System and beyond. Radioisotope thermionic generators are not nuclear reactors, but are a set of metal capsules in which a radioactive element, for example, plutonium-238, is located. Heat is released during decay, being converted to electricity by semiconductor thermocouples. These generators have been installed on American interplanetary stations Voyager-1 and Voyager-2 and have been traveling in space for more than 10 years, and are installed on the Ulysses and Galileo stations, which were developed jointly by West European countries and the United States, and so on. Incidentally, Ulysses and Galileo stations were supposed to be launched this year by the Space Shuttle, but the catastrophe of one of them--the Challenger--resulted in that both stations are lying in the warehouse as dead cargo and it is unknown when they will be launched. Isotope generators are reliable and long-lived, but have low efficiency (approximately 93 percent of the released heat is wasted) and their power is insufficient for military purposes. The largest radioisotope thermionic generators produced up to 300 watts. An increase of power requires considerable quantities of plutonium and difficulties are arising with launch of generators into space on manned spacecraft due to the radiation hazard to the crew. There is of course another path--to supplement the radioisotope generators with a cooling system and turbogenerator. The U.S. Department of Energy is developing this project. A total of 16 million dollars was spent on it last year. But the expected power will be no more than 10 kW.

A second version of radioactive sources are nuclear reactors. The leaders of SDI are placing their main bet on them. A minimum of two models is planned. One is for the "fundamental needs" of military stations and the other is for total support, including power supply to weapons. We are talking about the second model, a multimegawatt model, only in the future tense, and development of it may require 10 to 20 years. But the first model--the SP-100--is planned for development by 1993. The chief of the Innovative Science and Technology Office for "Organization of SDI Implementation" J. Ionson regards this development as the cornerstone of power engineering of the entire "Star Wars" program. Approximately 20 million dollars was allocated to this project in 1986 and 72 million will be allocated for 1987. It has been proposed that another 23 million be expended on modernization of the laboratory building at Richland (Washington state), where ground tests of the reactor should begin in 1990. The cost of the ground tests themselves is estimated at 450 million dollars, while space flight tests are

estimated at 500 million dollars. The Organization for SDI Implementation gives out approximately half the enumerated sums, while the Department of Energy almost fully pays for the second half from its own funds. NASA receives the greatest share. This is a clear example of how "Star Wars" is absorbing much larger funds than Congress is officially allocating for it.

A number of government laboratories--in California, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, Ohio and Tennessee, and the already mentioned laboratory in Washington state and possibly in New York, will work on the project. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena will participate from NASA. How then should a space reactor look? Its main indicator is power. The task of producing 300 kW is posed. The preliminary design was oriented toward 100 kW by the end of operation in 1991, hence the name of the model--SP-100. But the requirements were reviewed last year and the deadline has been postponed somewhat.

The reactor should occupy half the volume of the payload compartment of the Space Shuttle. This compartment is 18.3 m long and 4.6 m in diameter in the standard version. It is desirable to retain the given dimensions, since both a military platform and space tug are to be placed in the spacecraft simultaneously with the reactor. After all, the Shuttle flies only in low near-earth orbits (on the order of 300-400 km at apogee), while the stations should be lifted much higher, up to geostationary orbits (36,000 km). The space tug--a one- or two-stage auxiliary rocket--is also designed to do this. It is possible that the combination of reactor, station and tug cannot be placed in the Shuttle. "We will then," says Vincent Truscello, the director of the SP-100 project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, "have to deliver each structure separately and assemble them in orbit."

Although no essentially new, still completely untried ideas have been placed in the reactor diagram, many problems must still be solved for the first time at the engineering level. This will be the "hottest" of any reactors in existence and its operating temperature is equal to 1,350°C. Uranium nitride, highly enriched by the uranium-235 isotope, will be used as fuel for the first time in a reactor designed for space and the coolant of the primary circuit will be liquid lithium, which will be in a solid state at the time of launch of the reactor. The coolant for the secondary circuit will circulate without a pump by a "heat pipe" radiator for the first time under conditions of weightlessness. Two independent, redundant circuits are supposed to be used for reliability for the first time in the reactor control system. The semiconductor electronic components will operate for the first time at these high temperatures, with these sharp temperature drops and with this high level of radiation. At the same time, despite unusually rigid operating requirements, the reactor is supposed to function without maintenance for no less than 7 years.

Although there are many difficulties, the reality of development raises no doubts among these specialists. There are differences in analysis of the possible deadlines of execution, but these are insignificant. Essentials are another thing.

Nuclear reactors, even those simply constructed on Earth with all the measures of safety, are always dangerous. A reactor which is supposed to be launched into space is even more hazardous. Everyone remembers the explosion of the Challenger

spacecraft on 28 January 1986. And what would have happened if there had been a nuclear reactor in its payload? What would have been the scales of the catastrophe then?

Neither NASA nor the Department of Energy has conducted experiments which would answer these questions. There are some data related to radioisotope thermionic generators rather than reactors and they give reason for caution. The generators were tested on special benches, where pressures similar to those which occur during an explosion were simulated. The pressure reached 75 kg/cm² and the radioisotope thermionic generator housing tolerated it without damage. It is designed for a pressure up to 154 kg/cm². But investigators conducted an experiment in 1983 under real conditions. According to calculations, the pressure was supposed to reach about 90 kg/cm², but it apparently was much higher, since the measuring apparatus went off the scale and failed. Specialists at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, using a computer model, calculated that the maximum pressure could reach 126 kg/cm², that is, still less than the calculated strength of radioisotope generators. However, the experimental results were catastrophic--the generator flew to pieces over an entire area measuring 75 x 200 m. The fuel elements (fortunately, they contained no real radioactive plutonium but only its replacement) were pulverized into such small fragments that not all of them could be completely assembled. Despite all attempts, only 70 percent of the mass of these elements was collected while 30 percent was scattered without a trace. This then was the cost of the calculated data and conditional tests.

Naturally, when NASA now states that the probability of an accident of the radioisotope generator or reactor is very low, on the order of 1 in 10 million, many people do not believe these words. After all, the same administration has given detailed figures for the Space Shuttle. "They were justified," wrote SCIENCE in March 1986, "until 2 months ago when the Shuttle exploded on the 25th launch."

Perhaps it is difficult not to agree with the chairman of one of the subcommittees of the House of Representatives E. Markey, who accused the Secretary of the Department of Energy J. Harrington that his agency "in attempting to militarize the programs for peaceful investigations of nuclear energy is creating a Frankenstein." (Footnote) (Frankenstein was the personage of the novel of an English writer of the last century, M. Shelley. A monster created by scientists to help people, in the end was transformed to a murderer and destroys his own creator) Both the project of a space nuclear reactor for military purposes and the entire American "Star Wars" program pose a lethal hazard to its creators.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA: JAPANESE PAPER TIES SPACELAB TO SDI

PM201259 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 87 Morning Editor p 4

[Report by own correspondent S. Agafonov under the rubric "Backstage of Events":
"'Spacelab': Makeweight for SDI?"]

[Text] Tokyo -- The Japanese newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN has front-paged an article about the widely billed U.S. program to create a space orbital station for peaceful purposes by the end of the nineties. But the question arises: Has this project been conceived for peaceful purposes?

Considering its declared civilian purpose, the West European countries, Canada, and Japan have eagerly associated themselves to the "Spacelab" project. There have already been several rounds of talks to specify their respective degree of participation in developing and operating the "space house" whose construction will cost 1.2 trillion yen. According to the preliminary agreement, Japan will be responsible for about one-third of this astronomical sum. In the budget for the next fiscal year Nakasone's cabinet has provided appropriations of 6.7 billion yen for this project.

It now emerges that upon verification the plan's "peaceful aims" have proved to be no more than a screen for enlisting partners. TOKYO SHIMBUN writes that facts have emerged recently attesting to the fact that it is the Pentagon which is most interested in the international project and which intends to take a direct part in the work of the space laboratory.

How serious these facts are is borne out by the official request which the Japanese Embassy in the United States has made to NASA. According to TOKYO SHIMBUN in the request the Japanese diplomats tried to ascertain whether that U.S. department would be involved in the "Spacelab" program. NASA's reply was highly characteristic: This question is being examined right now by U.S. government organs and the situation so far remains unclear. If we discard this fog of "lack of clarity" and put it more simply, NASA essentially confirmed that the Pentagon intends to occupy a key position in the program.

The Japanese mass media are writing of official Tokyo's mounting alarm over the "Spacelab" problem. The concern is understandable if you consider the acuteness of the negative reaction in Japan generated by the Nakasone cabinet's decision to associate itself to SDI. If it turns out that in addition to "Star Wars" Tokyo is taking part in another Pentagon space venture, then a political storm could erupt in the country against which even the conservative majority in the Japanese parliament will be unable to offer protection.

DO WE NEED TO SHARE "SPACELAB" WITH THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT? TOKYO SHIMBUN ASKS.

It is difficult to make a forecast in this case and better to await the development of events. It is already worth noting that Washington is not very sincere, to put it mildly, with its allies, and takes little account of them. One more conclusion is self-evident: In America today civilian projects are not held in honor. Only the Pentagon's blessing can lend them respectability.

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CSO: 5200/1246

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW REPORTS NEW ROUND OF GENEVA NST TALKS

Geneva Talks 'Turning Point'

LD171835 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 17 Jan 87

[Report by station correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev]

[Excerpt] The latest round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons has started in Geneva. Our correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev reports:

[Dmitriyev] The Soviet side submitted all-embracing proposals on November last year during the previous session. These follow from the large-scale disarmament program submitted by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbavhev and rely on the positive virtues of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. These proposals are now on the negotiating table. The belief of the Soviet delegation, headed by First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Mikhavlovich Vorontsov, is that the round which has just begun should be a turning point in resolving the set tasks. At a press conference, held at the Soviet Mission, representatives of the USSR have stressed the need for a very rapid achievement of accords and for work to be carried out in a constructive spirit. They expressed the hope that the U.S. delegation would take the same approach. [passage omitted]

Delegations Prepare Draft Documents

PM261403 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "The Geneva Talks"]

[Text] Geneva, 24 Jan -- Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons continue in Geneva.

A number of working meetings took place last week within the framework of the groups on space, strategic offensive weapons, and medium-range nuclear means, which began work on the preparation of joint draft documents.

Detailed conversations are being held between delegation heads and group leaders.

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CSO: 5200/1256

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: BULGARIAN MINISTER PRAISES JANUARY 1986 CALL

LD131449 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Sofia, 13 January (TASS)--The statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January last year is a document of immense historical importance and a concrete programme for the solution of the outstanding problems of our time by the year 2000, Lyuben Gotsev, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of Bulgaria, said in a TASS interview. It is a manifestation of new political thinking, called for by socialism.

The Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the current century led to a series of concrete initiatives produced by the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries in the political, military, economic and humanitarian fields. They resounded openly and clearly in Geneva, Stockholm, Reykjavik, Berne, Vienna, and also at the United Nations.

Lyuben Gotsev expressed his regrets over the fact that some Western countries, including the U.S., had not yet embraced positions of realism in their political thinking. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik and developments since that time have supplied a graphic example of two different approaches to world affairs. A hide-bound political thinking and anti-communism of the American neoconservatives and the mercenary interests of the military-industrial complex have sent the "hawks" in the U.S. and some individual West European countries into a counteroffensive. They have set out to distort, subvert and revise the agreements that have been achieved. All those efforts have been made to block the implementation of the ideas formulated in Reykjavik and to dismantle the basis for progress that began to be built at that meeting.

That is why the main goal of the USSR, Bulgaria and other socialist countries is the implementation of the long-term objectives formulated in the Soviet statement of 15 January 1986. That document will remain a concrete foreign policy programme for socialism, a programme of common sense in our nuclear age, Lyuben Gotsev said in conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS HITS KOHL COMMENT ON GORBACHEV JANUARY 1986 PROGRAM

PM201103 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 86 p 4

[TASS report under the "Rejoinder" rubric: "Behind the Screen of Demagoguery"]

[Text] Bonn, 17 Jan -- How does FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl assess the wide-scale disarmament program put forward in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January last year and providing for the elimination of all nuclear weapons on the planet by the year 2000?

The answer to this question, put to the chancellor by a Soviet correspondent at a Bonn press conference, was naturally of very great interest to the numerous journalists assembled at the Bonn press center.

After all, the FRG is a state at the meetingpoint of the two antagonistic military-political groupings, has the world's highest density of deployment of nuclear weapons, is stuffed to bursting with chemical and other types of armaments, and has the continent's most powerful NATO land army. It would seem that Bonn should display special interest in liberating Europe from the nuclear weapons which hang like the sword of Damocles over the West Europeans and make them, and above all the FRG population, Washington's "nuclear hostages."

But the chancellor's reaction disappointed the journalists present in the hall. Instead of a specific reply to the question, Kohl launched into general, hackneyed discourses about how his government's aim remains "the safeguarding of peace with the least quantity of weapons," how Bonn is "the champion of the policy of small steps and a gradual approach to its aim," and how he is allegedly seeking "progress in the matter of disarmament." Here Kohl did not say a word about how it is precisely the leading figures of the notorious "steel helmet faction," that set the tone in his party, and who have openly ganged up against the specific accord, outlined at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, on the total elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Speaking of this meeting, Kohl sought to paint a deliberately rosy picture, keeping quiet about how the attainment of specific agreements there was hampered by the stance of the U.S. side, which was obstinate in its reluctance to abandon its "Star Wars" program. And, of course, the chancellor kept quiet about how it was Bonn which actively supported this program and is taking part in its implementation.

It remains to be hoped that after the political passions connected with preparation for the elections have abated in the FRG, the federal government may still return to a reconsideration of its attitude toward the disarmament problem and of the constructive peace proposals put forward by the USSR.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: SCIENTISTS IN GENEVA PLAN MOSCOW NUCLEAR TALKS

LD261942 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1150 GMT 26 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva, 26 Jan (TASS) -- A meeting of an international organizing group of scientists, devoted to preparing for the Moscow forum of scientists on the problem of the radical reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, ended here on Sunday. The agenda and main presenters were determined, and organizational matters were examined.

The Moscow forum, in which it is expected that 250 specialists from various countries will take part, will be held from 14-16 February. The scientific and technical aspects of the various stages of a reduction in nuclear weapons up to their complete elimination, the role of nuclear disarmament for European security, the importance of the ABM Treaty in providing the conditions for nuclear disarmament, and ways of achieving agreement on a universal and complete ban on nuclear tests, will be discussed.

Prominent scientists from the USSR, the United States, Japan, Italy, Great Britain, Argentina and other countries took part in the organizing group meeting.

The USSR was represented by Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Doctor of Historical Sciences A.A. Kokoshin, deputy chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S AFANASYEV ON AMERICAN, CANADIAN VIEWS ON SALT, SDI

Part One: U.S. Visit

PM141810 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Part one of article by V. Afanasyev: "Eleven Days Across the Ocean"]

[Excerpts] 1. In the United States of America [subhead]

A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation was in the United States and Canada for 11 days. The makeup of the delegation, remarked on in both countries, was somewhat unusual. In addition to the author of these notes, it included I. Blokhin, an academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and K. Lavrov, a USSR people's artiste. Why should this attract attention? If only for the reason that 80-90 percent of actors in the United States and Canada are unemployed, as well as a considerable number of medics. Here were a doctor and an actor -- both members of the Soviet parliament.

Four beautiful colors adorned America at Christmas: green, white, red, and blue.

At the same time two more colors -- black and flaming orange -- cry out on the map of the United States. The blackness of death and the orange of nuclear explosions. Throughout our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which has already lasted well over 500 days, the United States has exploded 24 nuclear devices in the Nevada desert. We have extended this moratorium five times now. We will not explode any nuclear bomb before the United States does.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation arrived in the United States at not a very good time. It is a time of an extremely stormy outburst of militarism, anti-Sovietism, and anticommunism. As well as nationalism, racism, and anti-Russicism.

The United States is implementing unprecedented military programs. The first batch of 50 MX first-strike nuclear missiles is being followed up by preparations to install a second batch of the same number. They are mobile, mounted on flat beds. Another strategic missile -- "Midgetmen" -- is also being built; it too is mobile and hard to hit. First the 131st, then the 132d, and soon the 133d B-52 bomber with cruise missiles on board will take up its position at the Sawyer airbase. These bombers and missiles are above the limit stipulated by the SALT II treaty.

The SDI program -- the program appropriately christened "Star Wars" by the world public -- is in full swing and moving ahead at a really furious pace, again in violation of a treaty -- the ABM Treaty this time.

The White House has decided to request a further 500 million dollars in the current fiscal year in addition to the 3.5 billion already allocated by Congress. Between 5 and 5.5 billion dollars will be requested in the next fiscal year.

This program is defensive in name only. In reality, however, it is extremely militarist and globalist. The real aim of SDI is to carry out a first nuclear strike, knock out the enemy's strike means, and avoid nuclear retaliation. We will be frank, this aim is illusory in the extreme. Retaliation would come, inevitable retaliation.

The SDI program has become an obstacle in the way of radically reducing nuclear arms, an accord which was achieved in Reykjavik.

By going ahead with SDI the White House is pursuing a whole series of aims.

First: to guarantee the military-industrial complex high profits, as the cost of SDI is estimated at trillions of dollars.

Second: to exhaust the Soviet Union economically by drawing it into a new spiral of the arms race and prevent it from implementing its scientific, technical, and socioeconomic programs.

Third: to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and upset the military and strategic balance -- an important restraining factor -- in its favor.

Fourth: to make a powerful leap in the sphere of science, equipment, and technology. Whether there will be SDI or not is highly problematic. To gather the best minds from all over the world under the dubious banner of SDI, use the latest scientific, technical, and technological discoveries, derive the greatest possible benefits for the United States from this, and beat competitors with their own help -- this is one of the cherished aims of the U.S. leaders. The "brain drain" across the ocean has already begun.

...But let us return to SDI. We will not comment on the first and the fourth points. They are self-evident and need no further explanation.

With regard to attempts to economically exhaust the Soviet Union and gain military and strategic superiority over it, this is just illusion. History has more than once subjected us to far more serious ordeals -- military, economic, and political. We came out of these ordeals with honor. We Soviet people can forgo a great deal, including material wellbeing. We will never forgo our country's security or its independence. As is well known, there is an antidote to every poison, an answer to every question. We will also find an answer to SDI. It will not be the same as SDI and by no means as expensive. There should be no doubts on this score.

Wright, the speaker of the House of Representatives mentioned above who took possession of the conductor's baton for this House only in January, told us the following. A clear-cut continuity between the Republicans and the Democrats has become established in the sphere of U.S. foreign policy. He backed up this idea quite graphically. We take different roads to the river bank, he said. Upon reaching the bank we throw ourselves into the water together.

He frankly told us there will be no fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy as a result of the Democrats winning a majority in Senate (the Democrats have long held a

majority in the House of Representatives). But, he said, we are now in charge of the "purse strings" (the U.S. budget), which will allow us to put pressure on the President in the sense of limiting his military longings.

This is actually happening. The 100th U.S. Congress began work on 6 January. Three resolutions were submitted on the very first day of the Congress' work. One of them envisages discontinuing finance for the American nuclear test program when the yield exceeds 1 kiloton as long as the Soviet Union continues to observe its unilateral moratorium. The second contains a ban in the 1988 fiscal year on testing American antisatellite weapon systems on real targets in space.

The third demands that the administration fulfill the conditions of the SALT II treaty.

A day later a draft joint resolution from the House of Representatives and Senate on observing and strengthening the ABM Treaty was submitted to the U.S. Congress.

Each day of work by Congress is bringing more and more new draft resolutions.

These resolutions will be discussed. The fact that the Democrats are tripping up the president and his militarist aspirations is beyond doubt, in our opinion. We will be giving this our attention.

While we were in the United States we were not aware of any noticeable movement in favor of Reykjavik and its updated rerun. Official circles were swamped by "Irangate." But then, on our return to Moscow, we found out from the press the first stirrings in this direction had begun. There is now talk of a new summit meeting and developing what was achieved in Reykjavik. Aware that Moscow will not take part in a summit meeting without being sure that specific agreements will be reached, possible versions of these agreements are being outlined. McGovern, a prominent political figure in the United States, recently wrote in THE NEW YORK TIMES that the president must consider the following possibilities: to stop nuclear tests, as the Soviet Union has done on a unilateral basis since 6 August 1985; to take a decision on scrapping some old arms so as to thereby stay within the limits set by the SALT II treaty, as Moscow is now doing; to reach accord on limiting research for the "star wars" program for the next 10 years in exchange for Soviet agreement to reach an accord on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms over the next 5 years and the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles.

It can in no way be said that these possibilities are the same as the Reykjavik accords. But even this would be a big step forward in the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The President's popularity and prestige have noticeably waned since "Irangate." It is felt he can only maintain his prestige by reaching agreements with the USSR. "He cannot subdue Capitol Hill," the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN writes, for example, "but he can sign an agreement with the Soviet Union and make his last 2 years as President memorable ones."

We cannot judge just how memorable the last 2 years of the Reagan presidency will be. We have spoken powerfully in favor of a nuclear-free, violence-free world. We have spoken on this subject many times. Including in the Delhi declaration. Now it is up to the White House.

Part Two: Canada Visit

PM201711 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Second part of report by V. Afanasyev: "Eleven Days on the Other Side of the Atlantic"]

[Excerpts] 2. Canada [subhead]

[passage omitted] Our relations with Canada have traditionally been good. The (1983) visit by M.S. Gorbachev gave a big boost to their favorable development. He is known and remembered here. We came across quite a few people of the most diverse sort who met with him on Canadian soil in some circumstance, for some reason or another. Some people obviously had not met him but wanted in some way to express their positive attitude toward the Soviet people and their leader.

We had many meetings, conversations, and discussions with parliamentarians, diplomats, academics, and journalists in Canada. Questions of international relations, the preservation of peace, and disarmament occupied a central place in these talks. There was particularly animated discussion of the gamut of problems connected with the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The overwhelming majority of our interlocutors approved the Soviet initiatives to preserve peace and mankind. They persistently stressed the need for real agreements on disarmament and on improving the international situation. Senate Speaker Guy Charbonneau, for example, stated that "it is important to make every possible effort to lessen international tension and preserve and strengthen peace." He spoke highly of the Reykjavik meeting and expressed Canadians' desire to promote the process of moving toward reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons on earth.

I think that Canadians, and this was said to them, could promote this process more actively and exert a restraining influence on the United States to moderate its militarist aspirations.

Canada's attitude to the U.S. SDI program can scarcely be considered consistent. As is well known, it has refused to take part in in the program at a governmental level. However, private companies are preparing to do this. Moreover, the Canadian National Defense Ministry has been allowed to spend 47 million dollars on research work and testing of a space-based radar system. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV REPLIES TO U.S. STUDENTS ON NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

LD110734 Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 11 Jan 87

[Text] San Francisco January 11 TASS -- A group of high school pupils from Sacramento, California, in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, have expressed profound concern over the present-day international situation and the continuing nuclear arms race.

The schoolchildren called on the Soviet leader to do everything possible to prevent nuclear catastrophe, to develop and consolidate Soviet-American relations.

Gorbachev asked to tell the pupils that he realized full well their concern for the future of the world, for the future of life on earth and their desire that reason and the ability to trust one another serve the attainment of the supreme goal, that of peace.

The Soviet Union's efforts were directed at establishing a nuclear-free world, a world without violence and wars.

The reply was conveyed to the American pupils on the Soviet leadership's instructions by the Soviet consul-general in San Francisco, Valentin Kamenev.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: REAGAN RADIO ADDRESS 'IN SPIRIT OF MILITARISM'

LD181334 Moscow TASS in English 1307 GMT 18 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 18 TASS -- President Reagan has made a new radio address imbued with the spirit of militarism. He contended that the United States could conduct affairs with the Soviet Union from positions of strength and recalled with satisfaction that since the coming of his administration into office there had been a massive buildup of American military potential.

For instance, four battleships were modernised and 124 new ships purchased for the Navy, including two aircraft carriers and about two dozen modern cruisers and destroyers. The Air Force got about 2500 tactical fighter planes. The head of the administration said that the whole world had witnessed the strengthening by the United States of its role of "defender of freedom" and cited as an example the "liberation" of Grenada.

It is well known that the tiny island state fell victim to a brutal and totally unprovoked invasion by the United States. Throughout the world this action was branded as a brazen aggression.

The head of the administration intimated that he intended to spiral military expenditures further. He stated that Congress should not "undermine" America's might and allocate "sufficient" money for military spending. President Reagan reminded Congress that in 1985 and 1986 it had trimmed the military budget and expressed hope that this would not happen again.

The administration's interpretation of the word "sufficient" is well known. In its draft budget for the 1988 fiscal year the White House demanded the astronomical sum of 312 billion dollars for military aims. More than that, it is intended to spend a total of some 630 billion dollars for military purposes in the two fiscal years of 1988 and 1989.

The President did not conceal that the purpose of these massive military preparations and the buildup of nuclear and conventional armaments is to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The United States doggedly continues to pursue this aim despite numerous evidence that this is illusionary and unattainable.

Reagan chose also to sidestep the social and economic consequences of these military preparations for the United States. Thus, during the present administration's stay in office the state debt of the United States will have grown from 1.5 to 2.5 trillion dollars.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV ON WEINBERGER DEFENSE BUDGET REPORT

LD210047 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2010 GMT 20 Jan 87

[From the "World Today" program presented by Vladimir Tsvetov]

[Text] Balzac said every theme demands its own particular form. The "World Today" is far from being a literary program, and of course I recalled Balzac's words in connection with an episode in international life. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has presented his annual report to Congress concerning the military budget and defense programs. The theme of this work, 353 pages long, is not merely misanthropic, but fairytale-like, and it naturally required an appropriate forum.

It speaks of the directions of the U.S. arms race in the language of an inventory compiled by the medieval Dominican Order, which devised the most refined methods to destroy dissidents. It tells of this policy of the USSR, which dares to think differently from Weinberger, in the manner of a horror story.

Judge for yourselves: Our strategic nuclear power, says the U.S. Defense Secretary in his report, must have the combat capability to attack those military targets and command centers to which, in our view, the Soviet leadership attaches the greatest importance. A nuclear bonfire for the dissenting Soviet Union must be built by a variety of types of armaments, including SDI, the most important of our programs, said Weinberger, this is expensive firewood for the inquisitor's fire. Lest the congressmen take it into their heads to reduce their number, Weinberger set about telling a fairy-tale which ought to horrify the legislators.

In every corner of the globe, ever-growing Soviet military might poses a threat to the vital interests of the United States, Weinberger threatens. Terrorism and the drug trade is also a threat to U.S. national interests. In each case there are elements of utilization of this phenomenon by the Russians and their stooges, Weinberger sounds the alarm. If this were read to Chatskiy, he would no doubt repeat the expression which has become proverbial: Lie if you must, but within limits!

However, the U.S. Defense Secretary's woe is not from wit, but from hatred of socialism, and hatred can cause a man to lose his sense of proportion. In the gloomy performance being acted out by Weinberger, there is no place for Chatskiy, so I shall take upon myself the role of interpreter of Weinberger.

The report has two purposes: First, to convince congressmen of the need to continue paying for the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race. The second purpose is as follows: January is the month when multilateral and bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the most varied aspects of the problems of disarmament open or resume. Weinberger had to defame the Soviet Union, in case success in any of these negotiations -- if success should prove possible -- led any of the mortally frightened congressmen to doubt the expediency of over-arming. This is where another purpose of the report is concealed, the part which has assumed the form of a ghastly anti-Soviet fairytale.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS URGES U.S. TO DROP 'OLD DOGMAS' FOR NEGOTIATIONS

LD192018 Moscow TASS in English 1940 GMT 19 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The old refrain keeps coming up in statements of senior U.S. Administration officials: The United States should deal with the Soviet Union "from positions of strength". The President claims that it was American strength that brought the USSR to the negotiating table in Geneva and to the Soviet-American summits in Geneva and Reykjavik. The USSR can understand and respect only the language of strength, Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, echoes Ronald Reagan in a recent article in THE NEW YORK TIMES. The main task of the U.S. in Geneva is to "be patient" and try to "outwait" the Soviet Union in the negotiations, that is, to make it eventually capitulate and agree to the terms dictated by the United States. According to Adelman, the American interest would better be served by no concession to the Russians on space weapons.

What is most amazing in all such declarations is that Washington does not see in them glaring contradictions and a total lack of elementary logic. The whole world has realized that it was the attempts to stick to "positions of strength" and the blind commitment to SDI that made it impossible to capitalize on the very important accords reached in Reykjavik and blocked progress at the Geneva talks and an advance towards a non-nuclear world.

The Reagan administration ignores the lessons of history as well. It was only when the U.S. leadership woke up to the need to reckon with realities and grew aware of the futility of an approach from strength to international relations that conditions were created for mutually acceptable accords. On June 10, 1963, for instance, John Kennedy talked in a speech about genuine peace rather than the peace of the grave, and the incumbent Washington officials should remember his words.

When the Kennedy administration understood that weapons did not offer ultimate security and embraced more realistic positions, it became possible to take practical steps to improve Soviet-American relations, in particular, to conclude a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three media. The detente of the 1970's was only made possible when Washington had woken up to the fact, in Richard Nixon's words, that the time was past when America had considered it to be her duty to tell the peoples of other countries how they should settle their problems.

It is all the more important today, in the nuclear-space age and under conditions of strategic parity, to renounce old dogmas and the long-defunct principle of "big stick", let alone wielding it at the negotiating table. It is by being aware of realities, relying on the principle of equality and equal security and respecting the lawful security interests of one's partner that one can guarantee one's own security and provide conditions for progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. EXPERTS CITED ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

PM140922 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jan 87 p 14

[Fedor Burlatskiy article under the rubric "A Year of Hopes and Struggle":
"What Does America Want, Anyway?"]

[Excerpts] For us, for Soviet people, 1986 was a year of struggle for the practical implementation of the new way of thinking. Reykjavik was the culmination of this process. Although it did not prove possible to adopt concrete decisions there, the positions of the USSR and the United States converged more than ever before, as is well known.

What kind of a year was it for the United States? What kind of year will next year, 1987, be for Soviet-U.S. relations? May we hope for accords with the present administration on questions of reducing nuclear missiles and other arms, or must we wait for a new administration to come to power, which will happen only 2 years from now? Those are the questions which interested me during my trip to the United States. I should point out that I was granted good opportunities to discuss these questions at various levels.

In Washington I met with many U.S. establishment figures: J. Matlock, special assistant to the President for European and Soviet affairs (he is spoken of as a future U.S. ambassador to the USSR); A. Hartman, the current U.S. ambassador to our country; L. Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee; M. Stafford, special assistant to P. Nitze; B. Burton, State Department assistant for disarmament control [kontrol nad razoruzheniyem]; Profeser P. (Raddauey), secretary of the Kennan Institute; (D.) Billington, director of the Wilsonian Scientific Center, and others.

So what is the position of American official circles at the moment? In the main they assessed positively the results of Reykjavik. They agreed that an unprecedented convergence of the USSR and U.S. positions on key arms reduction issues was achieved there. They did not conceal the fact that in Reykjavik the President was not prepared for the new proposals from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and therefore reacted spontaneously to many proposals. This put him in a difficult position after his return to Washington. The White House representatives came out in favor of the continuation of direct diplomacy between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President. Moreover, they claimed that if M.S. Gorbachev came to the United States, if only for a week, it would be possible to resolve major questions of disarmament and the development of Soviet-U.S. relations.

The representatives of the administration expressed the opinion that the "Iran affair" will prompt the President to seek effective compensation in the international arena to help restore his prestige in public opinion. They see one possibility here -- the conclusion of an agreement on arms limitation questions with the USSR. When I asked whether all this means that the President is really prepared to be flexible on SDI and the reduction of the military budget, the answer was usually evasive: Some kind of compromise in this regard is possible, although, of course, the President has pinned his entire reputation on the SDI program.

People from the President's entourage spoke in terms of seeing 1987 as a unique opportunity to conclude an arms limitation agreement. Why? Because this suits the President's own mood, on the one hand, and on the other he will certainly find support from U.S. public opinion. [paragraph continues]

They claim that if this chance is lost, no new opportunity could arise before 1990. This is explained by the following aspects: The whole of 1988 will be spent on the election campaign. A new president will need at least 2 years to form an administration, find his feet, enlist the support of Congress, and begin energetic activity in the international arena.

As for the future presidential elections, the official representatives of the administration asserted that regardless of who wins -- a Republican or a Democrat -- he will take a position somewhat to the right of center, since R. Reagan's policy, especially in the sphere of the economy and arms, has had a great influence on U.S. public opinion. And for these reasons they believe that 1987 is the most favorable year for the continuation of Soviet-American dialogue.

I gained the impression that the problem of "linkage" ["linkidzh"], which we call "uvyazka," remains the most significant in U.S. policy with regard to the USSR. Many American officials, including relatively senior ones, told me in confidence that U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle links the entire process of talks with the USSR on disarmament questions exclusively with the problem of emigration from the Soviet Union; until there are radical changes in this sphere, no agreements with the USSR on disarmament should be entered into -- that is Perle's stance, according to his colleagues.

Why this inconsistency in U.S. policy? Why does the U.S. so eagerly and thoughtlessly use "linkage" against us and protest so vigorously against the problem of the "package" put forward by the Soviet Union? After all, the "package" does not concern changes of any kind within the United States itself. It does not link the problem of disarmament with economic and humanitarian relations. No, the "package" concerns security alone, and reflects the USSR's concern that this package be resolved in the interests of both sides and on the basis of parity.

Is that not logical? But what I was told by U.S. officials about the linkage of economic and humanitarian relations with internal developments in the USSR can hardly be deemed logical.

As is well known, at the recent elections to the U.S. Senate the Democrats prevailed, and now they control both houses. In Washington I met with Congressman L. Aspin, Democrat from Wisconsin.

L. Aspin said that in the next few years Congress will come out in favor of the development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue on arms limitation questions. In his opinion Congress will now resolutely oppose the administration's desire to abandon the SALT II treaty, especially if the Soviet Union publicly acknowledges its own few violations. The congressman is distrustful of all the Soviet Union's objections here, and believes that the great publicity and openness [otkrytost] of the United States should become the norm for the Soviet Union too, especially since in fact the two sides already know all about each other.

I asked about the possibility of a cut in the U.S. military budget, on the basis, naturally, of parity with the Soviet Union. L. Aspin expressed a skeptical view on this question since talks and agreements have not hitherto led to an equivalent reduction in the military budget. He does not believe major changes are possible here. Even if substantial reductions in nuclear missile arms take place, the problem of the balance and modernization of conventional arms will remain. Only the resolution of this problem could seriously affect the U.S. military budget.

My interlocutor, like other representatives of the Democratic Party, incidentally, is optimistic about the prospects for the future presidential elections. The Democrats have virtually no doubt of victory. In L. Aspin's opinion, at the first stage the possible candidates for the two parties will be George Bush and Gary Hart. But he does not exclude the possibility that new figures may emerge at the next stage.

The same view was expressed by the well known American historian Arthur Schlesinger, former staffer of John Kennedy's administration, who received me in his three-story house on 64th Avenue in New York.

Schlesinger is an active supporter of the disarmament program. His position is similar to that of McNamara, Bundy, Sorensen, and other former John Kennedy aides. McNamara recently expressed the view that to begin with, it would be a good idea to return to the concept of "mutual deterrence," formulated back in the sixties, and that for the purposes of such deterrence it is sufficient for each side to have no more than 100 nuclear warheads. As for total nuclear disarmament, even the most liberal representatives of the Democratic Party are not yet ready to support this position. They link this process with parity in conventional arms, and also with real monitoring of [kontrol za] other states capable of creating nuclear weapons.

After my return to Moscow I was invited to meet with Senator Gary Hart. G. Hart assessed highly the profound, frank, and realistic ideas and proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on questions of Soviet-U.S. relations and the USSR's domestic and foreign policy.

He also expressed the view that the Soviet Union should continue its active efforts in talks with the present U.S. Administration on questions of disarmament; even if this yields no practical results now, it will provide a basis for future agreements. G. Hart said that if any agreements were concluded with Reagan, that would give the Republicans certain advantages in the future elections. But in G. Hart's opinion, the problems of arms limitation come before party problems, and the Democrats will in all circumstances support the present Republican administration if it shows readiness to make compromises with the Soviet Union.

Things are still difficult in America when it comes to the new way of thinking on questions of world politics. Of course, elements of the new approach can be discovered in various milieus, especially among American professors and politicians from former administrations. They can be found to a lesser extent among journalists, and are utterly negligible among representatives of the country's present leadership.

Naturally, none of my interviewees was such a madman as to say that he wants or tolerates the idea of nuclear war. The view that such a war would be catastrophic has become axiomatic for all Americans, especially since the conclusions drawn by Carl Sagan and other major American scientists on the inevitability of the onset of a "nuclear winter" in the event of the simultaneous explosion of the stockpiled nuclear weapons.

But the question is what conclusions are drawn from this extremely important premise? As for the Soviet leaders, the most important conclusion, which they constantly speak of to representatives of Western countries, including the United States, is quite simple: We cannot, we have no right to regard each other as enemies unless we want to disappear forever from the face of our planet, along with all mankind.

This means that first of all the "concept of the enemy" must be discarded. Of course, we represent different social systems. The Soviet and American peoples believe in different values, although in much -- and West Europeans are particularly insistent about this -- we are close to each other.

So what was my general impression from my meetings and conversations in the United States? What does America want, anyway? First, it seemed to me that the majority of my interlocutors, including Washington officials, understand that 1986 was a year of lost opportunities for them. They look back with regret at Reykjavik, where major, important agreements could have been reached. Second, Americans have hopes that 1987 will yield real progress in arms limitation talks, although they are far from entertaining any illusions about R. Reagan's stance on SDI.

And last, the concept of the "enemy" and even "enemy number one" in the Americans' public awareness about the Soviet Union still prevails today. This too must be reckoned with, as a real fact. Tremendous efforts will be needed on our part and, probably, important and radical agreements between the USSR and the United States and some activeness on the part of the most progressive section of the American elite in order to bring about a breakthrough in public awareness in that country.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, SDI

LD171641 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 17 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the Moscow-based Institute for United States of America and Canada Studies; introduced by Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] A year ago, on January 15, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made a statement outlining a Soviet plan for a nonnuclear world by the year 2000. In fact I think it's not only a plan, it's a program of action to guide our foreign policy in the years to come. So we want a nuclear world [as heard] and, naturally, not only for ourselves, that would be impossible; it is our principal line. How realistic is it?

[Bogdanov] Yes, it's a very good question because now you hear from practically any political quarter some different shades of opinions about nonnuclear world, beginning from absolute no it's impossible, coming to some middle way, you know, position and to some too high expectations, you know. [passage omitted]

[Bogdanov] Just have a look at some offices, I wouldn't mention, I wouldn't like to mention them. But just look at some offices, at some people. They were making, if you like, money on that; they were living on nuclear factors. In what sense? Because first of all they were making a nuclear strategy beginning from 1945. They were making different weapons systems, they were, after all their importance in their own society was defined by the nuclear factor. [as heard] If you deprive them of nuclear weapons tomorrow they will be good for nothing. You know, they defend themselves. You may say that it's a minor factor. No, Pavel, I believe it's a very, very major factor, psychological factor. But let me come back to our program. I like very much your definition. It's really a program. It's not just a slogan, it's not just what we call wishful thinking. If you -- I believe that our American counterparts, our American, you know, friends, colleagues they are no doubt also for a nonnuclear world. The American President has stated many times himself that that is his goal.

What is the difference? The difference is that you have a program on the table, very realistic program, stage by stage. Why by stage? Because of those difficulties -- psychological, security worries and all that, you know. That's why we have divided that period of 15 years into three stages, to make it really digestible, if you like, digestible.

Now let me come back to Reykjavik. If you like, in a sense, we have already tried our program in very, in a very serious circumstance, and I dare say to some extent, to a very major circumstance, and I dare to say to some extent, to a very major extent, they have succeeded. They have succeeded; they have come to an agreement on very major part of the nonnuclear world confidence, if you like.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, like deep cuts in nuclear weapons, elimination, the subsequent elimination of them in the next decade.

[Bogdanov] Only but for, just because of SDI, we could not move ahead because the American side was so eager to keep that in their hands, in their pockets that we couldn't go ahead. So my last word on that is it's very realistic and it is very much alive and it is very much on the table.

[Kuznetsov] [passage omitted] We have over 50,000, perhaps even more, nuclear arms of all kinds and I don't think this amount is a deterrent. I mean it's overkill, it's playing with suicide and it's about time we started to reduce and perhaps this, this is obvious to very many politicians round the world. [passage omitted]

[Plekhanov] You see there are two approaches to nuclear weapons. One approach is that they are a very special kind of weapon in the sense that you can't really fight and win a war with them like you could do with weapons which existed before nuclear weapons came into being. That's a traditional military approach according to which the appearance of nuclear weapons really hasn't changed anything in a major way. The other approach is that, well you know, they are a very special kind of weapon in the sense that you can only use them, or threaten to use them to deter a nuclear attack on you. In other words, nuclear weapons are a means of suicide, of mutual suicide, and the danger of mutual suicide is what prevents each side from attacking the other. Now, if, if that is the only, ah, if that, that is the only way you can use nuclear weapons for suicide then it is logical to assume that you can have a very minimal amount of nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Until there is a real change in the thinking of the strategists in Washington, military or civilian, I don't think that we will be able to achieve real reductions, much less nuclear disarmament with the United States. It really requires and I don't know what it will take them to change their view, to finally come to grips with reality and say that well, you know, if they're ever used it's curtains for everybody.

[Kuznetsov] I may be wrong, but I personally have the impression that our proposals are always described in Washington, the White House, as even excessive and therefore unrealistic, like Gorbachev's, Mikhail Gorbachev's plan for a nonnuclear world, or as insufficient. As a result the ball seems to be always in our court. Is (?such) White House tactics a trick or perhaps our proposals are such that they don't take into account the legitimate security concerns of the other side?

[Bogdanov] My impression is that this administration, at least some people in this administration, they're using very dirty tricks. I'm sorry to say that. They are, you know, leaning on, may I say so, on uninformed public opinion. You still hear that song about verification. You still hear some, you know, tunes on conventional Soviet superiority. You still hear something like that. But at the same time this administration is very well informed that we have suggested to them at different forums, including Stockholm, some very efficient ways of verification, including on-site inspections, including international inspections, and of course national means of verification. If you are at the American end and you hear all that you may come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is still on the same level as it was before. They just hide from their own people, from their own public opinion, that there is an immense step forward from the Soviet Union which takes into account all Western, you know, worries about, about, legitimate worries about verification. That problem is no more on the [word indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] At least those are worries that we know about. Every time there is some new worry coming up, you know.

[Bogdanov] And you know what happens, what happens. For instance now America, the President, sent the message, sent a signal to the Senate that he would like two threshold treaties to be ratified; provided, provided the Soviet Union agrees to some additional measures of verification. And mind you they don't mention from the White House side what kind of measures they mean. I read it like that. Suppose, suppose the Congress will ratify then they will put to the Soviet Union such measures that will be from the very beginning not acceptable to us because it would not be, you know, verification business, it would be a spying business, something like that. So maybe I'm pessimistic, I'm very sorry. Maybe Sergey is more optimistic, but I believe that these people are just not able to think in cooperative terms. They're rather busy with building up obstacles on the very difficult way of disarmament.

[Kuznetsov] My question to you Sergey. Why don't they want to put to test our sincerity, like there's been a lot of talk about verification, why not opening up laboratories to check whether we have a similar research effort in, in space defenses, so on and so forth? Why don't they put it to test our sincerity, to test? It's easy to check whether we're cheating or not. Are they afraid that we may be serious after all?

[Plekhanov] Yes, of course. They don't want to test our sincerity because they know that we are sincere. Ah, you test the other side's sincerity, (?then) OK let's, let's sign an agreement and the other side says OK let's do it. And then you have to sign an agreement and in fact this is exactly or very much like what happened at Reykjavik, when I think President Reagan went beyond his own expectations, down the road of agreement, and had to stop at the very last moment, when he...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] Did he expect to know or what? Did he expect to know?

[Plekhanov] You see, I think, I think he didn't expect the amount of concessions on our side and the amount of active willingness to reach an agreement, to find a common ground.

He didn't really expect that. He thought that well, you know, it could be just talks about something, or probably some limited agreement and then when he sat down at the table with Mikhail Gorbachev he saw that, my goodness, there's a real possibility of a major agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons and then the whole crowd around him starting getting scared, and what's, what's going on, are we really moving in that direction in which we do not want to move? [passage omitted]

[Kuznetsov] My final question, as time is running out on us. There are several concepts of a nonnuclear world. We know about American concept, President Reagan's concept of a nonnuclear world which boils down to the phasing out of nuclear weapons through space defenses. And there is a Soviet concept, a nonnuclear world is at the same time a world with a nonmilitarized space. Now we have these two contradictory, opposing concepts. Do you see any room, for, for compromise, or are they incompatible head on?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I see room for compromise based on common sense. That's my point.

[Kuznetsov] Common sense, what do you mean by common sense? Perhaps, you, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think if the other side I think if the other side -- common sense for the United States to build space defenses, I mean for President Reagan. [as heard]

[Kuznetsov] Our common sense tells us...

[Plekhanov interrupts] Pavel, it's nobody's common sense to build space defenses, that's why I used that as common sense, as human common sense.

[Kuznetsov] Oh, I see.

[Plekhanov] Yes. There must be some kind of a consensus between both sides and if there is a lack of consensus at this point I think both sides should behave in such a manner that we respect each other's differences, like it was done at Reykjavik. If President Reagan believes in SDI so much, OK he can continue the research program, but please don't violate the ABM treaty because that will impinge on our interests. So if there is that give and take -- and also let's see what happens within the next 10 or 15 years. If there is a willingness to grant that the other side, to give the benefit of the doubt to the other side to some extent, at the same time adherence to the existing arms control treaties. I think that's the kind of balance that could, that we could live with for a while, before things become clear. But I'm convinced that time will show that the SDI is a great mistake, that's a very dangerous thing. But let the facts come out, let the people think and make judgments.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much. Our time is up. Thanks again for coming to our studio and sharing your views on Top Priority. I'm Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, signing off till next week at the same time and on the same wavelength. Goodbye.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW ROUNDTABLE ON NST, MORATORIUM

LD112104 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 11 Jan 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Nikolay I. Yefimov, first deputy editor-in-chief of IZVESTIYA; Georgiy A. Kuznetsov, deputy editor-in-chief of ZA RUBEZHOM; and Vitaliy S. Sobolev, All-Union radio commentator]

[Excerpts] [Sobolev] Hello, comrades. This is our first roundtable meeting this year, and that puts us under the obligation not to confine ourselves to the latest events, but to also try to look ahead, to the extent that that may be possible.

Peace Year is over, but the problem of war and peace is as acute as ever. In the analyses of the international situation, and in the forecasts made by politicians and the press of various countries, pessimistic and optimistic notes can be discerned. The optimists point out, for instance, how much was agreed on in Reykjavik. The pessimists stress the desire of the United States to gain one-sided concessions from the USSR, the absence of any constructive proposals from Washington, its multifarious military preparations, and so on. But whoever's arguments may appear to carry most weight, it is clear that we cannot cease, for one moment, to struggle against the arms race. That much is clear to millions of people, and Washington cannot shrug off their demands.

On 15 January, the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons resume in Geneva. That day is also the first anniversary of the submission of the Soviet disarmament program, which, if implemented, would enable mankind to enter the 3d millenium without the nuclear threat.

[Yefimov] I think there are three events that distinguish the past year from those that preceded it: They are, in my view, the bold initiative of the Soviet Union in proposing the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000; the accident at Chernobyl; and the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. The philosophers, wise and perspicacious men, understood long ago that human consciousness lags behind human life. Just as in astronomy, it takes years and even millenia for the light to reach us. Just 30-35 years ago, we were intoxicated by the power of man. We thought ourselves equal to every task. We could turn back rivers, dam gulfs, disembowel mountains and valleys, and build gigantic factories. But that power has led to an ecological problem on a global scale. Another power -- nuclear -- has posed a still more serious, still more urgent problem: The problem of human survival. The essence of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech of 15 January last year, and the essence of the new thinking which

he so persistently urges on the Soviet Union, is precisely that we should not only be aware of the real threat that hangs over us, but that we should lose no time in totally averting it, casting aside all group interests, narrow class interests, and so on. The danger is monstrously great.

If we were to take all the explosives used in World War II as a unit, then the nuclear weapons already stockpiled would be the equivalent -- translated into terms of conventional explosives -- of 6,000 units. Just imagine that: We've stockpiled 6,000 World War II's, that is how much is now being stored in the depots. All that is capable of turning our planet into a dead, cold globe in 30 minutes. World War II cost 55 million lives. Multiply that by 6,000 units, and you get a fantastic figure: 330 billion. It's not even all that fantastic: nuclear might would destroy not only the living, but also those yet unborn, those who should have come after us to continue our race and preserve our memory. The accident at Chernobyl, and its radioactive fallout, which was bad enough, really cannot be compared in any way at all, not only with 6,000 World War II's, but even with one nuclear warhead. That accident, which so worried and frightened millions of people living many thousands of kilometers from the reactor that went out of control, ought to have provided much food for thought, both to ordinary people, statesmen and political leaders.

Alas, many of them have still not got the message. It has not sunk in, either in Washington or in London or in Paris. Yet we should not look at all we tried to do last year just in the light of our disappointment. In Reykavik, despite everything, both the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time got within striking distance of historic decisions. Does this mean then that agreement is, in principle, possible? Yes, it is possible.

However much they may back away from this reality in certain Western capitals; however great our disappointment -- and it has been great for the very reason that we were so close to an agreement -- the fact remains that accords are possible. The beginning of last year gave us a comprehensive program for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and the end of the year confirmed its feasibility. I don't think any previous year brought us anything like that. Therefore, in my view, we must look to the future with a sense of optimism.

[Sobolev] The International Peace Year, as Comrade Gorbachev noted in his message to Perez de Cuellar, is a spur to practical action toward ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war and laying the foundations for a comprehensive security system. The Soviet Union intends to strive to achieve that aim, so that we may have lasting peace. That is an optimistic view of the future.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, we can be optimistic. I'd like to stress particularly the significance of the International Peace Year, which began with the statement of 15 January, and which has been a kind of litmus test for judging the policies of the various governments. I should say that our Soviet initiatives and declarations, and many others [as heard], as well as our practical actions, in the form of the moratorium which was extended several times, have created a particular political climate on our planet that has enabled many governments, many parties and public organizations to make their contribution to strengthening international security.

[Yefimov] For example, one should mention the initiative of the Nonaligned Movement and of the Delhi Six. One must note the role of the neutral states of Europe in bringing the Stockholm Conference to a successful conclusion, with Finland being an example. Comrade Ryzhkov's visit to that country, which has just ended, has again shown the kind of relations that can and should exist between states with different social systems.

[Kuznetsov] One could cite the policies of a number of governments and parties -- say, the parties making up the Socialist International, the Social Democratic Party in Germany, or the Labor Party in Britain. In other words, as I see it, the international climate as a whole is now very different from the way things were before the International Peace Year.

[Sobolev] One thing that has played a large part in that has been the Soviet moratorium.

[Yefimov] The moratorium has played a very important part, in that the moratorium has said to millions of people abroad that the Soviet Union's intentions are sincere, honest and peaceful.

[Sobolev] That was a real, practical step. It's not just a program, not just a proposal; it is a unilateral practical step...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] It was action.

[Yefimov] Our test sites were silent. The reaction of the United States to this sincere and honest action of ours has been, you can say, astonishing -- both spiteful and hypocritical. In my view, an astonishing statement was made last week by Dan Howard, White House deputy Press Secretary. In answer to the question why the U.S. is refusing to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, he said literally this:

As far as nuclear-weapons testing is concerned, the fact that the Soviet Union has announced the end of a moratorium that no one asked for is its own personal affair. From our point of view, from the American point of view, Howard continued, as long as nuclear weapons form part of the strategic defense of the United States and of the West, nuclear tests are necessary. The best moratorium, he went on, would be the destruction of nuclear weapons.

In what sense does this statement strike me as astonishing? First, it's amazingly cynical. No, whether or not to discontinue explosions is by no means the personal affair of the Soviet Union. At the latest UN session, 123 states voted for a resolution to ban all tests without delay, with only the United States, France and Britain voting against. In other words, it's the personal affair of 123 countries, the overwhelming majority of the peoples and governments of the world. Indeed, in the United States itself, the majority of the population is against the explosions. A resolution to ban all nuclear-weapons tests has been submitted to the 100th session of the U.S. Congress which has just opened.

[Kuznetsov] I'd like to cite the opinion of a member of the leadership of the Committee for a Rational Nuclear Policy, an American antiwar organization, Richard West, who has said that many legislators are ashamed that the United States is continuing its nuclear tests despite the fact that the USSR has not carried out a single nuclear explosion for 18 months.

[Yefimov] The second astounding thing about Howard's statement is its hypocrisy -- or, to speak more plainly, its mendacity. Consider well what he said: that the best moratorium on nuclear explosions would be the destruction of nuclear weapons. But we know perfectly well that Star Wars without nuclear weapons is inconceivable. A nuclear bomb is envisaged as an excitor [nakachka] for a laser weapon. As Reykjavik has shown, Star Wars is something they are not prepared to give up.

[Sobolev] They are not prepared to renounce nuclear weapons in general, either, because it was after Reykjavik that an absolutely colossal campaign was mounted in Western political circles and press, claiming that nuclear weapons were, if anything, even more of a necessity than bread.

[Kuznetsov] Well, it is not for nothing that they have now said they need to carry out between 200 and 300 tests of nuclear warheads. That alone speaks for itself.

[Yefimov] But they can not come out and say it honestly and openly, so they prevaricate. Finally, a third point: Howard's statement is also remarkable, in my view, for its absence of argument. For years, the excuse has been the problem of verification [kontrol]. But now that we have American equipment operating in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk, and the Delhi Six have offered their services, the problem has evaporated.

[Kuznetsov] They don't even mention it now.

[Yefimov] They've stopped talking about it. What the American leadership lacks is the political will, the desire, and that's really the problem. The will is absent because the introduction of a moratorium would put the brake on the continuation of the arms race, which they don't want to stop. They reckon that this time, they will at last gain superiority over the Soviet Union. Yet we now have a unique opportunity to stop the nuclear race. But I'm afraid the White House is going to ignore this unique opportunity. All the evidence suggests that they will.

[Sobolev] But, all the same, some encouraging prospects can at least be glimpsed. We've just been talking about the bill introduced in the Congress, on a mutual moratorium on the testing of nuclear warheads.

[Kuznetsov] In the House of Representatives three documents were brought in literally only a few hours after the assembly officially met for its first session. One of the other two is entitled: House of Representatives Resolution on Preserving and Implementing the ABM Treaty. The very title says a great deal, and in the decree section it reads: The secretary of defense does not have the right to test or develop antimissile systems or sea-, air-, space-based or mobile land-based components of such systems, unless the President assures Congress that the Soviet Union has tested or developed analogous constructions since the date on which the present law comes into force. In other words, regarding antimissile defense, Congress, if you like, supports, to a certain extent, the Soviet point of view rather than the Reagan administration's point of view.

[Sobolev] Part of Congress, for the time being.

[Kuznetsov] And yet another document is entitled: On the Arms Limitation Treaties. This document makes it binding on the U.S. Administration to adhere to the SALT II Treaty, which they have just violated by Equipping the B-52 bombers -- I am referring to the 131st and 132d bombers -- with cruise missiles. It is precisely this which is opposed by the authors of the resolution, and they want to cut off funds for the deployment and upkeep of launching installations above the limits permitted by the SALT II Treaty. In other words, this is a very serious document, which concerns money rather than just the wish of the House of Representatives.

[Sobolev] If you will permit me, I would like to mention yet another initiative, as one might call it, by the American legislators, which runs counter to the administration's intentions. To be precise, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has announced its intention of holding a series of hearings to discuss the treaties on limiting the underground testing of nuclear weapons and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, signed in the 1970s. The administration still has not sent any of these treaties for ratification, but the new Senate leadership attaches great significance to their ratification. We do not know whether the present bills will become laws; that is still a big issue. But I think that the American legislators have started out from what genuinely worries people and, we must assume, people in the United States as well. This is apparently the main thing influencing feelings in Congress.

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CSO: 5200/1256

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: TALK SHOW ON MORATORIUM, SALT, SDI

LD161823 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 16 Jan 87

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by commentator Sergey Pravdin with Sergey Losev, international affairs journalist and general director of TASS; and international affairs journalists Vladimir Pasko, Boris Andrianov, Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, Aleksandr Redchenko, Stanislav Kozlenko, Valentin Gorkayev]

[Excerpts] [Pravdin] Of course, comrades, you are aware the anniversary has occurred of the day on which Comrade Gorbachev in his statement of 15 January, last year, put forward a whole complex of initiatives aimed at eliminating nuclear, chemical, and other types of mass annihilation weapons by the end of this century. These days the editorial office is receiving many letters from listeners who write of their complete support for the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government and condemn the intrigues of the imperialist forces and ask to be told about the new peace initiatives put forward in the past year by the USSR. [passage omitted naming 12 writers of such letters] It is simply impossible to list all of these letters. In our studio today is Sergey Andreyevich Losev, general director of TASS, whom we have invited to reply to your questions. Sergey Andreyevich, please.

[Losev] A year has passed since that statement was made. One can now state the program for creating a nuclear-free world has, without any doubt, received very broad international support. The countries of the socialist community conduct a coordinated foreign policy and naturally they not only support but also develop the USSR's initiatives. The participants in last November's working meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries which are members of CEMA supported the USSR's principled positions in Reykjavik and stressed the need to step up joint efforts in the interests of the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons and to reduce conventional weapons, for the strengthening of peace and international security.

The lines for the creation of a nuclear-free world which were sketched in at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in the Icelandic capital clearly showed that accords on eliminating nuclear weapons are achievable now and not at some time in the distant future.

The USSR's approach to preventing a nuclear catastrophe has much in common with the position adopted by the nonaligned countries. This allowed our country to react positively to the Harare appeal by the conference of heads of states and governments of the nonaligned countries.

The conference called for the arms race to be ended, for nuclear weapons to be abolished, and for the resources freed by this to be used to eradicate hunger, illiteracy, poverty, and disease.

[Pravdin] What is the current position of the West European countries and the United States?

[Losev] It must be said that among the United States' West European NATO allies unconcealed dissatisfaction with, and doubts about the common sense of, the United States leadership are increasing. As Irangate develops, these feelings are becoming apparent in the United States as well. It is no coincidence three bills have been introduced for discussion by the House of Representatives in the first days of the 100th convocation of the U.S. Congress. These are bills on introducing a partial moratorium on nuclear tests, on continuing the ban on testing the ASAT antisatellite system against real targets in space, on returning the United States to within the framework of the main limitations imposed by the SALT II treaty. The striving to limit the administration's militaristic programs is also known by the opposition in Congress to the draft federal budget for the 1988 financial year.

However, the United States and NATO continue to prefer to ignore the will of the peoples and do not show any readiness to reach mutually-acceptable understandings.

[Pravdin] What is the track record, as it were, of the U.S. Government on questions of war and peace?

[Losev] Between 1981 and 1987 the Reagan administration, which is a protege of the military-industrial complex, has not signed a single agreement on reducing armed forces and armaments. Moreover, it is conducting a course of derailing the SALT II treaty and the termless ABM Treaty, to wreck the whole structure of agreements with the USSR which was created with the participation of the four previous U.S. Administrations. As the authoritative U.S. magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS states in its latest edition, Reagan has proved to be the most anti-Soviet U.S. President in the past 30 years and perhaps the most anti-Soviet ever. He set himself the aim not of strengthening the status quo between East and West but of overturning it.

A few days ago, on the eve of the resumption of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva the U.S. President gave the assurance he was striving to achieve significant, just, and effectively verifiably reductions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

But what are needed now are not words and assurances but concrete deeds. Meanwhile, the present administration's track record is very revealing. While the USSR has been observing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions for over 17 months, the United States has in that period conducted 24 nuclear tests and is preparing a new series. Our country does not exceed the limit set by the SALT II treaty whereas the United States has deliberately exceeded those limits and has deployed [razvernut] 133 B-52 strategic bombers with nuclear cruise missiles and MX intercontinental ballistic missiles with independently targetable warheads. The USSR has not only frozen the number of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR but has even reduced their number. In this period the United States has increased the number of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe to 364.

The USSR has not withdrawn a single one of the proposals it made at Reykjavik. But the U.S., on the contrary, is constantly departing from its proposals which it made at the meeting in the Icelandic capital, and tries to cover up this back-sliding with crude falsification and forgery.

Convincing examples of this were cited at the recent press conference in the USSR Foreign Ministry. President Reagan was prepared in Reykjavik to undertake the obligation not to depart from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. A week and a half later Max Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva, said the United States could not undertake such an unconditional obligation not to depart from the treaty, and that it could only discuss with the Soviet side the rules for departing from the ABM Treaty. Concerning strategic offensive weapons, the President agreed in Reykjavik to eliminate all offensive strategic weapons within 10 years; at the Geneva talks the U.S. delegation is prepared to discuss only the question of eliminating ballistic missiles. On medium-range missiles, the U.S. delegation is seeking to obtain the right to deploy [razvernut] medium-range missiles on the territory of the United States in such a way that they could strike USSR territory and would thus acquire strategic significance.

A sort of litmus paper which allows one to correctly judge the trend of Washington's policies is the present administration's striving to push ahead with the implementation of the Star Wars program with the aim of achieving military superiority over our country and to create [sozdat] the potential for making a first strike.

Finally, under the influence of the United States, NATO is continuing to delay replying to the specific proposals made by the Warsaw Treaty last June with regard to a deep reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

[Pravdin] Have there been no changes in the U.S. position of late?

[Losev] You know, on 13 January the U.S. President in a message to the Senate expressed the administration's readiness to agree to the ratification of the 1974 Soviet-U.S. treaty on limiting the capacity of underground testing of nuclear weapons and to the ratification of the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To the uninformed it might seem some sort of positive movement had finally occurred in Washington's position. On looking closer, however, this is just a maneuver whose purpose, as THE WASHINGTON POST puts it, is to block the adoption by the U.S. Congress of an amendment prohibiting the United States from conducting nuclear tests.

As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stresses, we continue to regard the total banning of nuclear weapons testing as a primary measure on the path to curbing and subsequently eliminating nuclear weapons. The USSR proposes this question be resolved without delay. The USSR intends to continue consistently and resolutely to oppose the irresponsible course of the U.S. Administration by putting forward its line of disarmament and of creating universal security.

[Pravdin] Some of our listeners put the questions this way: Are there any sensible officials in the U.S. ruling circles?

[Losev] Of course there are. Unfortunately they do not hold the levers of power in the United States. For example, just yesterday Paul Warnke, former head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, made the following characteristic statement. He stressed the USSR's demand for limiting work on SDI to laboratory research is legitimate and well-founded from all points of view. Implementation of this demand, Warnke said, would be a guarantee that the United States would not be able within a short time period, 2-3 years, to deploy [razvernut] a strategic defense system in space. In this connection we propose banning the testing in space of any strike systems of destruction.

Warnke continued that we could now begin talks on determining the framework of the ban, and parallel to this, begin, for example, a stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear weapons. In Warnke's opinion, renunciation of creating [sozdaniye] a strategic antimissile defense system would not only permit the military balance to be preserved but would also consolidate stability and security in the world and the confidence of the two sides in the absence of any threat of a first strike being made.

[Pravdin] The Irangate scandal in the White House caused by the disclosure of secret arms deliveries to Iran has undermined the administration's positions both in the country and abroad. Many U.S. observers are now trying to guess which way the White House will turn to seek a way out from the present unprecedented difficulties.

[Losev] U.S. observers and politicians are united in the opinion it has two possible avenues: To go in for a foreign adventure or to seek understanding with the USSR. For example, former Assistant Secretary of State Eagleburger expresses the opinion that a Soviet-U.S. agreement on limiting nuclear weapons would receive support in the United States from the left, the right, and the center in present conditions. As is noted by former National Security Assistant to the President Brzezinski -- and he is not a friend to us -- it is up to President Reagan to decide whether he wants to make another attempt to reach agreement.

The world cannot, of course, pin its hopes on the White House's decision because the elimination of nuclear weapons and preventing the arms race in space is a vital concern for all states and peoples, large and small. The survival of mankind depends on this.

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CSO: 5200/1256

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S YELTSIN INTERVIEWED ON INF, SDI, DISARMAMENT

Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 26 Oct 86 pp 41-46

[Interview with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, by Mirko Cekic and Nenad Briski: "A Fateful Fear of the Truth"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] In recent days the attention of the entire world has been centered on the meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. Today, on Thursday, 4 days after that meeting, how do its results appear to you?

[Yeltsin] I would like to say that Mikhail Sergeyevich (Gorbachev) presented his first impressions at a press conference in Reykjavik. Following that, upon his return to Moscow, all the results of the meeting were carefully analyzed and taken up in a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and this was done very thoroughly, soundly, objectively, and comprehensively. Conclusions were adopted concerning the results of the meeting. Then Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke on Soviet television in order to inform our people. He also analyzed in detail the very course of the meeting. He even conveyed some of the drama of the meeting—for example, that the fourth round of talks had not been envisaged, but the need for it arose during the summit meeting since there was a very great desire to achieve agreement. A very great desire. That last meeting lasted 4 hours and 5 minutes. The press conference was postponed three times.

But unfortunately this was not successful. The first emotional reaction was, of course, very strong and, of course, embittered.

However, after the entire analysis we concluded that an important opportunity has now emerged for conducting further negotiations from a different point of departure.

That is, not from the level of the unsuccessful Geneva talks, but starting with the issues on which agreement has been reached. On the 50-percent reduction, say, of strategic weapons. Earlier, as you know, there were disagreements about the makeup of those weapons. We made a concession. We did not wish to dispute the issue -- just let the present composition be cut in half. That is an agreement already, and an important one. And that is why we proposed that the quantity of those weapons be cut in half in the first 5 years, that they be completely destroyed over the next 5, and that over those 10 years neither side have the right to stray from the 1972 agreement on antimissile defense. Those are two exceedingly important agreements, and they are related to one another.

And second, with respect to medium-range missiles. We have finally succeeded for the first time in agreeing to destroy all (medium-range missiles) in Europe, although there have been talks about levels, sublevels, sequences, and stages of reduction -- we did nevertheless reach agreement.

To be sure, they related this to Asia. We even consented to that; that is, we consented to reduction of the number of missiles in Asia as well, for it to remain at the level of 100 missiles from each country, while in Europe they would be destroyed (all medium-range missiles). In this way all of Europe would be without nuclear weapons.

At one time there was the issue of Great Britain and France--would their weapons be included in the total balance? Now we have consented to their being excluded from the total balance. Both alternatives were proposed at one time by the Americans.

We have also reached agreement on the forces in advance bases, and we have agreed as well to freeze production and deployment of missiles with a range less than 1,000 km and also to begin negotiations on those missiles. This is an extremely important agreement, and humanity would breathe easier if such an agreement were concluded. Humanity would breathe easier because it would have tangible evidence that the nuclear threat is no longer hanging over its head.

But in all of this, along with this immense reduction, which is no longer partial, but global, we have to be certain that the Americans will not retain for themselves something that would threaten our security. Naturally, we cannot allow weapons to be tested in space which could also be used for offensive purposes. What would that look like if we were without weapons and we had American (space) nuclear weapons over our heads? That is not allowable.

As far as the third question (space weapons) is concerned, we feel that the entire world is now embittered and disturbed, and it seems to me quite clear that it is in a mood to influence the American Administration to rethink its position.

We even honored the President's promise which he made to the American people that he would engage only in research. We even consented to that: alright, engage in research, that can be monitored, but do not leave the laboratory.

Do not conduct research above us.

We believe that the American Administration will reflect on this issue and that the American people should have its say on this. In fact it is already speaking; along with others there are senators and there are congressmen who are speaking. America is now in ferment. Of course, the extreme right, the military-industrial complex, is saying "Bravo, Reagan," since he was so firm, he remained firm on his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), while others, realistic politicians and ordinary Americans, are saying what is in fact the case: That a very, very good opportunity was missed to go so far as later to truly pass on to complete destruction of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

[Question] What is the mood in Moscow at the present time?

[Yeltsin] We Communists are optimists. We got together here in the city committee, we agreed to go out into the work collectives, not to allow a pessimistic mood to set in with the people, so that they do not think that it was all in vain. No, on the contrary, if we achieved progress on too essential issue, then now we should fight for a full agreement, for the entire package which we proposed in Reykjavik.

Our disposition at present is not that we have to urgently prepare some counterweapon or some sort of weapons against SDI. No, we will first of all be using our political and diplomatic channels, a struggle waged in terms of people. The hope remains that the American Administration will change its position. Whether that will be during this presidency or the next one, that is up to them.

[Question] Yes, that completely explains the Soviet positions.

[Yeltsin] Of course, the first emotional reaction was a desire to slam the door...great indignation because of such obstinacy.

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CSO: 5200/1251

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: U.S. SALT POLICY 'OBSTRUCTIONIST'

LD161657 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 16 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 16 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

It has long since become commonplace in Washington that the U.S. defence secretary comes out in mid January every year with "new information about the increased Soviet military menace."

The matter is that precisely at this period the discussion of the U.S. military budget starts in the Congress, and the Pentagon, by tradition, deems it timely to present the capitol with another "sensation" about the "vulnerability of the United States". The aim of these efforts, which are easy to see through, is to get congressional approval for the appropriations asked for the U.S. preparation for war.

U.S. congressmen are no longer frightened with the Pentagon's January "sensations", so the head of the U.S. Department of Defence Caspar Weinberger this time merely repeated his last year's assertions about the deployment of "new" SS-25 missiles in the Soviet Union.

As is known, the Soviet RS-12M intercontinental ballistic missile, which is described as the SS-25 missile in the West, is a modernised version of the RS-12 missile that existed earlier. The Soviet side had earlier presented concrete facts showing that the characteristics of the modernised missile are fully in keeping with the provisions of the SALT II treaty. In view of the huge importance of the matter for humanity, the need to preserve a basic curb on the strategic arms race, the Soviet Union so far keeps from outstepping the limits of the SALT I and SALT II treaties.

The total number of the Soviet Union's strategic delivery vehicles was 2,504 units when the SALT II treaty was signed. It has not increased by a single unit since then.

When deploying missiles of a single new class (SS-24), which is allowed under the SALT II treaty, the Soviet Union phased out a corresponding number of old missiles.

Meanwhile the United States adopted late last year new measures to remove the remaining barriers to the buildup of its strategic arms. Washington, specifically, ostentatiously outstepped the total limit of 1,320 units of launchers of MIRVED strategic missiles, and heavy bombers with cruise missiles, set by the SALT II treaty. B-52 aircraft with cruise missiles and MX intercontinental MIRVED ballistic missiles were recently deployed at U.S. bases over and above the limit. In violation of the SALT II treaty

the United States is developing two absolutely new classes of intercontinental ballistic missiles (MX and Midgetman). The United States stance on strategic arms limitation has become even more obstructionist and arrogant as compared with January last. While proclaiming its aim of making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" Washington actually seeks to spread the arms race to space and spiral it on earth.

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CSO: 5200/1250

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS CITES U.S. TRIDENT MISSILE TEST LAUNCH

TASS Report

LD152214 Moscow TASS in English 2141 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Text] New York January 15 TASS -- A Trident-2 intercontinental ballistic missile meant for U.S. and British submarines was launched on the first test flight in the United States today.

A Pentagon spokesman said that the missile capable of carrying ten independently targetable nuclear warheads was launched from the Cape Canaveral test site in Florida and reached a target in the Atlantic Ocean.

Security was tight around the launch area as members of anti-war organizations hold actions of protest against the tests of new first strike nuclear missile weapons. Last Wednesday a group of anti-nuclear protesters launched several air-balloons with metallic coating to cause disturbances in radar systems. This morning the police arrested nine protesters. Altogether 55 protesters were arrested in the past week.

Moscow TV on Launch

LD170438 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Jan 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The test of a Trident missile has taken place at Cape Canaveral.

[Begin recording; video shows launch and flight of missile; brief clips of U.S. military officer apparently being interviewed, submarine under way on surface, underwater explosion, submarine launch of missile; then commentator Aleksandr Serikov in studio addressing camera] [Serikov] In the wake of this missile another 19 will zoom into the sky in just the same way. The Pentagon is planning a series of tests here of the Trident, which is capable of carrying from 10 to 15 nuclear warheads, each one possessing the destructive power of half a million metric tons of TNT. The Pentagon strategists are pleased with the launch. Now they are planning a series of underwater tests of the missile; these tests are already being publicized. One cannot but be struck by the fact the United States has begun these nuclear missile tests on the anniversary of the Soviet statement containing an appeal for the reduction and subsequent scrapping of nuclear weapons. What one sees is a wild outbreak of militarism accompanied by a no less wild outbreak of anti-Sovietism. The following

picture was shown on U.S. television. [video shows map with European countries marked in green, USSR marked in red with missile symbols placed on it; graphics shows five submarine symbols in Atlantic and the trajectories of their missiles to their Soviet targets] These are American submarines armed with Trident, preventing a supposed strike by Moscow to encroach on Western freedom and democracy. The Washington militarists are apparently very keen to use such provocative ruses to imbue Americans with hatred for us and our country and to justify growing military spending. [video shows peace demonstrators] But there are a quite a number of people in America like these who are protesting against the Trident tests and realize that disarmament has to be fought for. [end recording]

/12858

CSO: 5200/1250

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

USSR: SALT VIOLATION BRIEFING--A routine briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center today. Replying to a question on whether the USSR has violated the SALT-II treaty by launching two new nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles, Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, emphasized the launch does not constitute a violation. The new submarines have not yet gone on sea trials; it is precisely from that moment the launchers are to be counted under the treaty, so there is time to dismantle possible surpluses. We continue, he went on to say, to be guided by the Soviet Government statement of 6 December last year, which says that in view of the vast importance of this issue to the whole of humanity it is necessary to preserve the key to the limitation of the arms race. The USSR has so far refrained from overstepping the limits set by the SALT I and SALT II treaties. [Excerpt] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 22 Jan 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1250

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

TASS: JAPANESE CW UNITS--Tokyo, 19 January (TASS)--Japan's National Defence Agency has issued a permission to deploy special chemical warfare units on the northern island of Hokkaido. This decision was made soon after the recent Japanese-U.S. consultations in Hawaii on the issues of ensuring security, which centered, in part, on the questions of building up the Japanese Army's combat potential, the newspaper NIHO KEIZAI reports today. According to a military establishment spokesman, the first two of the special units will be fielded at Asahigawa and Chitose bases as early as this year. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0821 GMT 19 Jan 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1249

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: SOCIALIST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS CD

LD221717 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1923 GMT 21 Jan 87

[Text] Berlin: 21 Jan (TASS) -- A meeting of deputy foreign ministers of the socialist countries was held in the GDR capital on 20 and 21 January. Taking part were delegations from the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the GDR, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR. An exchange of views took place on questions concerning the Geneva disarmament conference, which resumes its work on 3 February this year. A high appraisal was given of the decisions of the 41st UN General Assembly session, which are a good basis for progress at the Geneva conference. The increasing role of the disarmament conference as an important, many-sided organ of negotiation on global problems of limiting the arms race was emphasized. Note was taken of the need to activate the work of the conference with the aim of achieving real results, and resolve was expressed to energetically foster this on the basis of the wide-scale proposals of the socialist countries on disarmament.

The meeting's participants stressed the prime importance of a general cessation of nuclear testing and the elimination of the nuclear arms race, and declared the readiness of their states to take the steps required to ensure that a convention banning chemical weapons is concluded in 1987.

The leaders of the delegations were received by GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer.

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CSO: 5200/1255

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV SUMS UP CDE RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen V. Tatarnikov, under the rubric "Stockholm": "The Triumph of Common Sense"]

[Text] The Stockholm Conference completed its first stage with the adoption of a substantive and far-reaching document on the strengthening of confidence-building and security measures. Now behind it is a difficult stage of nearly three years of intensive work by the delegations of 35 participating states.

The chief result of this work lies in the fact that, through joint efforts, all the European participant-states, as well as the United States and Canada, were able to overcome disagreements and reach agreement on a number of key questions of providing security in Europe. The document adopted in Stockholm both elaborates in specific detail and gives effectiveness to the principle of the nonuse of force, and it includes mutually acceptable measures for strengthening confidence and security in the military area. The Helsinki Final Act has received practical development in important new agreements based on the existing political and military realities on the continent.

The accords reached in Stockholm are timely as never before. After all, the European continent today is one of the most dangerous regions of military confrontation. Millions-strong groupings of the two largest military alliances' armed forces are located there, which turns Europe into a region of potential armed confrontation. This is why it was so essential to strengthen confidence-building measures between states and peoples.

From the very start of the negotiations in Stockholm the Soviet Union proposed codifying in the conference document a commitment of participant-states to the nonuse of force as an extremely important confidence-building and security measure of a political nature. This proposal was received negatively by the United States and certain NATO countries.

However, subsequently this question occupied its appropriate place in the Stockholm forum's work. It was firmly defended by the neutral and nonaligned countries. As a result, an agreed-upon text was included in the

conference document in the form of a declaration that is of a binding nature. The agreement on the nonuse of force represents a compilation of specific commitments that rule out the use of all forms of force, including military force, in relations among the states in Europe, in the Mediterranean Sea region, and beyond their boundaries. It represents an important new step aimed at making the principle of the nonuse of force an effective law of international life.

The most contentious issue at the conference was the issue of notification of military activity. Negotiations were conducted with the aim of working out a mutual exchange of information regarding maneuvers and troop movements and transfers in order that the European states, figuratively speaking, would know what was going on in their home. In order that they could be convinced of the nonthreatening nature of military activity both on the territory of Europe and in adjoining sea and ocean regions and airspace.

Of course, not everything went smoothly. For example, until the end the United States refused to provide notification on the transfer of its troops to Europe or buildups of them there, and it did everything possible to sabotage the working out of measures for notification of the activities of air forces in Europe.

However, balanced solutions were found. The 35 states agreed to provide advance notification of 42 days regarding certain types of military activities. The measures worked out in Stockholm became more significant in nature and broader in scope than those that had been implemented in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act. Whereas the Final Act makes notification voluntary and calls for it starting with the level of 25,000 personnel, in accordance with the measures adopted in Stockholm, notification regarding maneuvers of ground forces will be made starting with the level of 13,000 men or at least 300 tanks organized in divisions, brigades or regiments. Information on the participation of the participant-states' air forces is included in notification if more than 200 plane-flights will be made in the course of the military activity. The participation in military activities of amphibious or airborne troops in maneuvers is also subject to notification when 3,000 or more men are put in action.

The fact that notification is to encompass transfers of ground troops into Europe from outside the boundaries of the zone of confidence-building and security measures is an extremely important decision. It means that the United States is now supposed to provide notification regarding all its troop transfers into Europe starting with the level of 13,000 personnel or 300 tanks. Such notifications will unquestionably raise the level of confidence and security in Europe.

Procedures for inviting observers to military activities for which notification is given were worked out in detail at the conference. Observers are supposed to be invited to exercises, transfers and concentrations of troops if more than 17,000 men take part in them or if 5,000 men are taking part in parachute jumps or amphibious landings. Invitations will be extended to all the European countries, the United

States and Canada 42 days prior to the start of the exercises. No more than two observers may attend from each state. Such invitations will be mandatory; therefore, all states can be assured that the military activity being carried out conforms to the agreements and does not represent a threat.

A new and extremely serious confidence-building measure that was not in the Helsinki Final Act was worked out in Stockholm--the exchange of annual plans of military activities that are subject to notification. Practically every state is required to inform all other states about all notifiable military activities that it is planning to carry out in the upcoming year. The exchange of plans will be carried out by a date no later than 15 November. They will include exercises of ground troops, amphibious forces and airborne troops, and movements and transfers of troops that reach the notification threshold. From a military standpoint, this agreement is of special importance, since it opens to all states an overall picture of military activities for the whole year. This measure shows the states' readiness to eliminate suspicion and turn thinking from confrontation to confidence.

Until the final days of the conference the United States and some of its NATO allies categorically opposed any restrictions on military activities. They even disputed the very term "restriction," demanding that the term "restraint" be used in its place in discussions. Naturally, this stubborn unwillingness to limit the scope of major military exercises aroused justifiable suspicion in the opposing side. What, for example, is a present-day large NATO exercise? It involves placing armed forces on the scale of the entire European continent in combat readiness, shifting the work of management agencies up to the very highest level to a wartime status, and bringing troops, aviation and naval forces to combat readiness. In the course of these exercises large contingents of troops and aviation are transferred to Europe from overseas. These transfers are accompanied by extensive measures to mobilize human and material resources.

Only as a result of the persistent efforts of the socialist countries, which spoke out together with the neutral and nonaligned states, were the NATO countries forced to retreat from their categorical refusal to consider measures for restricting military activity. The participant-states agreed to provide by 15 November of each year brief information concerning the exercises that they intend to hold at a level of 40,000 to 75,000 men over the next two years. The largest exercises, in which more than 75,000 personnel take part, are not supposed to be held at all unless notification of them is provided two years in advance.

It should be noted that these modest provisions, as all of the participant-states acknowledge, merely represent the beginning of restrictive measures. They will continue to be examined. This is specially emphasized in the interpretative statement that was made at the conference's final session by the USSR delegation and officially registered in a protocol.

As is known, the Soviet Union is prepared to undertake any reasonable verification measures that help strengthen confidence among countries. This was persuasively demonstrated once again in Stockholm. There, thanks to the

USSR's constructive position, agreement was reached that every participant-state would permit no more than three inspections a year on its territory in the event of the violation of the document's conditions regarding confidence-building measures. The reaching of agreement on inspection is a qualitatively new element that may have a positive influence on the conduct of other negotiations at which questions of international security and disarmament are considered.

Of course, at this stage it was not possible to resolve all the issues that the socialist countries raised in Stockholm. For example, the issues of notification about independent air and naval exercises were postponed until the second stage. It is a secret to no one that it is precisely these two types of armed forces that represent the greatest threat to security. The exclusion of independent air and naval military activity from coverage by confidence-building measures causes great uneasiness not just for the Soviet Union but for many other states.

The agreements in Stockholm became possible only because common sense, political realism and a sense of responsibility gained the upper hand. They represent compromise solutions based on a mutually acceptable balance of the security interests of all the conference participants.

The measures in the military area lay important foundations for strengthening confidence and security in Europe. Now a solid foundation of military confidence-building measures, accompanied by reliable verification, including inspection, has been placed under the political aspects of European security. This creates great hopefulness for preserving peace and cooperation on the continent.

The conclusion of the Stockholm conference with significant and concrete agreements may contribute to achieving a radical improvement of the atmosphere not just in Europe but beyond its borders, and may foster the development of confidence as an inseparable component of relations among states. "The Soviet leadership," stated M.S. Gorbachev, "assesses in a positive light the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. A major step has been taken to reduce tension and to improve the international political climate, steps that are so necessary for solving the vital problems of our nuclear age."

A new field of confidence and detente has been plowed. It should yield good shoots of future agreements both at the all-European meeting in Vienna and at the second stage of the Stockholm Conference.

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CSO: 5200/1116

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

PRAVDA ON CONCLUSION OF STOCKHOLM MEETING

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by M. Kostikov: "Trust and Safety for Europe"]

[Text] The first phase of the Conference to Strengthen Trust, Safety and Disarmament in Europe was completed in the Swedish capital on 22 September. The final document adopted by representatives of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada, is essentially a qualitatively new step on the path toward creating an atmosphere of trust and strengthening safety, which meet the vitally important interests of Europe and future peace.

The Stockholm agreements were primarily directed toward strengthening the pledges of the governments to refrain from using force in international relations, including that in its most dangerous manifestation--the use of armed force. Thus, yet another important decision was made that an international pledge to refrain from any threat of force or to use it became an effective and immutable law.

One of the important results of Stockholm was to adopt a set of supplementary measures to strengthen trust and safety in the military area, implementation of which will lead to a reduction of the hazard of military conflict and will simultaneously contribute to solution of disarmament problems in Europe. These measures, which are politically obligatory in nature, encompass such key problems as notification of military exercises, transfers and redeployment of troops, an agreement to train observers, to exchange annual plans of announced military activity and to restrict it on the European continent. Implementation of these agreements is essential to reduce the risk of armed conflict and the use of force.

Having adopted these measures of trust in the military area, the Stockholm meeting thus lays important bases for strengthening the climate of trust and safety in Europe. The essentially political aspects of European safety will now be based on a broader foundation of limiting measures in the military area than before. This creates a large degree of confidence in maintaining peace and in development of cooperation on the continent.

New paths and possibilities are thus opened up so that the Stockholm agreements will be further disseminated to the other continents of the world to strengthen measures of trust and safety, which would contribute to creation of a universal system of international security.

Agreements on effective and adequate forms of verification, including on-site inspections, acquire special significance. Reliable verification is important at all stages of instilling trust and safety and of achieving disarmament not only in Europe but in the entire world as well.

The results of the meeting were essentially a practical development of the Helsinki Accord with regard to the presently existing political and military realities in Europe.

The important agreements reached at Stockholm became possible due to the subsequent efforts of the Socialist countries, of neutral and nonaligned states and because of all conference participants, due to the political reality and the feeling of responsibility that they manifested, which made it possible to overcome many obstacles and difficulties in achieving a compromise, based on a mutually acceptable balance of security interests of all participating countries.

The results of the Stockholm agreements indicate, as the Special Ambassador O. A. Grinevskiy, the head of the USSR delegation, stated at the concluding plenary session, that there are more possibilities for lessening tension, that the logic of confrontation has outlived itself, while the tendency toward strengthening peace has deep roots and is essentially irreversible. The results of the meeting create a favorable atmosphere for further movement toward step-by-step implementation of further effective and specific actions directed toward development and activation of an all-European process, the beginning of which was laid more than 10 years ago in Helsinki. They are of important significance for the work of a Vienna meeting of representatives of the participating governments of the Helsinki Accord on European security and cooperation and serve as a guarantee of a successful beginning for the beginning phase of the conference, at which problems of disarmament on the European continent will be discussed.

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CSO: 5200/70

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET BOOK ON MBFR HIGHLIGHTS COUNTING DISPUTE

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNIY ZHURNAL) in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 pp 67-71

[Review by A. L. Samoylov of book "Venskiye Peregovory: Nauchnyy Sovet po Issledovaniyu Problem Mira i Razoruzheniya" [Vienna Negotiations: Scientific Counsel on Problems of Peace and Disarmament] by G. E. Kamenskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1985; 89 pages]

[Text] This work notes that the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe should have been concluded long ago. However, up to now not even one line of a future agreement has been put down on paper--such an occurrence is rarely met in international negotiations practice. In round after round the NATO countries using various farfetched pretenses block the development of a treaty text. In addition, the achievement of agreements on reducing military groupings in Central Europe and their realization are the only way of reducing the high concentrations of troops and weapons which are a dangerous source of tension in Europe.

The concept of "deterrence" to which the North Atlantic Bloc adheres as their policy only stimulates new military preparations and new rounds in the arms race. As everywhere else the Warsaw Pact countries do not want to upset the existing military balance in Central Europe (p 6-7). Their policy and the construction of the armed forces are strictly ruled by a defensive military doctrine which does not seek to achieve superiority over the other side and which is not based on the first use of nuclear weapons or preemptive strikes and excludes the possibility of a "lightening invasion" in Western Europe. Since it is directed at achieving reliable security for socialist states this doctrine therefore considers the legal security interests of other states and nations (p 6, 7).

The USSR and other socialist states have no political, economic, social or other purpose which they intend to achieve using military means in Europe or anywhere else. They expend no more for defense than is actually necessary (p 7). The pamphlet's analysis of the positions and proposals by various countries in the Geneva forum shows that it is the socialist states who are really conducting negotiations in a constructive spirit, not trying to drive the other side into accepting obligations for which they themselves are not

ready and doing everything possible to achieve equal and mutually acceptable treaties (p 8).

At the same time NATO countries in a vain attempt to achieve military superiority at the expense of the security of the socialist states hold on to unrealistic positions, dragging out the time by piling up various obstacles to an agreement. Their "new" proposals to the Vienna forum are in the main only another "package" for previous ones which led to this cul-de-sac in negotiations. These proposals, based on positions and conditions which are unacceptable to the socialist states, are clearly not considered as part of a serious and business-like dialog and are intended only to camouflage NATO's line to increase weapons and armed forces (p 9).

The agreement to conduct negotiations to limit forces and weapons in Central Europe was concluded during the Soviet-American summit in May, 1972. In preparatory consultations in 1973 in Vienna, they established the subject of the negotiations--mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe and measures connected with this, the region in which the reductions would take place was outlined, and the group of states which would be direct participants in the negotiations and the troops and arms which were subject to reduction in the Central European region were established. Other states participating in consultations -- Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Turkey -- were given a special status by which they might make contributions to the discussion on practical issues, make proposals for negotiation and distribute documents but would not participate in making the decisions. They agreed on the principles for drafting future treaties: reciprocity and that neither side would suffer a reduction in security. The participants also agreed to organizational matters (pp 34, 35).

The many initiatives and proposals from the socialist states provided preconditions for the Vienna negotiations to make important contributions reducing the level of military confrontation in Central Europe. The Western plan avoided the fundamental issue of the responsibilities of the other six western direct participants besides the United States to reduce their weapons and armed forces.

Among the barriers set up by NATO at the Vienna process, first of all, is the West's intentional inflation of the actual strength of the armed forces of the USSR, GDR, PPR and the CZSSR in Central Europe. Naturally, the unfounded Western calculations and the size of the suggested cuts based on them were decisively rejected by the socialist delegates in Vienna. The NATO countries are trying to impose a system on the socialist countries which clearly smell of espionage and are not connected with the tasks of supporting a future agreement (p 63).

A clear example of how the NATO countries will use anything in the Vienna negotiations to obtain unilateral military superiority is the so-called "geographic factor", specifically, the unequal distance of U.S. and USSR territories from the area of future reductions. In this case the mobilization capability of only two of the twelve participants in the negotiations are evaluated and compared without considering many other mobilization factors such as the populations of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, their sizes,

economic and military-industrial potential, availability of a transportation network and other communications and so forth (p 68).

As opposed to the NATO bloc countries the socialist states are doing everything they can, and using any real opportunity to more rapidly achieve concrete results which will make progress toward military detente in Central Europe possible (p 77). They have never proposed an initiative which would be harmful to the security interests of the Western partners in the negotiations and have never tried to impose deliberately unrealistic obligations on the other side. The position of the Warsaw Pact states is developed, concrete, and considers the interest of the Western party insofar as it is possible without being harmful to the security of the socialist community (p 78).

The experience at the Vienna negotiations which have been strung out for long years because of the Western participants show that the Vienna negotiations are viewed by the NATO countries more as a political alibi to conceal the course toward militarization and the achievement of military superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries (pp 80, 81).

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CSO: 5200/1012

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

TASS: PACT WORKING GROUP--Moscow, 16 January (TASS)--A meeting of the working group of experts of the Warsaw Treaty member-states on questions of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe was held in Budapest on 15-16 January. The meeting discussed the state of affairs with the popularisation of the Budapest Address of the Warsaw Treaty member-states on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of a European scale with taking into account the discussion of these matters at the Vienna meeting of representatives of participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), contacts with NATO countries, with other European states. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1721 GMT 16 Jan 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1248

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: OPENING OF GENEVA NUCLEAR TEST TALKS

Gerasimov Briefs Press

LD201414 Moscow TASS in English 1359 GMT 20 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, January 20 TASS -- The Soviet side is fully resolved to turn the new round of the Geneva talks, opening on January 22, into a preparatory round for the starting of fullscale talks with the ultimate aim of fully ending nuclear tests, it was stated, by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Speaking at a briefing here today he said that in its striving to put an end to the dangerous competition of states in buiding up nuclear arsenals the Soviet delegation had proposed to the American side to immediately start the drafting of accords on the full prohibition of nuclear tests and also solve other related questions. But no accords were reached because of the non-constructive stand taken by the United States.

The American side refuses to study the question of the full termination of tests and proposed to discuss only one question at the talks -- the revision of the provisions concerning verification contained in the signed treaties of 1974 and 1976. The United States has not ratified these two treaties to this day.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that the deployment of the phased array big American radar in Greenland is a violation of the ABM Treaty. He reminded that today is the 533rd of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. This moratorium can be an endless one if the American side joins it.

Talks Begin

LD221920 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 22 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva January 22 TASS -- The scheduled round of Soviet-American talks on issues of ending nuclear testing began here today.

The Soviet delegation is led by Andranik Petrosyants, chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Atomic Energy.

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CSO: 5200/1257

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: COMMISSION WORKING ON NORDIC NFZ TREATY

LD202128 Moscow TASS in English 2102 GMT 20 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, 20 January (TASS)--Tass news analyst Valentin Vasilets writes:

The commission of parliamentarians of northern countries on the question of setting up a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe has taken another step along the road which must finally lead to the implementation of the goal set. This step is the decision to work out in the current year the provisions that could later be included in a treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe. In other words, practical work has been started in this sphere, which can only be welcomed.

As is known, Moscow not just welcomes the working out of the treaty but is also prepared to promote the success of the undertaking. It has already proclaimed its consent to assume a commitment on non-use of nuclear weapons against north European countries, parties to treaties. Member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev during his recent visit to Finland proclaimed concrete Soviet measures which could help consolidate peace, security and stability in the region.

The action of the north European parliamentarians attests to a remarkable phenomenon in international life which deserves special mention. It is well known that Western propaganda, above all U.S. propaganda, has invariably been ridiculing the idea of nuclear-free zones as absolutely unrealistic, divorced from reality, as a utopia. This stand has actually remained unchanged throughout 30 years, since the time the idea was conceived. But the idea has been gaining momentum.

The movement in support of the creation of nuclear-free zones emerged since then in many areas of the world. A treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific recently came into effect.

What is the explanation for the viability and attractiveness of the idea of nuclear-free zones? First, it is feasible and makes it possible to pass on from declarations to real steps in combatting the nuclear arms race. And this real contribution can be made by small states that have no nuclear arsenals themselves. The striving of many states to impart concrete feasible forms to their protests against nuclear danger is manifested in the creation of nuclear-free zones.

Second, the emergence of such zones apparently promotes the consolidation of the international regime of nuclear weapons non-proliferation. And nobody questions the importance of this task, particularly in view of the fact that the number of countries

having industrial, technological and scientific potential for the creation of nuclear weapons is increasing. The emergence of nuclear-free zones is a clear, direct road to limiting the spread of the most horrible weapons of mass destruction.

In a word, the idea of nuclear-free zones will persist and be effective, until the whole globe is rid of nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1247

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA CITES PETROSYANTS ON VERIFICATION

PM161644 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[Interview with A.M. Petrosyants, head of Soviet delegation to talks on ending and banning nuclear weapon tests, under the rubric "Authoritative Opinion": "Not a Question of Verification" -- first three paragraphs are unattributed introduction]

[Text] U.S. President Reagan has sent a letter to the Senate expressing the administration's readiness to agree in principle to the ratification of the Soviet-American 1974 treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. However, this is accompanied by the setting of conditions for verification of compliance with the treaties. Thus the President's letter says, in particular:

"Unfortunately... the treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are not effectively verifiable in their present form. Large uncertainties are present in the current method employed by the United States to estimate Soviet test yields. I have on several occasions reported to Congress on the problems with Soviet compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. Therefore, achieving Soviet agreement to improved verification measures that would provide for effective verification of these treaties has been my highest priority in the area of nuclear testing limitations."

We asked A.M. Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy and head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on ending and banning nuclear weapon tests, to comment on this statement. This is what he said:

[Petrosyants] The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its desire to ratify the treaties named, if the United States confirms its readiness to do the same. But as you can see, the U.S. Administration took 10 years in one case and 12 years in the other to come round to the idea of submitting them to the Senate for ratification, even then stipulating it is necessary to step up verification of compliance.

In this connection I must remind you the USSR has repeatedly declared its agreement to the establishment of any verification to ensure confidence in the compliance with these treaties, including on-site inspection [proverka na mestakh] if necessary.

I should also say that both treaties, even without being ratified, are effectively in force, although doubts, requiring appropriate explanations, have arisen more than once on both sides as to compliance with the terms of the 1974 treaty, which limits the yield of underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons. Incidentally, I will observe that doubts and inquiries have often come from the United States even when there were no grounds for this.

Washington extols the "Cortex" method to improve verification, although it has substantial shortcomings. American experts have evidently convinced the President of the advantages of this method without telling him what the U.S. delegation admitted at the talks, namely: The "Cortex" method determines the yield of an underground nuclear explosion with an error of plus or minus 30 percent. In other words, if the yield of the explosion is 100 kilotons, the method could record it as 70 or 130 kilotons. And that is, of course, fraught with the risk of distrust and complaints.

It has also been stated repeatedly in this context that the USSR is prepared to discuss at the conference table, with the participation of qualified experts, and to adopt all necessary decisions to improve verification of the yield of nuclear explosions, provided this work is oriented without fail toward preparing a treaty on ending tests and banning nuclear weapons.

We would like the American delegation to come to the fourth round of the talks, which opens on 22 January, with a decision to embark on preparing such a treaty. Then the Soviet and American delegations would be able in a calm, businesslike atmosphere to discuss and adopt the necessary decisions on the organization and implementation of the best forms of verification. This could be carried out both by all technical means of national verification and with the participation of international verification, and where necessary, on-site inspections.

In any event, for our country verification is not a problem. The USSR is no less interested than the United States in ensuring that verification is effective. We are in favor of resolving all questions of verification, on condition, I repeat, this is a stage on the path to preparing a treaty on a total end to tests and the banning of nuclear weapons.

So there is no need for the American side to "break down an open door," as the saying goes. It is even worse if the question of verification is being raised again in Washington solely to block the decision which the peoples of the world await and demand.

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CSO: 5200/1247

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS 16 JANUARY FIRE AT TEST MONITORING SITE

LD221523 Moscow TASS in English 1428 GMT 22 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS -- On the night of January 16-17 severe cold caused a short circuit that started a fire at one of the three stations monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear explosions in Bayan-Aul (Kazakhstan), carried out within the framework of the joint Soviet-American experiment.

The fire destroyed the auxiliary premises in which the instruments recording data of equipment monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear explosions were kept, a briefing today was told by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman. The servicing personnel also used these premises but there was no loss of life. The equipment installed in shafts is intact. To continue the experiment it is necessary to replace the recording instruments.

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CSO: 5200/1247

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET DAILY LAUDS STEP TOWARD NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SCANDANAVIA

Moscow SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Ivan Beydin: "A Reasonable Approach"]

[Text] The movement toward creation of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world occupies an important place in the struggle to eliminate the hazard of war and elimination of nuclear weapons. It has acquired an especially broad scope in northern Europe. It is in this part of the continent that a number of practical steps have been undertaken to create such a zone.

Specifically, it was decided in mid-August at a conference of the heads of the governments of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland, held in the Danish city of Stengard, to organize a working group at the government level of the mentioned countries to study all aspects related to creation of a nuclear-free zone. This question will be considered at the next meeting of the foreign ministers of the northern countries at the beginning of next year in Reykjavik, Iceland.

Yet another practical step was undertaken somewhat later toward creation of a nuclear-free zone in the European Arctic. We have in mind the formation of a parliamentary committee of Arctic countries. This committee was established at a meeting of the parliaments of five countries in Copenhagen. It included representatives of 17 political parties who are members of the parliaments. The social democrats were the initiator of creating the committee, but it included representatives of other parties as well--from communists to conservative leaders.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party and the former Prime Minister of Denmark Anker Jorgensen, in estimating the significance of creating the committee, noted that this decision was adopted unanimously. He called on all parties who have not defined their positions to join the committee.

Creation of a committee for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe was approved by the broad public. Specifically, delegates of a conference of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions of Sweden at Goteburg specifically supported it. At the beginning of November, parliamentarians of the five northern countries will again meet in Copenhagen to work out a specific plan of action.

The public of the northern countries rightfully feels that creation of a nuclear-free zone in their region would be an appreciable contribution in the struggle for nuclear disarmament on the European continent.

The new decision of the Soviet government to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing is serious support to those struggling for a nuclear-free European Arctic. Of course, there are many obstacles in the path of creating such a zone. Reactionary forces in these countries are opposed to the antinuclear movement. The ruling circles of the United States and their allies throughout NATO are also decisively opposed to this.

With regard to the socialist countries, they all decisively support the efforts of the northern countries and wish them success in their actions against the nuclear threat.

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CSO: 5200/70

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS: SPANISH NFZ URGED--Madrid, 14 January](TASS)--Spain's Communist Party has urged parliament (Les Cortes Generales) to elaborate provisions on Spain's nuclear-free status and sign them into law, Enrique Curiel, deputy general secretary of Spain's Communist Party, who represents the united left coalition in parliament, told a news conference in Madrid. Spain's Communist Party demands that the U.S. military bases in Spain be dismantled, the respective Spanish-U.S. treaty be denounced and Spain be withdrawn from the NATO military committee, Curiel stressed. [Text]
[Moscow TASS in English 1800 GMT 14 Jan 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1247

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY PARIS CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT

7 Jan News Conference

LD080853 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Paris January 8 TASS -- Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, now here for political consultations with the Foreign Ministry of France, held a press conference here on Wednesday.

In his introductory statement V. Petrovskiy stressed that his stay on French soil coincided with the eve of the first anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986 when the Soviet Union came out with large-scale peace initiatives opening prospects for delivering our planet from nuclear, chemical and other lethal weapons before the end of this century.

The past year was marked by persistent struggle by the Soviet Union for the realization of these proposals and implementation of practical direct steps towards a nuclear-free world. Its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon tests was a concrete expression of the Soviet Union's determination to relieve this planet from nuclear fear. This moratorium was recently prolonged again, for the fifth time, and will remain in force in the current year unless the United States holds nuclear tests.

A maximum of goodwill and the desire to take account of the legitimate interests and positions of other countries were invested in the package of agreements which the Soviet Union put on the table at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik. That was a moment when mankind glimpsed, as it were, beyond the horizon and saw that prospects of a world free from the nuclear threat are not a utopia, but quite a feasible goal.

At the same time, the reaction of many politicians to the Reykjavik meeting showed how strong the stereotypes of old thinking still are in the minds of politicians and with what difficulty the new approach is asserting itself, an approach based on the conviction that it is not force but the triumph of reason that must become the basis of international intercourse. But the efforts of the Soviet Union and all realistically-minded forces of the world were not in vain.

The Stockholm accords, the Vienna convention on the safe development of nuclear-power engineering, the Delhi declaration, and the results of the 41st U.N. General Assembly session are all convincing evidence of the fact that the new notion on the frontiers of the necessary, realistic and possible in conditions of the nuclear-space age is forcing its way. [sentence as received]

Carrying out the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU on the establishment of an all-embracing security system, the Soviet Union comes out with constructive initiatives for restructuring international relations in all spheres.

There were no international talks or forums in 1986 at which the Soviet Union would not make concrete practical proposals on disarmament, for unblocking conflict and crisis situations, ensuring economic security, solving problems of human rights, international terrorism, etc.

We continue to keep the door open to a dialogue and talks in all directions leading to eradication of militarism in its nuclear, chemical or other clothing and improving the international situation, V. Petrovskiy said. We believe that one must not indifferently watch any longer the rate of military preparations outpacing diplomatic efforts to curb the arms race. Such an indifference threatens with death.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the state of affairs in Europe and strives for lowering the level of military confrontation on the continent, reducing considerably armed forces and armaments, freeing Europe from nuclear and chemical weapons and developing active cooperation in the political, economic and humanitarian fields. Europe whose culture has been asserting, in the course of many centuries, faith in man's reason, should be, today too, a powerful generator of the movement for a better, more secure and just world, V. Petrovskiy said in conclusion.

Consultations Reported

LD082250 Moscow TASS in English 2241 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Paris January 9 TASS -- Soviet-French political consultations have been held here. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy took part in them.

In the course of the consultations there was an indepth exchange of views on the question of banning chemical weapons and concluding a relevant convention already in 1987. Also discussed were some other problems of disarmament and developing cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and nuclear energy. The question of putting into action the preparatory mechanism of an international conference on the Middle East settlement was studied. A meeting was held with the French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond.

The USSR Ambassador in France Yakov Ryabov took part in the consultations and conversations.

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN 1986

PM151619 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "In the Interests of All the Peoples"]

[Text] A year ago, on 15 January 1986, the entire planet heard M.S. Gorbachev's statement which outlined the program for creating a nuclear-free world and eliminating all kinds of mass destruction weaponry, including chemical weapons, by the end of the century. The appearance of this most important document of our day was dictated as new political thinking based on the prime importance of common human values and the need to pool efforts in building a world free of violence, suspicion, and fear.

The Soviet Union made this initiative -- unprecedented in terms of its scale and aims -- at the very time the acute question of mankind's survival was being placed on the agenda. So much nuclear explosive has been accumulated on the planet there is enough to kill everyone on earth several times over. Nonetheless, the arms race continues through the fault of the United States. Furthermore, it threatens to move into space, which will create an unforeseeable situation. Under these circumstances our country, relying on the support of all peace-loving forces, has conducted a resolute offensive against the threat of nuclear war.

During the past year the Soviet Union fleshed out its program, reinforcing it with practical steps. The most important of these is the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. Striving to erect an effective barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has repeatedly extended its moratorium. Concern for a nuclear-free world also dictated the USSR's latest decision -- to extend the moratorium after 1 January 1987 until the first U.S. explosion.

The proposal advanced by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states for comprehensive and deep cuts in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals gained the progressive public's broad support. It cuts the ground from under the feet of the opponents of nuclear disarmament, who have stated that the elimination of nuclear arsenals would allegedly ensure Soviet superiority in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces.

In the chronicle of events since the 15 January 1986 statement a special place goes to the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit. It was aimed at determining a way out of the vicious circle of the accelerating arms race. Owing to Washington's obstructionist position the meeting did not lead to any practical results. Nonetheless, real prospects for a nuclear-free world opened up before mankind thanks to the meeting.

A portentous landmark on the road of ridding the planet of mass destruction weaponry was the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, which was signed during the Soviet-Indian meeting. It is in line with the conditions of the nuclear and space ages and reflects the interests of the entire world community and the hopes and aspirations of all the peoples.

The Land of the Soviets firmly defends the cause of peace in the international arena. The Soviet Union supported the "Harare Appeal," which voiced the Nonaligned Movement's call for an end to the arms race and the abolition of nuclear weapons. It also responded with complete understanding and readiness for practical action to the appeal from the "six states on four continents" which advocated a speedy end to the nuclear arms race and the prevention of weapons being launched into space. The USSR actively supported a whole series of proposals for reducing the level of military confrontation in certain parts of Europe and put forward its own large-scale initiatives for ensuring lasting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union was one of the socialist countries which put forward the concept of a comprehensive international security system for discussion at the 41st UN General Assembly session...

M.S. Gorbachev's message to UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar was a new boost to the practical action to ensure that peace is everlasting. It reaffirms our country's commitment to saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war and creating the foundations of comprehensive security equal for all. At the same time the message is also an impassioned appeal for exceptional effort leading to the implementation of real measures to limit and end the arms race.

The desperate opposition to the cause of peace and detente on the part of the U.S. military-industrial complex and the other aggressive forces of international imperialism stood out sharply against the background of the Soviet Union's untiring desire to do everything possible to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The erosion and subversion of existing agreements limiting nuclear arsenals -- including the SALT II treaty -- and the attempts to wreck strategic stability and attain military superiority continue. The West strives to present Soviet peace initiatives as a kind of socialist weakness and to prove that if just a little more pressure were applied the Soviet Union would fold and be forced to concede its positions.

The attempts and hopes of the supporters of the arms race are in vain. The USSR's love of peace has nothing to do with weakness. The peaceful labor of the Soviet people and their friends and allies is reliably defended. The mighty USSR Armed Forces, equipped with everything they need, stand guard over socialist gains.

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA ON REYKJAVIK RESULTS, PACIFIC SECURITY, NFZ

PM061445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov International Review]

[Excerpts] The Reykjavik Achievements [subhead]

We have entered the year of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, the 70th anniversary of Lenin's Decree on Peace. At the present crucial historical stage the role of the first socialist country as the advocate and defender of general human interests and values stands out particularly visibly.

When the world was faced with the choice between mankind's destruction of nuclear weapons or mankind's destruction by nuclear weapons, it was the motherland of the October Revolution which showed the way to resolve this dilemma. On 15 January last year the Soviet program for freeing the world from nuclear weapons before the end of this century was announced. It was that concrete plan of action which predetermined the irresistible force of the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik. Those proposals, as the New Year address to the Soviet people said, enabled mankind to look beyond the horizon and see the outlines of a nuclear-free world.

Of course, turning the prospect into a reality will not be easy. You can hardly predict how much actual progress will be made toward that goal this year. But one thing is in no doubt: Moscow would like to overcome the state of fruitlessness and inertia existing in the Soviet-U.S. talks and give them real dynamism. As M.S. Gorbachev stated replying to a U.S. journalist recently, that is what we worked for in Reykjavik and we shall work even more energetically for it in 1987.

The New Year statement of the "Delhi Six" says that the USSR and U.S. leaders were very close to agreements which could pave the way to the elimination of all nuclear armaments. It is gratifying that the proposals put forward in the Icelandic capital remain in force. For that very reason, the "Six" believe, 1987 offers the USSR and the United States an opportunity to reach agreement on a number of important measures in the disarmament sphere including considerable reductions in the nuclear arsenals.

In the words of the Indian, Argentine, Mexican, Greek, Tanzanian, and Swedish leaders, their appeals for a rapid ending of nuclear tests and the prevention of the arms race in space have now acquired even greater topicality. [paragraph continues]

The statement's authors again urged the United States to join in the Soviet moratorium. The "Delhi Six" urged Washington and Moscow to resume all-embracing talks as quickly as possible so as to achieve their declared aim: to prevent the arms race in space, to end it on earth, and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons everywhere.

On New Year's Eve, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger was asked how he saw the effect of the "Star Wars" program on the problem of arms control in the light of the Reykjavik meeting.

"In my opinion, nothing happened in Reykjavik," the Pentagon chief stated bluntly. "The SDI program is taking its own course and should in no way be linked with arms reduction. It is important to implement the strategic defense program come what may and will remain one of the President's paramount tasks come what may..."

Thus the stumbling block is to remain. Consequently, this is the range of positions: There is the voice of reason resounding from Moscow; the authoritative opinion of the "Delhi Six"; and the obdurate obstinacy of Washington. This contrast shows that the struggle for a nuclear-free world and mankind's survival can and must be waged on the basis of the achievements in Reykjavik. But it will not be easy.

The Truth Behind the "Doctrine" [subhead]

From the very first days of the new year in Tokyo a new trend has appeared in Japan's foreign policy efforts. Foreign minister Kuranari decided to open his diplomatic calendar with a visit to Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Papua-New Guinea. Initially it was supposed that after the regular Japanese-Australian consultations Kuranari would set off for Washington so as to somehow ease the high feelings concerning the growing imbalance in bilateral trade (in 1985 Japanese exports to the United States exceeded imports by \$50 billion and in 1986, by all accounts, that figure will increase to \$70 million). It transpires, however, that the "Irangate" scandal has for the moment pushed this problem into the background and that the White House is in no mood to receive guests from Tokyo now.

That is why it was announced that the Japanese foreign minister intends to begin the year with a visit to countries in the South Pacific, and to announce Tokyo's "Pacific doctrine" during this tour since this region has unexpectedly assumed special significance for Japan's national security.

The truth behind the doctrine is revealed by MAINICHI. According to that newspaper the ANZUS treaty has virtually ceased to be operative in the South Pacific because the New Zealand Government has decided not to allow U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons to visit its ports. On the other hand, the Soviet Union recently concluded fishing agreements with the Pacific Ocean island states of Kiribati and Vanuatu and established contacts with Fiji. All this, MAINICHI notes, is extremely worrisome to Washington. Thus Japan must comprehensively step up its ties with the South Pacific states so as to "block Soviet penetration and keep the region in the orbit of Western influence."

The hysteria about "Soviet expansion" was of course not caused by the appearance of our tuna ships off the shores of Kiribati or Vanuatu. As London's THE ECONOMIST puts it, the Americans are trying to check the spread of the "nuclear allergy." They are alarmed by the influence of New Zealand's example on the public of the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. They do not like the Rarotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Now Japan has been set the task of pressuring the region using the neocolonialist range of economic and financial levers. It has been decided to double Japanese credits and subsidies to Oceania. Nine small island states will soon be visited by a specially formed group of representatives of Japanese state institutions and private firm.

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW ASSAILS U.S. SALT, MORATORIUM STANCE

LD092127 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Jan 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; commentary by political observer Valentin Zorin]

[Text] A new bout of militarist fever in Washington -- that's the theme of the commentary by central television political observer Valentin Zorin.

[Begin recording; video shows Zorin in studio] Hello comrades. In medicine there is a method of treatment which is resorted to in particularly dangerous cases and which is called shock therapy. One has the impression that the Washington administration, finding itself, in connection with the scandal which has received the name Irangate, in an extremely difficult situation that threatens everyone in the current presidency, has now gone for precisely this sort of shock therapy. Unable to justify the serious violation of laws committed not just anywhere, but in the White House, and having become entangled in lies and sinking deeper and deeper in the quagmire of the growing scandal, Washington's ruling clique is trying to save itself by banking on a new outburst of jingoism and creating an atmosphere of military hysteria in the country.

Here are events of only the last few days: Once again the SALT II treaty has been deliberately violated -- already the second heavy B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles above the limit allowed by the treaty has been brought into operation. With deliberate, broad publicity it has been announced that a new batch of MX strategic offensive missiles have been deployed on their launch sites. The launch of the "Tennessee" nuclear submarine vessel, equipped with missiles, has been publicized just as deliberately. Stirring up tension in the American public, the Pentagon is organizing a deliberate leak of information about preparations at the Nevada test site for a whole series of nuclear tests. Finally, in the last few days, the President has sent Congress a draft budget for the next financial year in which military allocations, compared to current level, are increased at a stroke by \$23 billion.

Washington has not for a long time experienced such a concentrated, whipped up military fever. All this is taking place against the background of a broad program for strengthening peace and security put forward by the Soviet Union. Implementing its militarist campaign, which it is difficult to qualify as anything other than provocative, the Washington leadership is apparently pursuing two aims: first, by expressly whipping up tension, to divert the attention of the American public from the scandalous political failure of the Republican administration and try to extricate itself from the situation in which it has found itself; second, by throwing a bone to the military-industrial concerns, to strengthen its political base and liven up, in a moment of difficulty, their by no means disinterested support.

However, the matter is far from being as simple as some of the inhabitants of the White House think. There is not only indignation growing in the country over the political scandal, but also protest against the administration's course. How this develops will be seen in the not-so-distant future. [end recording]

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S SOKOLOV ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, INF, TESTING

LE MONDE Account

PM211000 Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Soviet Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov: "The USSR's Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The Soviet Union thinks competition in the arms race -- both in respect to quantity and quality -- and the desire to achieve military superiority will not result in a political or military advantage in the nuclear and space age. The path leading to security requires the lowering of the level of military confrontation by the reduction and subsequent complete liquidation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Military potential must be reduced to a level which corresponds to defense requirements alone. This is not a very easy task.

The situation is the following: On the one hand the U.S. President signs a political statement proclaiming there must be no nuclear war, that there would be no victors in such a war, and that his country will not try to achieve military superiority, and, on the other hand, he signs the Pentagon's programs which aim to prepare for global and "limited" wars against the USSR and the other socialist countries in the hope of winning.

The United States is going ahead with preparations for military operations from space, which present a threat to all states and to mankind as a whole. At the same time competition is being revived in the sphere of chemical weapons and arms which use new physical principles and provide a qualitative leap forward compared with so-called conventional weapons.

Why are the U.S. and NATO leaders refusing to bring together the Warsaw Pact general staffs and the general staffs of the NATO forces in Europe? Such meetings would make it possible to clarify the military situation in Europe. Why did they not agree to the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal for a meeting between the two organizations' general secretaries? The West also refused to convene the working groups of experts -- which exist in the two organizations -- to examine the problems of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

What are we to think of this lack of interest in such contacts? It clearly reflects either an error of judgment (namely the Warsaw Pact has greater need of a normal military and political climate), or the illusion that NATO could achieve the military supremacy it seeks, and could impose its law on the USSR and its allies "from positions of strength."

In my capacity as a soldier informed of the potential of modern weapons, I can merely make the following observation: The sooner illusions about strength are abandoned, the better it will be. Better for everybody.

The Soviet Union is prepared to structure its defense without relying on nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. We agree to immediately reorganize our entire military system in accordance with denuclearization, provided all other nuclear powers do likewise. The Soviet Union thinks that nuclear disarmament ought to be accompanied by a considerable reduction in conventional weapons, on the basis of reciprocity.

The Idea of a Nuclear-Free World [subhead]

At present the USSR is not merely calling for a reasonable reorganization of the world. As far as the situation allows, we are taking practical initiatives to improve the international situation, even when there is no reciprocity. The USSR pledged unilaterally not to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons. This decision is an inviolable law for the Soviet armed forces.

The Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear tests for 18 months. It has unilaterally suspended the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and has withdrawn some of them from service. We have frozen work in antisatellite weapons and so forth.

The positions adopted by the USSR during the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik embody the idea of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 -- an idea put forward by Mr Gorbachev. The major compromises we proposed in Iceland on a whole series of points relating to nuclear and space weapons created a favorable climate for historic progress toward freeing mankind from the nuclear threat. The U.S. policy of "positions of strength" created an obstacle to a nuclear-free world and the U.S. "Star Wars" program scuttled the signing of an agreement.

It is an illusion to chase after the specter of military superiority, to try and guarantee your own security at the expense of other people's security, and to cherish the vain hope of creating the "ultimate weapon" in the framework of "Star Wars" -- a weapon designed to prevent any retaliation in the case of a nuclear war. No such weapon exists, and we are prepared to prove this by asymmetrical measures. Is it necessary to adopt such extreme measures? Would it not be more reasonable to act on the basis of political agreements?

Our program is constructive and it takes into consideration the interests of all states, primarily the European states. Parity would be maintained at all stages of its implementation, and no state would see its security undermined. It makes provision for the liquidation not only of nuclear weapons, but of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons.

This program has been complemented in an integrated way by the Warsaw Pact member states which have proposed considerable reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. If the NATO states were willing to agree, the level of military confrontation between the two groups would be reduced by more than 1 million men by the early eighties.

The Soviet leaders are aware of the complexity of the problem presented by the denuclearization of our planet. They are also aware of the fact the continuation of the arms race brings the world ever closer to nuclear disaster. Unless measures are taken now, man is likely to lose control over events. The USSR thinks it has a duty to make every effort to protect the future of our planet from a catastrophe.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Account

PM221701 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense: "Security: Problems and Potential"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The French newspaper LE MONDE asked the USSR defense minister to write an article in connection with the anniversary of M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement.

The article was published 20 January 1987 in considerably abbreviated form, which gives readers an incomplete impression of its content. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes the full text of the USSR defense minister's article.

Maybe never before has the world community's attention been concentrated to such an extent on vital questions of war and peace. This is understandable since never before has civilization been subjected to dangers comparable with those of the present, never has the threat of the destruction of life on earth been so real [aktualnyy] by virtue of the existence of arms systems capable of destroying the planet's vital nerve. Mankind's future is inextricably linked with the prevention of war and consequently with the ending of the arms race, the achievement of equal and universal security for all countries, and the exclusion of violence from international relations. Each country has the right to live in the way it considers necessary. This is the basis of interstate relations in a civilized world. Nobody has the right to dictate to others. Is this achievable, and how?

We in the Soviet Union proceed from the premise that in the nuclear and space age rivalry in the quantity and quality of arms and an aspiration for military superiority does not yield anybody political or military gains. The path to security lies through the reduction of the level of military confrontation and the reduction and ultimate complete elimination of nuclear and all other types of mass destruction weapons. Military potentials must be reduced to limit essential only for defense.

This is an extremely difficult task. It is no secret that after World War II many states' armed forces were not brought into line with peacetime conditions. The "cold war," the brinkmanship doctrine, the use of the arms race as a means of economic attrition and pressure on other countries -- these and other attributes of Washington's course aimed at world hegemony gave rise to a situation in which the peoples were unable to fully taste the fruits of the rout of fascism and militarism and were compelled to switch an inordinately large proportion of their resources to the armed forces.

But be that as it may, the arms race has now reached a point where the weapons, irrespective of how sophisticated or numerous they might be, cannot be utilized in practice. The end no longer justifies the means. Not now, nor especially in the foreseeable future. Given their use on a massive scale, the means will destroy everything, including the end. "It has now become most clear to everyone," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, notes, "that the old notions of war as a means of achieving political ends are outdated. In the nuclear age these obsolete dogmas fuel a policy which could lead to a universal conflagration."

Is this understood in the West? I doubt it. Despite statements by individual leaders of Western countries about their commitment to nuclear disarmament, U.S. and NATO military strategy and military planning, the development of the armed forces, and the regulations of the categories of troops continue to be based on the utilization of nuclear weapons -- and moreover, on their first use, regardless of what attempts are made to claim the opposite. Even very recently it has been possible to hear the U.S. and NATO armed forces are not ready to resolve the tasks they face without nuclear weapons, now and for the indefinite future. This spawns arguments in favor of improving nuclear weapons, creating new types and models of such weapons, and continuing nuclear tests.

This is what happens. With one hand the U.S. President signs a political statement there must be no nuclear war, there can be no winners, and his country will not strive for military superiority. With the other hand he sanctions Pentagon programs geared to preparations for waging global and "limited" nuclear wars against the USSR and the other socialist countries calculated to achieve success in such wars. Preparations for conducting U.S. military actions from space, actions which threaten all states and all mankind, are under way. At the same time rivalry is heightened in the sphere of military chemistry, of weapons based on new physical principles, and of ensuring a qualitative leap forward in so-called "conventional" arms.

The U.S. military-industrial complex is a state within a state and gambles on violence, strong-arm confrontation, and subordinating policy, diplomacy, and even trade to the cult of force. The impression is that Washington is almost stuck on militarism. If so, this is a dangerous atavism. It is all the more dangerous since it is backed up by immense destructive potential and a total lack of constructive initiative in the approach to disarmament and security problems.

U.S. and NATO leaders refused to hold a meeting between the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces and the commander in chief of NATO Armed Forces, Europe. Such a meeting could have discussed the situation in the military sphere in Europe. They also rejected the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal to hold a meeting between the general secretary of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO secretary general. The West also avoided holding a meeting between expert working groups set up within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on questions of armed forces and conventional arms reductions in Europe.

How is the lack of interest in such contacts to be evaluated? Obviously, as evidence either of the delusion that we need a normal military-political climate more than the Western countries, or of the illusion that it is worth tightening up a bit and NATO will ultimately acquire the military superiority it is seeking and be able to dictate its demands to the Soviet Union from a "position of strength." The age of world wars is gone forever, but some people would like to believe the final battle honors lie ahead. As a military man who knows the potential of modern weapons, I can state one thing: The sooner we put an end to strong-arm superstition, the better. The better it will be for us all.

Unlike the United States and the other NATO countries, the Soviet Union is prepared to build its defense without relying on nuclear and other types of mass destruction weaponry. We have agreed to embark immediately on reorganizing our entire military machine along nonnuclear lines if the other nuclear powers take this route too. The Soviet side adheres to the view that nuclear disarmament ought to be accompanied by significant armed forces and conventional arms reductions on a reciprocal basis.

The explanation for that is simple: There are no social groups or castes in the USSR which could live of an arms race or be interested in continuing one. There are no circles in our country which lean toward aggressive policies. The Soviet Armed Forces, as a part of the Soviet people, are interested in military detente. The Soviet Armed Forces' main professional task is to ensure the USSR's security and protect the positions of our country and our friends from foreign threats. We have no other aims or tasks. We have no predatory designs on any state, either in Europe or elsewhere. We are prepared to resolve all questions of building the Armed Forces and reducing them only on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security. The USSR makes no claim for greater security for itself but, understandably, nor will it agree to any less security.

There is no ambiguity here, there is no divergence between political declarations and military doctrine. The Soviet military doctrine is in organic unity with the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy course. For the Soviet Union war has always been only a response forced upon us to repulse aggression and defend its independence. Always -- from the first days of the existence of Soviet power, ever since October 1917.

The Soviet people have had many occasions to repulse strikes by hordes of foreign interventionists. They drained the bitter cup of World War II, having borne its main burden and having paid the highest price for victory over fascism -- the lives of more than 20 million of their sons and daughters. I deem it necessary to emphasize that the Soviet and French people were together in that cruel struggle. During the last war, too, the Soviet state fought not for world domination but for lasting stable peace on earth.

The USSR does not limit itself to just calls for a reasonable restructuring of the world. To the extent the situation allows, and even in the absence of reciprocity, we take specific steps for the benefit of the improvement of the world situation. The USSR pledged unilaterally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This decision is an immutable law governing the life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is being applied in the practical training of troops and staffs, in the more rigid control measures precluding the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and so on. The Pentagon strategists pretend to disregard this Soviet pledge. In actual fact, however, the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is taken into account by them when planning the building of U.S. Armed forces and developing the latest military concepts.

For 18 months now the Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear tests. The deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe has been unilaterally suspended, and some of them have been downgraded from standby alert status. We have frozen work on antisatellite weapons, and so on.

The ideas of building a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 contained in M.S. Gorbachev's statement were embodied in the USSR's positions at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Thanks to our major compromise proposals on the entire package of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons, foundations were laid in Iceland for a historic step toward freeing mankind from the nuclear threat. The peoples were given an opportunity to look beyond the horizon and to see the real outlines of a world without nuclear weapons, a world of mutual respect, trust, and good neighborliness. The obstacle along the way to it was provided by the U.S. "position of strength" policy, while the U.S. "Star Wars" program provided the means by which accord was thwarted.

The Soviet proposals put forward in Reykjavik and the basic provisions of the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons -- all this constitutes a creative development of the proposals to eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of this century. Our proposals are not a slogan. They are a program which fuses together the philosophy of shaping a safe world in the nuclear and space age with a platform of specific actions according to a strictly calculated timetable. This is the central orientation of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

Western propaganda declares the nuclear disarmament program to be a utopia, a fantasy. I must say that what is a utopia today, and an evil and perfidious one at that, is the pursuit of the specter of military superiority, the desire to ensure your own security at other peoples' expense, and futile hopes of creating some kind of "ultimate weapon" within the framework of "Star Wars," which is supposed to help avoid retribution in a nuclear conflict. [paragraph continues]

There is no reasonable alternative to the elimination of nuclear weapons except through political accords.

The realistic nature of the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons is demonstrated by Reykjavik. There, the Soviet proposals made it possible to bring the American side to the point of accords on strategic offensive arms reduction, the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, and then the elimination of the sides' nuclear potentials as a whole. Through the fault of the United States, an agreement was not reached. Nonetheless the possibility of accord was convincingly demonstrated.

Our program is realistic because it is concrete. It defines the timing, stages, volumes, and order of reduction of nuclear weapons. The USSR and the United States have experience in drawing up procedures for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We proposed strict, effective verification -- national and international, in all appropriate forms, including on-site inspection.

Our program is constructive, it takes account of the interests of all states, and above all the European states. At every stage of its implementation parity would be preserved and no states' security interests would be damaged. Provision is made for the elimination not only of nuclear weapons, but all types of weapons of mass destruction, above all chemical weapons. It is organically supplemented by the proposal of the Warsaw Pact states on a significant reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Given a corresponding willingness on the part of the NATO countries, in the early nineties the opposing groupings of armed forces would be reduced by more than 1 million people.

The realistic nature of the Soviet program is also indicated by the very broad response to it in the majority of states of the world.

Of course, the Soviet leadership is aware of the complexity of resolving the problem of ridding our planet of nuclear weapons. It is equally well aware the continuing arms race is pushing the world ever closer to nuclear catastrophe. If measures are not taken now, if the nuclear arms race is not stopped, the turn of events could go out of man's control. The USSR considers it its lofty duty to do everything in its power to safeguard the planet's future, together with all states, for the sake of all peoples of the world.

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET MARSHAL ON PERILS OF NUCLEAR WAR, SDI, MORATORIUM

PM080905 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 25 Dec 86 p 1

["Authoritative Opinion" by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Savitskiy: "To Struggle for Peace, for Mankind's Survival"]

[Text] People say that there can be no future without a past. This would appear to be true. If so, however, we must not only remember and be familiar with the past, it is also incumbent upon us to learn to draw the necessary conclusions from it.

World War I cost 10 million human lives, World War II -- more than 50 million. How many lives will a third world war take? Can mankind let itself continue to keep up this fatal historical reckoning? Such questions can be heard from television screens, they can be read in newspaper headlines, they reverberate in our homes, our squares, and our streets....

Is there an answer to these questions?

War, in the words of General Koumanakos, the famous Greek public figure, is on trial today. Indeed, it is on trial by mankind. Let me add: about time, too. Anyone who has seen for himself even a single explosion of a nuclear charge and its consequences -- and I am one of those who have -- would understand what I have in mind. War in our nuclear age is equivalent to the self-destruction of civilization. Were it to flare up, life on earth would end....

But this does not at all mean that our profession has lost its meaning, that we are "idling our lives away" in vain or are being maintained to no purpose. Peace needs to be protected more than ever before. Unfortunately, for the time being it is impossible to protect it from the threat of war without a well organized and reliable defense. Such a defense constitutes an inevitable response to the intrigues by those who are still playing with fire, striving to intimidate mankind and simultaneously impose their will on it.

The Soviet Government's decision to terminate the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests if the United States conducts another nuclear explosion next year is nothing but a response, a forced but necessary response. Soviet nuclear testing ranges have been silent for more than 500 days now, but the Washington leadership has not joined the USSR initiative which offers tremendous opportunities. The security interests of our country and its allies do not allow us to extend the moratorium again. Even so, we are prepared not to resume testing provided common sense finally gains the upper hand in Washington.

Today's world, in which everything is interconnected and interdependent, is entering a most crucial stage. If the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative announced by President Reagan gets going, it will most likely prove to be the last "initiative" of all mankind. If SDI, or the "Star Wars" programs as it has been styled in America, were to be implemented, it would inevitably bring about unpredictable military-political consequences.

This is well understood all over the world. It is also known in the United States. Much has been and is being said there about SDI and the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. Those who have taken the course of embarking on a new round of the arms race are being warned by the military, by politicians, and by scientists. [paragraph continues]

Speaking on the day marking the 41st anniversary of the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima, Linus Pauling, twice Nobel Prize winner and member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, declared that the total destructive yield of 60,000 megatons available to the two major nuclear powers does not leave even the slightest doubt that our civilization will not survive a third world war.

Those who believe that a nuclear war could possibly be survived in underground bunkers or somewhere in a faraway corner of the earth are mistaken -- this was said in support of Pauling by Gilbert White, another member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, who spent 3 years studying the possible environmental consequences of a nuclear war together with scientists from 30 countries. Up to 150 million metric tons of dust and soot would be released into the atmosphere in the event of nuclear strikes, he warns. This means that only 1 percent of the sun's energy would reach the earth, and the difference between night and day would disappear. All inhabitants of the planet would die -- it would be just a question of time and painful suffering....

There would seem to be just one possible conclusion from all this has been said: Only a madman is capable of unleashing nuclear weapons. But this conclusion would be mistaken. Unfortunately, matters are completely different. A nuclear conflagration could turn the earth to dust even without interference by unhinged persons.

U.S. Navy Commander, Retired, J. Busch, speaking like Pauling in Japan -- the country which survived the atom bomb -- announced that U.S. submarines are not fitted with systems precluding the possibility of accidentally launching the missiles with nuclear warheads they carry.

There is no reason to disbelieve the words of the U.S. Navy commander who is no longer on active service. Especially in view of the fact that, before getting out of uniform, he himself commanded one of those submarines. His fears are shared on a broader scale by former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, the man who was directly responsible for the country's military strategy during the Kennedy and Johnson Presidencies. "The majority of Americans and, I believe, the majority of Japanese are simply unaware that the West's strategy calls for early first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union," he declared in his speech at a seminar held in the Japanese city of Osaka soon after the Reykjavik summit meeting. "They would be shocked to learn that they are mistaken. They would be terrified to learn that the top brass themselves consider that the implementation of our present strategy would lead to our society's destruction."

All this applies to conventional nuclear missile weapons -- if one can use the expression -- and to U.S. military preparations concerning, so to speak, yesterday and today. So, what can be said of SDI, a system which is planned to be controlled by computers? How can anyone seriously speak about control if the planet's fate is to be made dependent on machine error or technical breakdown....

It is, however, well known that there are still quite a few excessively ardent champions of SDI in the United States. Who are they? "The champions of SDI," according to W. Fulbright, the eminent U.S. politician and public figure who for years headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "are the incumbent administration and what people call the military-industrial complex."

It cannot be put more clearly.

There is perhaps just one more point to be added. Those who persevere in their attempts to gain military superiority in order to dictate their conditions to the world perceive SDI not so much as a means of defense as a means of attack. Not a shield but a sword.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara declared bluntly that the real objective of SDI is to paralyze the Soviet Union's strategic forces and to guarantee the possibility of an unpunished nuclear strike against the USSR.

This, as people say, dots all the i's.

But such calculations are totally senseless. Surely people in the United States do not really expect us to stand idly by! There are numerous methods to neutralize SDI and render it militarily useless. I have no intention of listing them -- this has already been discussed repeatedly and with sufficient clarity.

Those who represent the military-industrial complex are perfectly well aware that SDI will not protect the world from a nuclear catastrophe. But this does not worry them. For then SDI, just as all other large-scale military programs, primarily means profits in the billions. Enormous, fabulous sums of money. To abandon SDI for them means abandoning this money. But why, for whose sake? The prevailing balance of fear, they reason, prevents war. It has prevented it so far; please God, it will continue to prevent it. In this sense the implementation of SDI will change nothing. If SDI fails to produce the desired result and fails to create a reliable shield above America, the balance of fear will remain in existence. Meanwhile, billions and trillions of dollars will have found their way into the concerns' safes, and the Russians will have become more obliging. To put it succinctly, the profits are secure one way or another. But even if the Russians did create [sozdayut] their own program in response to SDI, this will also be no cause for alarm. The chances are balanced again, and the balance of fear reappears.

Our country will respond if SDI materializes. Parity will certainly be maintained. But the arms race will reach a level at which it will be exceptionally difficult, if at all possible, to halt it.

Modern science and technology demand all of us people inhabiting the earth a new approach toward matters, a new awareness of events, and, ultimately, new thinking and a new policy. But the new does not appear automatically, a struggle must be waged for it, its path must be cleared. It was not in vain that even the great Einstein, one of

the first to map the path to the peaceful use of the atom and to warn against its use for military purposes, claimed that everything has changed in the nuclear age apart from man's thinking. History has proved him only partially right. Everything seems to have really remained the same for those who are accustomed to making fortunes out of war. But the new thinking -- in line with the times and based not on temporary advantage or narrow national interests but on a global approach toward the questions of war and peace on earth -- is forging ahead with growing persistence and captivating minds on an increasingly broad scale. Soviet Communists have set an example for all mankind.

Mutual deterrence, equality of threat, parity of fear.... All these fossils of the "cold war" times are hopelessly outdated. Outdated, but at the same time even more dangerous. Fear is not at all the force to stop mankind on the brink of the abyss. Even the fear of universal and hundredfold assured self-destruction. People get used to fear. Like, let us say, each and every one of us gets used to the idea of the inevitability of old age or death. The world has gotten used -- or almost used -- to the idea of nuclear bombs. In any case, people have learned to live as if they were altogether nonexistent.

But they do exist, these bombs: An unimaginably monstrous destructive force of 60,000 megatons does exist! In order to halt at the brink of the abyss, in order to survive and preserve a future for itself and its offspring, mankind--yes, mankind, and not just parts of it--must bring its thinking into line with the realities of the nuclear age. This is what our party and government are aiming for. The task of the Soviet Armed Forces, as I understand it, is to ensure the necessary historical time period for this difficult and complex process.

It is now, today, that we people on earth are bound to do everything to ensure mankind's survival and lay the foundations of a future world without wars.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW PANEL SHOW ON SDI, SALT, MORATORIUM

LD100010 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 9 Jan 87

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program presented by All-Union Radio foreign political commentator Andrey Ptashnikov with Vladimir N. Chernyshev, TASS military observer; Aleksey M. Vasilyev, doctor of historical science; and Viktor Levin, commentator]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] First of all I would like to dwell on the letters from our listeners that voice righteous indignation over the aggressive militarist course of the U.S. Administration in the international arena. [Passage omitted on letters of named listeners cited on struggle for peace and U.S. insistence on SDI and Ptashnikov emphasizing that the United States is still testing nuclear weapons and breaching SALT II, and introducing Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev]

[Chernyshev] The general secretary's statement propounded a specific and well-developed plan of purposeful action to remove the most serious threat looming over mankind today, the danger of nuclear war. [Passage omitted on details of Gorbachev's proposals of 15 January 1986]

[Ptashnikov] A year has already elapsed since this program was announced. The United States and its NATO allies, however, have undertaken no practical action in the way of movement toward a nuclear-free world. What is the efficacy of our program today?

[Chernyshev] Now that a year has passed, the grandeur and significance of the comprehensive Soviet plan can be seen even more sharply and clearly. First of all, the whole world can now see that it presents a tangible strategy for movement toward a nuclear-free world, a strategy which makes it possible to clearly see the prospects and the final goal, and thus to manifest tactical flexibility along the path to that goal.

It is precisely the existence of this plan, drafted in detail, which made possible the breadth, scope, boldness, and constructive nature that characterized the actions of the Soviet representatives at the summit meeting in Reykjavik. Thanks to the Soviet proposals, and their convincing nature the sides found themselves close to adopting historic decisions. Unfortunately, the U.S. representatives lacked the courage, responsibility, and political resolve, and there was no success in sealing coordinated accords.

The barrier on the way to a nuclear-free world is the U.S. Star Wars program.

Nonetheless, the year that has elapsed since the announcement of the Soviet program has brought a great deal. Let us remember how some people in the West tried to present the Soviet program as a fantasy, an illusion, propaganda; tried to divide the world into the gullible and the sceptical. But now everything has changed. There has been a sharp change in man's thinking, in its view of what is possible and what is not, of what can be achieved and what cannot.

The planet has learned that the removal of the threat of nuclear destruction is something real, and it can now be said with assurance that the world has been divided, but not into the gullible and the sceptics, but into the supporters and opponents of nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming majority of the population of our planet, having recognized that there is a real opportunity to destroy the nuclear sword which threatens the very existence of civilization, supports the Soviet program and demands that it be implemented.

Thus, in my view, the main achievement of the past year is that at last the world has come to believe this, and believe it seriously; and once the belief is there, the forces rising to struggle against the arms race, against the threat of nuclear disaster, swell and gather strength.

[Ptashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, while speaking of the comprehensive Soviet nuclear-disarmament program, you mentioned an accord on ending all nuclear blasts as one of its component parts. Could you perhaps enlarge upon this matter?

[Chernyshev] It is now perfectly plain to all that a reduction in nuclear arsenals alone, without any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, will not provide a way out of the dilemma of the nuclear threat, as the remaining part of the nuclear arsenals is modernized and the possibility remains of creating increasingly refined and deadly nuclear weapons and of testing new types on the testing grounds. Therefore, an end to testing is a practical step toward ending the arms race.

For a year and half, silence has reigned over the Soviet nuclear testing grounds. Our country has extended its unilateral moratorium five times. But the last time the Soviet Union did this it extended its moratorium until the first U.S. nuclear explosion of 1987, since, as before, there are no indications that the United States is prepared to follow the example of the USSR and renounce nuclear testing.

What is more, Washington has already given preliminary notice that the next nuclear device will be detonated on 29 January. At a time when the United States is stubbornly continuing to implement its program of nuclear tests, with the aim of creating new nuclear weapons and stockpiling them, of course the Soviet Union cannot go on displaying endless unilateral restraint.

A situation has arisen, which, if it persists, threatens to seriously damage the security of the Soviet Union and its allies.

I would note one more factor of outstanding importance: In defending their specific interests, the leaders of the capitalist world cannot close their eyes to the significance of public opinion in drafting political decisions. That is why they try to manipulate public opinion. It is possible to draw up a genealogical chain of such motives: the unilateral moratorium, extended five times by the Soviet Union, resulting in the undermining, to a large extent, of the myths about the Soviet military menace

and the propaganda nature of the foreign-policy initiatives of the Soviet Union. Hence the shift in public opinion in the United States and the other NATO countries; a certain divergence between the United States and a number of its allies on the possibility of compromise with the Soviet Union, and some movement in the positions of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on questions relating to negotiation with the USSR, including negotiation on ending nuclear tests.

Unfortunately, the final link is still missing in this chain -- a change, as a result of the factors enumerated, in the position of the U.S. Administration itself. But it seems to me that we may conclude that, regardless of whether it rises to the proposals of the USSR on banning all nuclear explosions, the U.S. Administration's room to maneuver is already more restricted than it was. I would say that the very refusal by the U.S. Administration to end tests of nuclear weapons refutes more convincingly than any logical process of deduction the thesis propounded in official Washington policy, that the United States is striving to rid mankind of nuclear weapons. [passage omitted on Ptashnikov on the nature of the U.S. military-industrial complex, the corporations involved in it, and what they stand to gain from government arms contracts]

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RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON NST, CSCE, NFZ

PM121200 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

[Text of message from CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to UN Secretary General J. Perez De Cuellar on 10 January 1987]

[Text] To UN Secretary General J Perez De Cuellar.

Esteemed Mr Secretary General,

The year 1986, proclaimed the International Year of Peace by the United Nations, is over. That decision of the United Nations reflected mankind's interest in breaking the chain of years gripped by the accelerating arms race.

Was that goal achieved? Regrettably, it was not, because not all the member states of the United Nations were seeking an end to the arms build-up in deed rather than in words.

We are far from thinking, however, that 1986 failed to live up to its political symbolism. Perhaps, never before had the attention of the world community been concentrated to such an extent on the vital problems of war and peace.

One idea comes to mind in this context: Now that the International Year of Peace is becoming history, should it not be the duty of every state to submit, in response to the unanimously adopted UN resolution, an account to the world community on what it did not ensure that the year of peace lived up to its name? Anyway, we for our part consider it our duty to report to the United Nations cumulatively through you, if only in a general outline, on what the Soviet Union did concretely in 1986 for that year to justify the hopes pinned on it.

To begin with, in the very first month of the International Year of Peace, on 15 January, the Soviet Union put forward an initiative of unprecedented scope and goals by formulating a program for building a nuclear-free world and eliminating weapons of mass annihilation of every type, including chemical weapons, by the end of the current century. Throughout the year we were concretizing that program in individual areas and backing it with practical deeds.

When the Soviet Union entered the year of peace, its nuclear test sites have been quiet already for five months. We kept extending our moratorium on nuclear explosions throughout the year, although other parties continue to upgrade the deadly weapons, devastating as they are. The Soviet Union's extension of its moratorium beyond 1 January 1987, till the first American explosion, offers another chance to raise an effective barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race.

Developments last year were such that extraordinary efforts had to be taken to break the vicious circle of the accelerating arms race. Being aware of this, we put all business aside and had a meeting with the U.S. President to find solutions to the key problems of the nuclear-space complex. The results of that meeting are public knowledge. The hopes that it would lead to practical results did not materialize.

The Reykjavik meeting, however, led the cause of nuclear disarmament to an unprecedentedly high plateau, which offered a view of fresh horizons. Mankind is looking into those newly-opened horizons in the hope that persevering efforts to achieve radical reductions in and the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons will at long last yield positive results.

The Soviet Union for its part repeatedly reaffirmed and is reiterating anew its desire to follow that road.

Regrettably, our negotiating partners do not show readiness to find accords effectively to contain the arms race. Moreover, they are chipping away at and subverting the existing agreements which put limits on the nuclear arms arsenals, including the SALT II treaty, seeking to undermine strategic stability, building up nuclear weapons in excess of the ceilings agreed upon earlier and heading for the introduction of weapons into outer space.

The opponents of nuclear disarmament often claim that the Soviet Union is advocating the abolition of the nuclear arms arsenals in order to secure superiority in conventional armaments and armed forces. These claims are nothing short of a political ploy. Together with our allies in the Warsaw Treaty organisation, we put forward at a conference in Budapest in June 1986 a proposal on comprehensive and deep cuts in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Yet the NATO countries have not yet agreed to discuss our proposals in detail.

We are prepared to advance in every area toward real measures to limit and stop the arms race. We consider it essential to have at every stage and in every area strict verification of accords to the point of on-site inspection. Yet measures of most thorough and dependable verification, just like disarmament measures, should be reciprocal -- but here, regrettably, we do not have a proper response from the other side. Recently we made proposals on adequate verification of the termination of nuclear tests, a ban on chemical weapons, reductions in conventional armaments and the non-militarization of space. We are prepared to open our laboratories -- but all this should be on a reciprocal basis. Meanwhile, we do not have a positive response from those who not so long ago stridently clamored for the strictest verification.

Along with verification, an important concomitant measure of the process of arms limitation and disarmament should be the utilization of funds saved in this way to meet the needs of socio-economic development.

The Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate in every way with all the states advocating stronger international peace and security. It responded positively to the Harare appeal, in which the Nonaligned Movement urged firmly and strongly an end to the arms race, the abolition of nuclear weapons and firm linkage between the problems of disarmament and development. It also responded with full understanding and readiness for practical steps to the appeal of the six states of four continents for early end to the nuclear arms race and the prevention of the introduction of arms in space.

The Delhi Declaration on principles for a nuclear weapons-free and non-violent world was signed at the Soviet-Indian summit meeting in November 1986. It is a document of new political thinking, a document proceeding from the priority importance of common human values and the need to pool efforts to build a world that would be free from nuclear weapons, violence, hatred, suspicion and fear.

The Soviet Union's constructive cooperation with the other participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contributed to the successful completion of that conference. We have strongly called and continue to call for the results achieved in Stockholm to be developed in Vienna, at the regular meeting of representatives of the state participating in the European conference.

The Soviet Union vigorously supported a number of proposals aimed to lower the level of military confrontation in individual parts of Europe, such as the initiative of Bulgaria and Romania for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, the call of the GDR and Czechoslovakia for the abolition of chemical weapons in the center of the continent and Finland's initiative for a nuclear-free Nordic Europe.

The Soviet Union is known to be in favor of the proposal of the nonaligned countries on establishing a zone of lasting peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean. We for our part voiced a number of ideas, such as the withdrawal of the Soviet and U.S. navies from the Mediterranean.

Last year we kept working vigorously for the early implementation of the UN declaration on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and for the immediate convocation of an international conference for this purpose. New Soviet initiatives call for a substantial reduction in the naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the application of confidence-building measures and guarantees for the safety of sea and air communications in that region.

A series of major initiatives were put forward by us to achieve security in such an important part of the world as Asia and the Pacific. We consider that more dynamic bilateral relations, the settlement of the existing regional problems and a lower level of military activity offer a sure way to the development of an atmosphere which will eventually make it possible to convene a conference like the Helsinki one and work out a complex of dependable measures on security and peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.

Concerned over the growing militarization of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union resolutely voiced support for the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the peaceful reunification of the country and its proposals for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the whole of the Korean Peninsula.

We are trying to do whatever we can to deblock crisis situations, which generate tension in the world, and to avert new conflicts.

To break the deadlock over Middle East settlement, we proposed that a preparatory committee be established with the participation of all the permanent members of the security Council to convene a peace conference. The Soviet Union stands for an end to the senseless Iranian-Iraqi war and for an early solution to the Cyprus problem. The Soviet Union is seeking an immediate settlement of the situation related to Afghanistan

and is strongly demanding an early termination and prevention of outside interference, which would expedite the return home of the Soviet troops staying in that country at the request of its government. It is fully supporting the efforts made by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve national reconciliation.

The Soviet Union is prepared to contribute in practice to the development of favorable conditions for a fair political settlement in Central America. We are in solidarity with the settlement made by the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Contadora support group on 1 October 1986, that peace in Central America was possible but that it called first and foremost for the termination of interference in the affairs of the sovereign states of the region and for practical respect for their right independently to choose their roads of development. We also are in favor of Brazil's proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic.

The Soviet Union supported the idea of a number of Pacific states on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and signed protocols 2 and 3 to the Rarotonga treaty.

The Soviet Union stands for the earliest possible implementation of the UN resolution on granting genuine independence to the people of Namibia and on the abolition of the racist system of apartheid in South Africa. We are in solidarity with the fight waged by the "Frontline States" against the aggressive actions of the Pretoria regime and fully support the demands for the application by the Security Council of sanctions against South Africa in full volume.

As you know, Mr Secretary General, the Soviet Union stands for a higher role and efficiency of the United Nations, for the broad application of the methods of settling disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter, for a better use of the potentialities of the Security Council and the UN General assembly, and for your efforts of mediation.

We note with satisfaction that awareness is growing all over the world of the need to settle disputes and conflicts by political means, with unconditional respect for the right of every people to an independent road of development. This is forcefully illustrated by worldwide outrage over the barbarous U.S. attack on Libya last April. It was condemned everywhere, including at the UN General Assembly.

We fully support the efforts of the United Nations to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear energy and outer space and environmental protection. We support the just demands of the Group-77 of developing countries for a new international economic order, including the solution of the problem of foreign indebtedness, which has both economic and political consequences. We for our part proposed the convocation of a world congress on economic security, which could discuss all the problems of world economic contacts in their entirety. Two conventions laying the foundations of an international regime for the safe and stable development of nuclear power engineering were concluded on our initiative in the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We stand for dragged-out humanitarian problems being resolved in a humane way, in a truly humanitarian spirit. To this end we proposed that a representative conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation be convened in Moscow within the framework of the all-European process. We are prepared to discuss on a serious and sound basis every aspect of human rights and basic freedoms. The Soviet Union firmly stands for guaranteeing man the right to life, to work and to equality before law.

We support the efforts of the United Nations and progressive international organizations against racial or any other discrimination, against the excessive enrichment of some at the expense of the impoverishment of others, and for a fairer and more civilized world. We stand for practical efforts to eradicate such an abomination as international terrorism, which claims innocent lives and mars relations among nations.

It can be said without exaggeration that the approval by the General Assembly of the concept of a comprehensive system of international security, proposed by a group of socialist countries, a concept covering every sphere, including military, political, economic and humanitarian, constitutes an important step towards the consolidation of the foundations of peace with regard to the United Nations. A framework has thus been created for a broad and constructive dialogue on the nature of a new philosophy of security in the nuclear-space age and practical ways of restructuring international relations on its basis.

Support from such a large number of countries for the idea of establishing security for all shows that a new mode of thinking and actions of states and a tendency for the democratization of international relations are confidently gaining ground. We intend to continue constructive exchanges of opinion on a system of all-embracing security so as to have basically developed foundations of such a system ready for submission to the next session of the General Assembly.

Speaking in general on the recently closed 41st session of the UN General Assembly, we think we can draw the conclusion that its proceedings and the resolutions passed by it reflected the people's awareness of peace as the highest value to the whole of humanity and their striving to ensure that a new mode of political thinking, a new style and approach to the solution of international problems become asserted in the United Nations, which, under its charter, is a center coordinating the activities of states. Mankind is running out of time, and this was manifest in that the highest forum of the world community called for the dynamic development of international relations and for a search for new, fresh approaches.

The International Year of Peace was a difficult, involved year. An arduous road was covered. I started by commenting on the political symbolism of the International Year of Peace. But it also gave an impetus to practical action for riding mankind of the threat of nuclear war and creating foundations of all-embracing security that would be equivalent to all. We intend to endeavor towards that goal, from the Reykjavik frontier, under the flag of openness and democratism so that peace should be eternal.

It is my conviction, Mr. Secretary General, that with your energetic participation, the possibilities of the United Nations will continue to be used efficiently under the humane motto of the International Year of Peace: "To safeguard peace and the future of humanity."

Please accept, Mr. Secretary General, the best wishes of success and well-being in the new year.

M. Gorbachev

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RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV INDIAN TRIP, DELHI DOCUMENT IMPORT TO ASIAN SECURITY

PM061400 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Academician Ye. Primakov article: "A Big Step Forward: Thoughts Following M.S. Gorbachev's Visit to India"]

[Excerpts] Major international events never have one single effect over a strictly limited period. They are major and significant precisely by virtue of the fact that their influence extends over time and space; they affect the entire system of international relations and are taken into account when important decisions are taken. One such event was the recent visit to India by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Security in Asia [subhead]

One of the most important results of the talks in Delhi was Prime Minister R. Gandhi's support for the idea of a comprehensive system of international security. Naturally, security in Asia is an integral part of this. At the same time this is probably the most difficult element of the system to construct. In Europe, in the military sphere, the matter amounts in practice to lowering the level of and lessening the confrontation between the two opposing alliances -- the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In the political sphere, it amounts to the elaboration of various measures capable of leading to detente and ensuring peaceful, multifaceted cooperation between states belonging to the two opposing systems -- socialist and capitalist.

Of course, all these tasks are not easy to resolve, even in Europe. But in Asia, in my view, it is still more difficult. [paragraph continues]

Here the military problems are not confined to confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Located within the Asian-Pacific region are the USSR, the United States, the PRC, India, Japan -- in other words, the "polycentrism" is more developed here than anywhere else. In Asia there are many conflicts in an acute state, originating from various causes -- the Near East conflict, Iran-Iraq, the conflicts around Cambodia and Afghanistan, and others. A whole series of Asian states have territorial claims against each other.

In these conditions, how can security be achieved in Asia? Even before M.S. Gorbachev's visit to India, items were published in Western newspapers and in certain Indian newspapers incompletely or incorrectly representing the Soviet position on this question. Some people tried to suggest that the USSR wants to transfer the "European

model" mechanically to Asia and immediately begin the process of convening a conference to create an all-Asian security system. As long ago as his Vladivostok speech the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee proposed measures which have absolutely nothing in common with that scenario. M.S. Gorbachev's speeches in India gave additional explanations, from which it is clear that the Soviet line consists of the following:

- without transferring European experience mechanically to Asia, to make use of everything in that experience which can usefully be adapted to Asian soil and promote the security of that continent's countries;
- to this end, to advance by every avenue, including bilateral accords, subregional agreements, and finally, if it proves possible in time, a regional agreement on security matters;
- to pay particular attention to the need to settle the existing conflicts in Asia, making use to that end of all the potential which exists, including the USSR's contacts with the United States;
- to strengthen military-political stability by reducing the numerical strength and limiting the activity of the USSR and U.S. naval forces in the region; to hold talks with the United States and interested Asian countries on confidence-building measures in the military sphere in relation to Asia and the adjacent sea areas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
- to hold multilateral talks on guaranteeing the security of maritime communications, as well as guaranteeing the sovereignty of the littoral states over their natural resources;
- to encourage and support movements to create peace zones, and in particular to turn the Indian Ocean into such a zone;
- to draw up an international convention on combating terrorism on maritime and air routes, and to take part in such a convention.

This list naturally does not exhaust all the measures for progressing toward a system of security in Asia, but at the present stage they are the most important, and there is every reason to suppose that India agrees with that assessment.

One of the most acute regional security problems for India is its relations with Pakistan. Justified concern is aroused in Delhi by the energetic U.S. activity in arming Pakistan with modern means of waging war. In these conditions the Soviet Union naturally understands the need to strengthen the defense capability of peace-loving India. At the same time, at the Delhi news conference M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the USSR advocates the political, peaceful settlement of all disputes between India and Pakistan. An important element of the new way of thinking which the USSR is introducing to interstate relations is the categorical renunciation of playing off one country against another and exploiting the contradictions between them, and of attempting to "catch fish by muddying the waters."

In general, it must be said that the Soviet Union -- and this position is, by all appearances, understood and accepted by India -- advocates that the development of its relations with any state should not be detrimental to others. [paragraph continues]

It is from this standpoint, for instance, that we approach the problem of the normalization and development of relations with China. The USSR's policy with regard to India is based on the same principle.

A Document of Global Significance [subhead]

The high point of the visit to India was the signing of the Delhi declaration, which proclaims the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. This document is very important, not only because it was signed by the leaders of two countries whose population amounts to a billion, that is, one-fifth of mankind. The Delhi declaration's significance is worldwide.

The 27th CPSU Congress proclaimed the need for new political thinking in our times, times which differ fundamentally from the past in that the constant improvement of weapons of mass destruction has faced mankind with a real problem of survival. The Delhi Declaration may be regarded as the practical implementation of the new political thinking.

We have many times witnessed the West putting forward versions of "crisis diplomacy" and "rules of behavior" when a conflict situation grows into a crisis threatening to involve the United States and the USSR. Perhaps there is some sense in these efforts. But it is far more urgent and vitally important to draw up "rules of behavior" for states with a view to preventing crisis, settling conflicts, and averting the slide toward the abyss of thermonuclear disaster. The Delhi declaration is such a document.

The 10 principles it sets forth are a detailed characterization of peaceful coexistence in our time.

The Delhi declaration stresses that peaceful coexistence must become the universal norm of international relations. This implies not simply the universal renunciation of war as a means of resolving disputes, but energetic activity with the aim of settling by political, not military, means all conflict situations regardless of the level at which they develop -- global or regional.

In order to strengthen peaceful coexistence, all members of the world community must be confident of their security. This confidence is not created by the "equilibrium of fear" -- the system on which security is in effect based at the global level today. The Delhi declaration proclaims as an urgent goal the creation of a comprehensive system of international security instead of the notorious "equilibrium of fear."

Irreversible peaceful coexistence can only be ensured in the conditions of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. Such a world can only be attained through a system of concrete, urgent measures aimed at disarmament. The Delhi declaration proposes such measures.

Peaceful coexistence is not simply security, important as that is. The Delhi declaration focuses attention on the need to mobilize the material and intellectual potential of all mankind in order to resolve global problems: the food problem, the population problem, the elimination of illiteracy, environmental conservation, and the peaceful use of the world's oceans, the sea bed, and outer space.

Today, alongside the Soviet Union's signature on the Delhi declaration, there is the equally weighty signature of India. But time will pass, and other states will also subscribe to the principles of this historic document. It may be boldly said in this connection that the Delhi declaration is oriented toward the future.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW RADIO ON MORATORIUM ANNIVERSARY, SDI, ASIAN SECURITY

LD190845 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Jan 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Yuriy Nikolayevich Bandura, deputy chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI; Viktor Aleksandrovich Tsoppi, member of the editorial board of NOVOYE VREMYA; Igor Pavlovich Charikov, All-Union Radio commentator on foreign politics]

[Text] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades. The date 15 January 1986 has already entered the chronicle of the 20th century as an important, significant, and memorable date. On that day, on behalf of the Soviet Union, one of the leading world powers, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, made a statement which contained a most important foreign policy action, an action unprecedented in its scale, in its scope of problems and issues, and in the specificity of every proposed step: a program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The 20th century has given mankind the energy of the atom, but this energy, as became apparent 6 August 1945, can be used not for creation, but destruction, and now, with the existence of huge stocks of nuclear weapons, self-destruction as well. Prompted by this peril the Soviet Union appealed to the other states in possession of such weapons and to the people of all countries to support its wide-scale program to eliminate all types of such weapons stage by stage.

This program is the logical continuation, development, the culmination if you like, of our foreign policy, the aim of which is to avoid an armed confrontation between the two social-economic systems and to avoid the destruction of civilization. This program was coordinated -- and it could not have been otherwise -- with the interests of our allies in the countries of the socialist community. A year has passed since the memorable day when Mikhail Sergeyevich delivered this statement on Soviet television. Quite a few events of varying significance have taken place in international life, as well as quite a few events with a high degree of significance. First of all is the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Not one of these events has overshadowed 15 January; on the contrary, they have confirmed the urgency, the weight, the constructiveness, the breadth, and the mutually acceptable nature of the set of proposals contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement. Indeed, great things are best seen from a distance, and although this distance is only 1 year, what was said in the seven points of the Soviet program has acquired even greater significance.

What reaction did this statement evoke in the United States of America? On the evidence of both the U.S. press and our journalist colleagues working in the United States, nobody in the U.S. administration expected such a bold, decisive, and constructive step. They simply were not ready for this. They were not ready,

generally speaking, because the United States' foreign policy concept is aimed at quite different tasks; it is aimed not at disarmament, but at the build-up and upgrading of arms; not at organizing peaceful mutual relations, but at stirring up local conflicts; and, in the final analysis, at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. This is why attempts were undertaken from the very start to fence off the new Soviet initiative from ordinary Americans, that is, to hush it up somehow, to refrain from replying to it, and, as far as possible, to distort its contents. The administration is unable to juxtapose anything to it. In the 6 years -- it's already the 7th year now -- in the 6 years the Reagan Administration has been in power, it has not come out with one sufficiently practical and constructive and sufficiently radical initiative aimed at settling the situation in the world.

The only thing the administration has engendered over these years is the Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called Star Wars program, which has become the obstacle, as we know, on the path of the realization of the program of the state-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons set forth in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement. As the latest facts show, the administration adheres to its former concepts and holds the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative as its main task. In this context, I would like to quote one American politician, William Fulbright. In his book *THE ARROGANCE OF POWER* he writes: At the moment man is living for the first time in conditions where his existence is in peril. Other forms of life were imperilled or destroyed by changes in their natural environment. Man is threatened by a change in his environment; but he himself has engendered this threat, having created nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Our responsibilities for killing have become limitless, which creates a qualitatively new situation, and if we want to survive, we have to fundamentally change our attitude to opinions and advice, and their implementation, and to human and international relations in general. I remind you this was said by Fulbright exactly 20 years ago in 1967 in a book published in New York. Even if present politicians, those who are in the White House now, are familiar with it, I fear very much that they, on the whole, have not heeded the opinion of an adequately experienced politician.

[Tsoppil] Of course. What is happening in the world at the moment confirms Fulbright's correctness and the view of things that the world is divided by economic interests, various social systems, various ideas and aspirations, various standards of living and so on -- this world is nevertheless whole; it is a world in which everything is interconnected and interdependent. This is precisely why today one cannot think in the old ways, especially politicians, especially people vested with the authority of the state and a huge responsibility to their own people as well as all mankind. I think it is this feeling of responsibility that dictated the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January last year. Of course, the world has changed in the past year. It has changed, in my opinion, for the better and precisely as a result of the stance taken by our country a year ago, and as a result of all the subsequent actions by our party and state, actions which have to an enormous extent substantiated the tasks of antiwar activity posed in the 15 January statement.

A year ago we put forward a daring model of a new world -- a world without nuclear weapons, and so, without nuclear war. This gave rise to quite evident perplexity in many people -- I would even say, a sort of bafflement -- and prompted a conditioned reflex which has been instilled in human consciousness by decades of tense political confrontation. This confrontation threatens to reach the point of universal man-to-man fighting, with a deadly outcome for the whole universe. Many people said then, being at the mercy of this fear, many people said: Your program is too good to become a

reality. Without wasting any superfluous words -- far more were wasted earlier than need have been -- our country put on the negotiating table specific and practical proposals, proposals which, whatever else may have been said, were fully acceptable to the United States as well. What I have in mind is the proposals on strategic weapons, on medium-range missiles, and on issues of verifying [kontrol] the cessation of nuclear tests and the nonmilitarization of space. Let us recall no matter how mighty and invulnerable, it would seem, is Washington's immunity to the effect of common sense, even the U.S. President, confronted by our flexibility, good will, and quite well-thought and wise pliability, did not resist and comprehended -- unexpectedly, by the way, for many of his admirers and adversaries -- that the Soviet proposals could be accepted.

The program for a safe, nuclear-free world did not begin to be translated into purposeful actions only because its path was blocked by the Star Wars program. These are incompatible, mutually exclusive, and mutually severing concepts of the future of mankind. In compliance to what logic can one agree to the fact, having destroyed all lethal weapons on earth, hanging a yet more dangerous means of destroying the human race above the earth? After all, in essence the president, having rejected the plan for the nonmilitarization of space, confirmed he is both the hostage and the agent of the interests of the military-industrial complex, which takes on, so to speak, the contract of ensuring the United States' military superiority, whatever it costs mankind, whatever it costs mankind and howsoever it imperils it.

[Bandura] Evaluating the past year since the statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, one comes to feel that the potential of the aspirations for good will in the world proved to be so powerful that our statement, announced from Moscow, aroused enormous forces which are being channelled into specific initiatives, not only on the part of the Soviet Union, and I would even say, not only on the part of the socialist community. For example, I would like to cite such globally known documents announced last year -- which were powerfully, widely announced throughout the world -- as the Harare appeal. I think one could say a lot about this, but in it I can detect the desire by the greater, the overwhelming majority of the human race to secure peace, to secure it on the wave of enterprising policy which the Soviet Union is conducting.

[Tsoppi] Yes, the Harare appeal it is a very representative document.

[Bandura] As is known, taking part at Harare were the heads of states and governments of nonaligned states representing a most enormous part of the population of the globe, and the thoughts and currents which were laid down in this document, its appeals and concepts, are in accord with the foreign policy aims of the Soviet Union, and are in accord with the program proposed to the world on 15 January last year.

One gains from this the picture of a changing world, the picture of a world where new thinking and a new political philosophy are starting to become a reality, embracing the overwhelming, if not the absolute majority of humanity. Manifestations of this new philosophy, new political thinking which is brought about by the requirements of the missile and space age are evident everywhere. One of the latest of these, one of the most important and which attracts the greatest attention worldwide, was the announcement of the cease-fire starting at midnight on 15 January in Afghanistan, commencing a process capable of leading to nationwide reconciliation in Afghanistan.

[Tsoppi] You know, Yuriy Nikolayevich, I think one has to search for and find -- and it is becoming increasingly easy these days -- tangible symptoms of the new thinking among our political opponents in the West. For example I would like to cite the following fact. Recently, Felipe Gonzalez, the head of the Spanish Government, was asked what role Western Europe was able to play in a conflict between the East and the West. Having made the proviso that of course Europe and the United States are not only in the same alliance but also constitute an integrated cultural world, he stated all the same, truthfully speaking, there cannot be complete similarity -- this is just impossible from the point of view of political logic -- between European plans and the plans of the United States. Even in such spheres as security and defense, Europe should have its own position. Furthermore, in the view of Gonzalez, the West Europeans cannot build their strategy on the permanent basis of a fait accompli such as the American position may become. I think this is a manifestation of great political wisdom, and Felipe Gonzalez is not alone.

[Charikov] You know, Viktor Aleksandrovich, since you have been citing the comments of West European politicians, I would like to highlight the following issue here. Western Europe is currently confused in many ways, I would even say frightened and, is being sobered up, if you like, even if that sounds paradoxical, by the complete inconsistency in the foreign policy of the present administration of the United States and by whether or not such a thing actually exists at all. After all, recently and with increasing frequency, even in Washington itself, it is being said in Washington political circles that since 1980 there simply has been no foreign policy as such, in the classical sense, during the Reagan Administration. There has, in fact, been a certain series of separate acts, a series of various comments by individual politicians at one moment or other, or in one specific political situation or another. For this reason, the Western allies of the United States, in the NATO bloc in the first instance, are by and large unable to trace any logic and are unable to predict it. In what way are they then able to support this policy or follow its course? They are simply forced either to support or decline or abstain from supporting this or that specific action.

[Tsoppi] Sometimes they occupy a position which looks strange even against the backdrop of the United States' position. For example, in Reykjavik, agreement had practically been reached on the removal from Europe of medium-range missiles. Then suddenly, in Western Europe -- and even in the first instance in France, on whose territory these missiles are not positioned [raspolagatsya] and which has enough of its own missiles -- suddenly there was a wave of outrage at such an accord. Why? How is this possible? For example, French Defense Minister Andre Giraud was simply in a panic. He said: Is it possible to imagine Western Europe left to rely solely on the U.S. strategic weapons which would be kept only on the territory of the United States? The same position was adopted by the French foreign minister and by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who said with regard to the zero option -- and I will remind you that the zero option which was constantly being put forward by the United States was at that time very enthusiastically received in Western Europe...

[Charikov interrupting] Viktor Aleksandrovich, this was the only initiative of the Reagan Administration. When I was speaking about its political activity I forgot to mention this.

[Tsoppi] Yes, well, so when this initiative was put forward by the United States, everyone in France applauded. President Mitterrand said, yes, let the Soviet SS-20 and the U.S. Pershings disappear from the center of Europe. Now it all proves to be the

other way around, and, moreover, in her new military program France asserts she in absolutely no way wants to include her policy in the policy of disarmament, in a policy which would lead to ridding the whole of the European continent of nuclear weapons.

[Bandura] You know, here is the impression I am forming of the actions by the West in recent times. It seems to me that the effectiveness, the force, the attractiveness, reasonableness, and comprehensibility of the initiatives of the Soviet Union are exerting such a powerful influence on the frame of mind of ordinary inhabitants of the West, that they are starting to change their thinking and ideas about the Soviet Union and about the socialist system as a whole, but, neither the United States nor a part of the circles in the West which are closely linked with the United States wants to change its mind. At the same time, they don't want to permit their fellow citizens to deviate from the course which has been under construction for decades with respect to the Soviet Union and with respect to mutual relations between the East and West. In this situation, sometimes leaders of the Western world, many leaders -- far from all -- but many start and are obliged to acknowledge the effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy, of the directions laid down in the 15 January statement, which have been continued in specific initiatives by the Soviet Union.

They are starting to acknowledge the effectiveness of the Soviet initiatives. The way they attempt to turn this whole business upside down is shown by a comment I read in one recent American newspaper by -- this newspaper presents him as one of the most eminent U.S. experts on disarmament issues -- Scowcroft, a former presidential assistant on national security...

[Tsoppi, interrupting] Brent Scowcroft, the renowned politician, who goes back to the Nixon administration.

[Bandura] This is what he says -- I quote: The all-embracing nature and the boldness of the proposals put forward at Reykjavik have put into confusion the entire agenda for the sphere of arms control [kontrol and vooruzheniyami], and it will be difficult, almost impossible, to turn back and assemble the fragments into a whole. What is apparent from this? In my opinion it is evident that no one in the West, even the most outspoken supporters of continuing the arms race, has the power any longer to stand up against, has the power any longer to review the positions that we embarked upon in Reykjavik.

[Tsoppi] Today the Soviet threat has been transformed.

[Bandura] That is right.

[Tsoppi] It has become clear the Soviet Union is threatening the whole world with peace, and this has turned out to be very frightening.

[Bandura] One could talk about the Soviet peace threat.

[Charikov] Yuriy Nikolayevich, Brent Scowcroft is not the only U.S. politician who, no longer in office and retired, is criticizing the actions of the present administration. Why is it that only having become ex-holders of office, why is it that only having retired, do politicians begin saying really intelligent things? This question has always worried me. It seems to me that there is an answer to this. The answer is that while in service, while occupying an official post, as the saying goes, they are simply obliged, forced, to keep quiet, conceal their personal opinion, as they

are called upon to express someone else's opinions. When they are no longer in office, their tongues loosen, and they obtain freedom of speech, so to speak, in the full sense, and they begin to express the thoughts they were once forced to conceal. So, who is the person, or the group of people, so to speak, or the certain force, that has a hold on what they say while they are at the helm? What do you think, Viktor Aleksandrovich?

[Tsoppi] I think the answer here is rather trite and rather simple. I think if one is talking about the present administration, then it would not be a startling revelation to say the United States, its foreign policy, is guided by the military-industrial complex. I think this complex today has exceedingly talented defenders, exceedingly dogged pursuers of its ideas. For example, I have in mind Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense. At the same time one should not think the people working in the administration are all crazy, that they are all candidates for suicide. They are searching for some kind of justification for the policy that seems murderous and suicidal to everyone.

[Charikov] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January, through its whole package of proposals, also applies to the peoples of other continents; not only Europe not only America, but also Asia and the Pacific Ocean region. Isn't that so, Yuriy Nikolayevich?

[Bandura] Of course. The propositions relating to Asian security expounded in the statement of 15 January were powerfully developed further in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. One could name as an example the withdrawal of six of our regiments from Afghanistan, which demonstrates the readiness of the USSR to withdraw its troops from this country as soon as a political settlement for the situation regarding Afghanistan has been guaranteed. Unfortunately, one cannot say the new thinking is making ground widely on the Asian continent, to which ever increasing attention has been riveted in recent years.

I would like to dwell on one of the latest facts. In particular, just today, the trip to a number of countries in the Pacific Ocean region by Kuranari, the Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, is coming to an end. He is putting forward the conception of Japan's mutual relations with countries in the Pacific Ocean region. If one tries to grasp attentively the propositions he is suggesting, it would seem nothing bad could be found in them. Japan is interested in peace, prosperity, stability in Asia and the Pacific. Japan is prepared to make its contribution. However, the phrase -- Japan is calling upon the countries of the Asian and Pacific region to counteract the USSR -- is being pronounced with perfect clarity between the lines and at times out in the open. It is, of course, impossible to understand what evidence Tokyo sees, as it calls it, the USSR's penetration into countries in the Pacific -- which it perceives to be a threat to its interests -- since the USSR has no such intentions.

A quite different option is visible here, namely, that in Tokyo, and in Washington as well, very serious misgivings are being expressed at those manifestations, those shoots of new thinking gaining ground in the Asian-Pacific countries, among others. It seems to me the predominant spectrum of the mood in Southeast Asia and in the Far East was expressed during the recent visit to China by Takeshita, secretary general of Japan's ruling party, who was told bluntly in Beijing that Tokyo's recently expressed intention to exceed its self-imposed limit on its military spending, set at 1 percent of the gross national product, is giving rise to the most serious fears in China. I think Japan's exceeding this limit, linked on a practical basis with the removal of all

barriers to the development of the military machine within Japan itself, cannot but evoke a reaction from the peoples of other countries as well, particularly because actions of this kind, however they are justified, run counter to the flow of new thinking which today embraces virtually the whole world.

[Tsoppi] Yes, I also think there are grounds for optimism. I would like, time permitting, to recall that it was precisely in Asia that the Delhi declaration, that has become world renowned, was signed, openly setting the practicable task of creating a world free from nuclear arms and the use of force. Considering the very broad response this document evoked not only in the countries of Asia, that the situation in this region should shift, should move away from the fatal path that it is being pushed along by the joint efforts of the United States and its ally Japan.

[Charikov] In my view, Viktor Aleksandrovich, this Delhi declaration follows in its spirit from the statement of 15 January.

[Tsoppi] Of course.

[Charikov] Well, esteemed comrades, our program's time is running out. Allow me to sum up succinctly the results of our conversation today. The past year has shown the whole permanent significance of the 15 January statement, its global scale, its truly global scale, the constructiveness of the proposals contained in it, and their practicabilities, with their topical and timely nature.

[Tsoppi] I would put it like this. This statement is working and working increasingly vigorously.

[Charikov] That is right. Furthermore it is not only working among the public and the politicians of America and Europe, but also, as we were saying today, among the public in other continents: Africa, Asia, the Pacific region. As a matter of fact this document has rocked the minds of all mankind. It would not be an exaggeration to say that today we have in the form of this statement a document of truly epoch-making significance.

Well, comrades, allow me on behalf of the participants in the program, to thank you for your attention, and to say goodbye. All the best to you.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA DISCUSSES ASIAN SECURITY PROBLEMS

PM141127 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by Political Observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "The Asian Aspect"]

[Text] The Soviet program for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century is in tune with the feelings of the peoples of Asia, for whom problems of peace and security are no less acute than for the European peoples....The implementation of our program would fundamentally alter the situation in Asia, would rid the peoples of that part of the world also of fear of the nuclear and chemical threat, and would raise security in that region to a qualitatively new level.

These lines from the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's 15 January 1986 statement sound even more topical this year than when they were announced. Asia accounts for one-third of the world's dry land and over two-thirds of mankind. Five of the world's seven most populous countries are situated here: China, India, the USSR, Indonesia, and Japan. Neither the prospect of a nuclear-free world nor the assertion of an all-embracing international security system is conceivable without enlisting the Asian and Pacific region to this process.

As a state which has its own most extensive borders in Asia, the USSR is seeking to ensure that the Asian and Pacific region is not a source of tension or an arena of military confrontation. The course of events in this part of the world is of national and state interest for our country. This in no way implies claims to any privileges, the search for advantage to the detriment of others or attempts to strengthen our security at others' expense. We see our interest in pooling efforts, in cooperating with full respect for each people's right to live as it chooses.

The Soviet program for creating a nuclear-free world is particularly attuned to the feelings of the Asian peoples because it was precisely in that part of the world that the first U.S. atom bombs exploded, reducing Hiroshima and Nagasaki to dust. It is with Asia that the first plans for the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in "regional conflicts" against the Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese people were linked. It was in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin that the sinister consequences of the nuclear race were first felt, when Japanese fishermen suffered from the radioactive dust of the U.S. hydrogen bomb.

On numerous occasions in the postwar decades Asia has been the arena of imperialist piracy, which has now become the linchpin of the doctrine of "neoglobalism." It was in Asia that the U.S. military unleashed the two biggest wars since 1945: in Korea and Vietnam. Seeking to reverse history and to deprive the peoples of the right to

determine their own historical path, imperialism disdains nothing. There is the setting of some states against others, military actions, state terrorism against inconvenient regimes, the arming and financing of separatists and terrorists, economic blockade and debt slavery, and various acts of political subversion and intrigues.

The undeclared wars against Afghanistan and Kampuchea, support for the Punjab extremists, the Tamil problem which they also want to turn against India, the shameless annexation of Micronesia, interference in political processes in the Philippines, the pressure on New Zealand -- such is neoglobalism in its unadulterated form. The tempo of the young states' development, their surmounting of the difficulties inherited from the past; depend largely on whether they will be able to offer proper resistance to neoglobalism -- that main evil in the path of world progress. The solution of the truly global problem of disarmament and development will also depend on this.

Recently there has been a marked activation in the attempts of U.S. imperialist circles to use the Asian and Pacific region as one more arena of military-political confrontation with the USSR and the other socialist states and the national liberation forces. The Pentagon is seeking to turn the countries in Asia and the Pacific, where the eastern borders of world socialism pass, into a frontier for the deployment of forward-based nuclear weapons, such as West Europe and the adjacent Atlantic have already become.

As a whole the Asian and Pacific region has still not been militarized to the same degree as the European region. Since the latter half of the seventies the United States has intensively built up its military presence there. Although two out of the three Pacific Ocean states with nuclear weapons -- the USSR and the PRC -- have pledged not to make first use of them, the United States has deployed nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads in a crisis zone -- the south of the Korean peninsula.

Counter to the "three nonnuclear principles," U.S. fighter bombers designed to deliver nuclear strikes have been deployed on Japanese territory. Encouraging militarist tendencies in Japan, U.S. imperialism is seeking to turn it into a key link in the anti-Soviet, antisocialist "Eastern front." They want to enclose Washington's military links with Tokyo and Seoul in a triangle for the same purpose. In brief, we cannot fail to see that militarization and the buildup of the military threat in this part of the world are beginning to gather dangerous speed.

Peace and security cannot be ensured by a policy geared toward confrontation. The Asian and Pacific region can and must actively join in the general world process aimed at preventing a thermonuclear catastrophe. That is why the Soviet Union's appeal is so topical: to act together to seek ways toward the consolidation of peace, security, and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin. The peoples of this part of the world are interested in a coordinated approach toward regional problems. The Soviet Union proposes seeking a settlement of vexed questions through bilateral and multilateral consultations, strengthening mutual trust, and gradually creating the preconditions for holding a pan-Asian forum of the same type as the Helsinki conference to jointly engage in the search for constructive solutions.

The opponents of this idea claim the security formula elaborated in Europe is inapplicable to Asia. Of course, the specific features of the Asian and Pacific region cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the USSR has absolutely no desire to impose a ready-made formula for pan-Asian security on other states but calls on them to take part together in its elaboration. As the fruit of joint efforts, this formula should be acceptable to all and reflect each state's interests. It is a case not of the

mechanical transfer of European experience onto Asian soil but of considering Helsinki in giving practical embodiment to the principles once elaborated by the peoples of Asia themselves.

The concept of pan-Asian security does not come from the air. As the Indian prime minister has said, the principles of "Panch Shila," Bandung, and nonalignment to which the CPSU Central Committee general secretary referred in his speech in Vladivostok create the theoretical and political framework for analyzing the complex and unique problems of peace and stability in the Asian and Pacific region.

The Soviet-Indian summit talks in Delhi lent powerful impetus to the positive processes in Asia. Through the force of their example the USSR and India are promoting the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence, impeding the tendencies leading to nuclear catastrophe, and demonstrating the real possibility of opposing imperial ambitions and militarist diktat. The Delhi Declaration signed by the two countries' leaders embodies a graphic example of new political thinking.

A world free from nuclear weapons and violence, the Delhi Declaration says, requires specific and urgent measures. It is essential to totally destroy nuclear arsenals before the end of this century, to prevent any weapons from being put into space, to ban nuclear tests and the creation of new weapons of mass annihilation, to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles, and to lower the level of conventional armaments and armed forces.

It is not hard to see these aims coincide with the main provisions of the program for a nuclear-free world put forward in the 15 January statement accord with the idea of creating an all-embracing system of international security. The implementation of these Soviet initiatives and the realization of the principles of the Delhi Declaration would normalize the situation in the Asian and Pacific region. [paragraph continues]

Against the background of the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons it would also be possible to ensure the interest of the security of states which do not possess them. They would officially proclaim their adherence to the three nonnuclear principles: not to have or produce nuclear weapons or import them onto their territory. The nuclear powers would pledge on the basis of international law not to use nuclear weapons against the countries and regions of that part of the world which observe nuclear-free status.

With an agreement on the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century it would be immeasurably easier to agree also on other measures to strengthen peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region. If a nuclear-free world were to become a general political guideline, favorable preconditions would take shape for eliminating foreign military bases on the territories of the Asian states and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins.

The elaboration of the concept of pan-Asian security on the basis of nuclear disarmament is a long-term task which has to be resolved stage by stage, moving from the simple to the complex. Yet even the longest journey begins with the first step. In addition the development of the pan-Asian process is now favored by factors like the growth of the authority and positive role of the Nonaligned Movement, the upsurge in antimilitary, antinuclear feelings, the activation of the struggle for a new international economic order, and the marked improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

"The CPSU," its program states, "advocates the pooling of the efforts of all interested states with a view to ensuring security in Asia and their joint quest for the constructive solution of this problem."

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: HONECKER, NAKASONE DISCUSS ARMS ISSUES IN BERLIN

Militarization of Space

LD131819 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Berlin January 13 TASS -- Talks between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker and Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, on an official visit in the GDR, were held here today.

Upholding and consolidating peace is the GDR's most important task now, the GDR leader said. There will be neither victors nor vanquished in the event of nuclear war. So this catastrophe must not be allowed, in the same way as no one should be allowed to be striving for the achievement of the military-strategic superiority. Nations ought to learn to coexist peacefully, since there is no reasonable alternative to this. The militarization of space presupposed by the U.S. "Star Wars" programme would mean the stepping up of the arms race to huge proportions and would simultaneously preclude any opportunity of getting it under control.

Erich Honecker insistently declared in favour of the United States joining in the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and strictly observing the existing treaties on arms limitation, including the SALT-2 treaty. The proposals advanced by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik suit the interests of entire humanity. The Reykjavik meeting again extended to peoples the hope for possibility of nuclear disarmament. This historic chance should be used, he said.

Supporting Erich Honecker's statement on the need for a political dialogue in the interests of peace and detente, Yasuhiro Nakasone said that it is important for Japan to conduct a dialogue with states with different social systems, striving for concrete results.

Touching upon the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit, Japan's prime minister described it as a historic event. He positively assessed Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals and emphasized that because of the difference in the stands about SDI results were not achieved. He expressed the hope that the great powers can achieve agreement which is possible. Japan and the GDR which have no nuclear weapons must support the efforts of the sides, Yasuhiro Nakasone said.

Asian Security

LD132114 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Berlin January 13 TASS -- The Soviet Union's initiative for ridding the globe of all kinds of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries for a reduction of conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals mean a comprehensive peace programme, said general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist State Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker. Speaking today at a reception in honour of Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, on an official visit here, Erich Honecker emphasized that the GDR welcomes and supports the initiative Mikhail Gorbachev advanced in Vladivostok and all other proposals for the ensurance of security and peaceful cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

These constructive realistic ideas mean an important impetus to all who are striving for peaceful relations and fruitful cooperation in the area.

Speaking in reply, Japan's Prime Minister said that the demand of the time now is to be developing a political dialogue, contacts and talks with a view to achieving a turn from the arms race to disarmament, detente and cooperation. The constructive efforts of all states for the sake of world security are now needed as never before, he said.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: NORWEGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON SDI, TESTING, INF, NFZ

LD092334 Moscow TASS in English 2309 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Text] Oslo January 10 TASS -- Norway is opposed to the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" aimed at the development and deployment of space arms systems banned by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

This was stated by Johan Jorgen Holst, minister of defense of Norway. He addressed the trainees of the Military Academy of the Norwegian Armed Forces.

Expounding the position of his country's government on main disarmament problems, he pointed out that Norway supported the proposals on a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms and also on a complete withdrawal from Europe of medium-range missiles with a simultaneous reduction in tactical nuclear weapons.

Holste also came out in favor of the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and of a nuclear-free zone in Nordic Europe.

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